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1. Introduction1
“On the one hand, we want to benefit from cheating, while on the other, we want
to be able to view ourselves as honest, honorable people. This is where our amazing
cognitive flexibility comes into play: As long as we cheat by only a little bit, we can
secure the benefits and still view ourselves as marvelous human beings.”
Dan Ariely (Behavioral Economist)
1.1. Motivation
For many companies, the challenge to manage the internal supply chain from sourcing to serving
the end customer is growing (PwC, 2015). On the one hand, customer needs are now more
sophisticated and volatile than ever. On the other hand, operations networks are becoming
more global and complex in structure. A recent analysis by McKinsey & Company shows that
organizations are becoming more mature in managing their supply chains, which is reflected
in decreasing and converging high-level supply chain benchmarks, such as overall fill rates and
supply chain costs (Karlsson et al., 2017). However, when taking a more granular look, the
performance along individual dimensions, such as demand forecasting, is still heterogeneous.
For example, among consumer goods companies with similar levels of demand volatility, the
1 This thesis is an extended version of Scheele et al. (2017), which is joint work with Ulrich Thonemann and
Marco Slikker. It benefited from the comments of four anonymous referees and the editors of Management
Science. Preliminary research results have been presented at the following conferences: Behavioral Opera-
tions Management Conference (Washington, D.C., 2012), INFORMS Annual Meeting (Phoenix, AZ, 2012),
European Conference on Operational Research (Rome, 2013), MSOM SCM SIG Conference (Seattle, WA,
2014). An earlier working paper version was awarded the 2014 INFORMS Behavioral Operations Man-
agement Best Working Paper Award and was presented in the finalists session at the INFORMS Annual
Meeting (San Francisco, CA, 2014).
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gap in forecast accuracy between median and top-quartile firms is still at 17 pp (Karlsson et al.,
2017).
The demand forecast is a major input factor in the internal planning process, which ranges
from inventory management and production planning to sourcing decisions. The operational
performance of a company depends to a large extent on how well it matches supply and
demand. Achieving a good match requires accurate information to be available to the decision
maker who is in charge of the supply decision. At many companies, different departments
are responsible for collecting demand information and making production or order decisions
(e.g., Shapiro, 1977; Eliashberg and Steinberg, 1993; Balasubramanian and Bhardwaj, 2004;
Oliva and Watson, 2009; O¨zer and Uncu, 2013). Typically, a sales or marketing division (Sales)
collects demand information and creates a demand forecast, which is then used by an operations
division (Operations) to make a production or order decision. The rationale behind this task
allocation is that Sales is close to the customer and has good information about future demand,
while Operations has good information about the effect that production and order decisions
have on cost. If the incentive system of Sales is not properly designed, the demand forecast
could be biased, which means that Operations would receive inaccurate demand information
and consequently make suboptimal decisions (Chen, 2005; Lawrence and O’Connor, 2005; O¨zer
et al., 2011).
Figure 1.1 shows an example of biased forecasts at a global pharmaceutical company. The
graphs show the demand forecasts that were produced three months in advance and the actual
monthly demand for four products over a period of 48 months. Most demand forecasts are
greater than the actual demand, with an average demand forecast inflation of 16.2 %. Further
analyses revealed that Sales personnel expect production quantities to increase in their demand
forecasts. Higher production quantities increase the availability of products, which results in
increased sales and sales bonuses. It is therefore not surprising that Sales has a tendency
to inflate demand forecasts. Note, however, that the demand forecasts and demands are
correlated, and the inflation is moderate. This implies that actual forecasts contain information
about future demands, as opposed to the predictions of an economic model with expected-
payoff-maximizing decision makers, which predicts that forecasts are entirely uninformative
2
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(see Theorem 1 in O¨zer et al. (2011) and Theorem 1 in Section 3.2). As O¨zer et al. (2011)
show in an inter-firm setting, this effect can be explained by a human desire to trust and be
trustworthy, which is further promoted in long-term relationships. One could expect similar
factors to influence forecast information sharing within a firm. However, as the data of O¨zer
et al. (2011) and Figure 1.1 suggest, these factors are not sufficient to remove biases from sales
forecasts.
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Figure 1.1.: Monthly forecasts and actual demand of example products (in thousand units)
Inspired by the example above, the objective of our research is to design incentive systems
for Sales that lead to truthful demand forecasts. The economics literature has analyzed in-
centive systems and has shown that monetary incentives play an important role in motivating
individuals (e.g., Prendergast, 1999; Lazear, 2000; Gibbons, 2005). Properly designed incentive
systems can further foster cross-functional collaboration (Ellinger, 2000) and improve supply
chain performance (Cohen et al., 2007). However, incentive system designers are faced with
certain challenges, such as choosing the right set of performance indicators (Kerr, 1975) and
predicting how human decision makers react to incentives (Fehr and Falk, 2002; Camerer and
Loewenstein, 2004). We address these issues in our analyses and the design of incentive systems
for truthful forecast information sharing within a firm.
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1.2. Context and Contribution
There exists a rich body of operations management (OM) literature on supply chain coordina-
tion. One branch of research in this field investigates how the actions of a supply chain dyad
can be aligned if information is distributed asymmetrically, i.e., if one actor is in possession of
information that the other actor needs to make an informed decision. Empirical investigations
in the semiconductor industry have shown, for example, that a downstream buyer who has su-
perior access to market information uses this advantage to manipulate the production decisions
of the upstream supplier (Cohen et al., 2003; Terwiesch et al., 2005). In contrast, it has been
shown that sharing sales and market information truthfully across organizational boundaries
can significantly improve the operational performance of the supply chain (e.g., Gaur et al.,
2005; Cui et al., 2015).
The focus of earlier publications was to design contracts that provide incentives for the better
informed party to reveal its private information truthfully to the uninformed party (Cachon,
2003). In many cases, these contracts require the better informed actor to “put his money
where his mouth is,” i.e., to send a costly signal that credibly conveys the private information
(Chen, 2003, p. 342). Alternatively, the uninformed party can try to motivate the informed
actor to release its information, such as by offering a menu of contracts. Both approaches
are used in the analyses of coordination mechanisms for truthful forecast information sharing.
For example, Cachon and Larivie`re (2001) study how a manufacturer can credibly signal high
demand to a supplier through an upfront payment to reserve capacity. O¨zer and Wei (2006)
compare capacity reservation and advance purchase contracts in a supplier-manufacturer rela-
tionship and derive conditions under which both types of contracts reveal the private demand
information of the manufacturer. Various extensions of the problem and alternative contract
forms have been analyzed (e.g., Mishra et al., 2007; Li and Zhang, 2008; Shin and Tunca, 2010;
Gu¨mu¨s¸, 2014; Chen et al., 2016). Besides the use of formal contracts, repeated interactions
between supply chain partners can support truthful forecast information sharing because the
uninformed party can use review strategies to detect and punish untruthful behavior (Ren
et al., 2010).
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While the general structure of the problem is similar, few publications have analyzed the
issue of truthful forecast information sharing within a firm. In contrast to inter-firm informa-
tion exchange, a different set of mechanisms is available to coordinate the actions of decision
makers who belong to the same organization. In particular, performance-based incentive sys-
tems, such as the ones that we consider, allow for enforceable ways of “contracting” between
different departments. Research in Marketing and in OM has addressed the question of how to
incentivize Sales to provide accurate forecasts. Among the first to approach this problem, Go-
nik (1978) describes a sales incentive system, which ties the bonuses of sales personnel to their
forecasts. In essence, bonus payments under the Gonik scheme are piecewise linear functions
of revenues, where the self-selected forecast determines the kink in the function. By adjusting
the parameters of this incentive plan, a rational sales agent can be incentivized to provide
an accurate estimate of demand, which simultaneously serves as a sales target (Mantrala and
Raman, 1990). Alternatively, Sales can be offered a menu of linear contracts to elicit private
knowledge about the market and be motivated to exert sales effort (Chen, 2005; Chen et al.,
2016). Celikbas et al. (1999) present a model where Sales is penalized for overforecasting and
Operations is penalized for understocking. Assuming that the demand forecast of Sales is used
as an upper bound in the production decision of Operations, they find that the parameters of
such an incentive system can be set such that demand forecasts and production quantities are
coordinated.
The traditional OM approach to problems of inter- and intra-firm forecast information shar-
ing builds upon the assumption of rational decision makers who maximize their own payoffs.
This assumption has been relaxed in a growing stream of behavioral research on these topics. In
their study of forecast information sharing under wholesale price contracts, O¨zer et al. (2011)
show that trust and trustworthiness between a supplier and a manufacturer can explain why
forecasts are considerably more truthful than expected under rational decision-making assump-
tions. Their experimental data indicates that the degree of trust depends on environmental
factors, such as the cost of capacity, the level of demand uncertainty, and the cultural back-
ground (O¨zer et al., 2011, 2014). Furthermore, trust and trustworthiness seem to be affected
by the type of information that an informed supply chain partner communicates: Offering
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information that enables the uninformed party to make a decision generates higher trust than
offering advice or even making the decision on behalf of the uninformed party (O¨zer et al.,
2017). For situations where the upstream party is better informed, Beer et al. (2017) inves-
tigate both theoretically and experimentally if a supplier can signal its trustworthiness to a
buyer through pre-contractual investments. They find that the prices paid by the buyer, the
quality delivered by the supplier, and ultimately the overall supply chain profit are higher if a
supplier invests in the upfront signal. For situations where two firms in a supply chain dyad
receive different demand information, the experimental data of Hyndman et al. (2013) suggests
that pre-play communication can help them to align their capacity decisions even if the infor-
mation exchange is nonbinding. Ebrahim-Khanjari et al. (2012) develop a model that captures
the social characteristics of a salesperson (e.g., selfishness and loyalty) and derive theoretically
how these characteristics influence the degree of trust of a retailer in the salesperson’s forecast.
In situations where a supplier intends to design a menu of contracts but does not know the
holding cost of a buyer, the model of Voigt and Inderfurth (2012) and the experimental data of
Inderfurth et al. (2013) suggest that a holding cost signal can convey credible information and
hence improve supply chain performance only if the trustworthiness of the buyer and the trust
of the supplier are well aligned. They also find that there are situations of insufficient trust
and underreporting of the cost position, where communication harms the supply chain. O¨zer
and Zheng (2017) synthesize the existing knowledge of the role of trust and trustworthiness in
supply chain information sharing.
Our research builds on the work of O¨zer et al. (2011, 2014). We extend their model by
transferring it to an intra-firm context and adding forecast error penalties to the payoff function
of the informed party (Sales). Our theoretical and empirical findings contribute to the existing
literature on forecast information sharing in several ways: First, we provide robustness to the
finding that Sales is more trustworthy than predicted by expected-profit-maximizing behavior
even in the absence of formal incentives and that Operations anticipates this trustworthiness
when receiving the demand signal. We support this finding empirically with experimental
data and insights from a case study. Second, we show how forecast-based incentives influence
the forecast decision of Sales and subsequently the order decision of Operations. Third, by
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combining these insights, we derive conditions for Sales incentive schemes that enable truthful
forecast information sharing.
Research on behavioral OM has evolved significantly over the last two decades (reviews are
provided in Gino and Pisano, 2008; Bendoly et al., 2010). One stream of research in this field
focuses on individual decision biases, typically in newsvendor-type situations (e.g., Schweitzer
and Cachon, 2000; Bostian et al., 2008; Ho and Zhang, 2008; Katok and Wu, 2009; Ho et al.,
2010; Becker-Peth et al., 2013; Kremer et al., 2014; Zhang et al., 2016). Another stream of re-
search analyzes the behavioral drivers of strategic, interactive decision making in supply chains.
Besides trust and trustworthiness, supporting elements of cooperation also include concerns
for fairness (Cui et al., 2007; Katok and Pavlov, 2013; Katok et al., 2014; Ho et al., 2014)
and the existence of personal relationships (Loch and Wu, 2008). An inherent characteristic
of research in behavioral OM is the combination of different research methods (Croson et al.,
2013). A well-established method for discovering human decision biases and social preferences
in supply chain interactions is controlled laboratory experiments (Katok, 2011). In this thesis,
we combine the classical approach of model building with results of laboratory experiments.
More specifically, we build a model based on previous research and behavioral theory and use
experimental data to estimate the behavioral parameters of our model. We show that our
results are robust by conducting an out-of-sample validation experiment and provide evidence
that the main insights remain valid under repeated interaction. In the field of OM, there has
furthermore long been a call for more case and field research to complement the traditional
methods of modeling, optimization and simulation (e.g., Meredith, 1998; Fisher, 2007; Barratt
et al., 2011). We follow this call and complement the theoretical and experimental approach
by a case study that investigates the use of forecast-based incentives in practice. We hence
contribute methodologically to the growing body of behavioral OM research by using a multi-
method approach of formal modeling, human-subject experiments and field research to develop
and test sales incentive schemes for truthful forecast information sharing.
Our results have important implications. They show that firms can incentivize truthful
forecast information sharing by including a forecast-based component in the incentive system
of Sales. Our analyses indicate that behavioral factors play an important role in decision
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making. Taking these factors into account is crucial for predicting and influencing human
forecasting behavior.
1.3. Outline
In the following, we briefly outline the structure of the thesis. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 contain
the main results of our research – each with a different methodical focus. Chapter 5 serves to
provide further robustness to the previous results.
Chapter 2 contains a case study of a global pharmaceutical company, which motivated the
theoretical and experimental research of the following chapters. We characterize the initial
situation at the company, describe the process of introducing forecast accuracy incentives into
the target agreements of product managers at a local sales unit, and report the quantitative
and qualitative results of this pilot project.
In Chapter 3, we develop a game-theoretic model that describes the forecast exchange be-
tween Sales and Operations. We specify the sequence of events and develop utility functions
based on behavioral theory for both parties. We define three different types of incentive sys-
tems for Sales, all of which include a bonus for sales but differ in the way they penalize forecast
errors. We present a solution concept for the signaling game that we consider and derive
Pareto-dominant separating equilibria for the forecasting behavior of Sales and the ordering
behavior of Operations. Based on the theoretical results we develop a set of hypotheses.
Chapter 4 reports the results of laboratory experiments that test how well our model explains
the behavior of actual decision makers. We first describe the design of our main experiment,
address the laboratory protocol, and discuss the results of the experiment. Based on the
experimental data, we then estimate the behavioral parameters of our model and test the
hypotheses. We use the insights of the main experiment to define a new set of treatments that
we test in a validation experiment with a new group of subjects. We show that close-to-truthful
information sharing can be achieved by our approach.
Chapter 5 summarizes various analyses in support of the results of Chapters 3 and 4. We
first take a look at alternative models that relax the assumption of Bayesian belief updating
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and test different reference points in the valuation of the forecast error penalties. We then
report the results of additional experiments, where we replace the human Operations player
with a computer and let subjects play the forecasting game repeatedly with the same player
instead of different players. We conclude the chapter with a set of supporting analyses based on
the data of the main experiment. These include regressions to identify time and order effects,
treatment-specific parameter estimations, measures to ensure the overall understanding of the
experiment, and an analysis of subjects’ risk attitudes.
We conclude our work in Chapter 6. Besides summarizing our main results, we lay out how
these results can be used to guide the design of sales incentive systems in practice. We also
address the limitations of our research and provide directions for future research.
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at a Pharmaceutical Company
In order to address our research question of whether and how properly designed incentive sys-
tems can remedy systematic biases in sales forecasts, we conducted field research at a Western
European pharmaceutical company (hereinafter called PharmaCo), which ranks among the top
20 global players in the industry with net sales of over EUR 10 billion and more than 40,000
employees worldwide. We use this case study to motivate our research question and to contex-
tualize the theoretical and experimental research that we conduct. Our field research follows a
mixed methods design, combining both quantitative and qualitative methods of analysis (e.g.,
Yin, 2009; Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004). Information was collected from 2009 to 2010. We
conducted 14 semi-structured interviews with representatives from different functional areas
in six different countries. We also participated in three workshops where representatives from
local sales organizations and global supply chain management functions discussed the matter
of forecast accuracy and the potential effects of incentive-based interventions. These field ob-
servations were complemented by information from a range of documents, such as standard
operating procedures, organization charts and internal survey data that the company made
available for the purpose of our research. In addition, we had access to a global database of
forecast and sales data, which we used for quantitative analyses.
We will next describe the organization, forecasting process and forecasting performance at
the company at the beginning of our field research (Section 2.1). We will then present the
setup (Section 2.2) and results (Section 2.3) of the pilot project.
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2.1. Initial Situation
Over the last decade, operational topics such as forecasting and planning processes have become
increasingly important in the pharmaceutical industry (e.g., Ebel et al., 2013). Since sales
margins used to be high and reputation risks immanent, high service levels had been the
major objective for many years. Meanwhile, however, increasing price pressure due to health
care reforms and declining research efficiency were forcing the industry to become more cost
competitive. This transition from a mainly sales-focused to a cost-conscious organization
enabled us to accompany the introduction of forecast accuracy incentives in a pilot project
at PharmaCo.
The product portfolio of PharmaCo was split into two segments. One segment consisted of
pharmaceutical products that a physician must prescribe to a patient (prescription medicines).
The other segment involved products that were sold through pharmacies without prescription
(consumer products). The market for prescription medicines was relatively stable. Except for
effects caused by product lifecycle-related variations (e.g., during the launch phase and when
a product loses its exclusivity) or exceptional disruptions, such as regulatory interventions, de-
mand was generally driven by well-predictable patient populations and the share of prescribing
doctors. The demand for consumer products was more volatile as it was subject to the listing
decisions of pharmacies and consumer preferences.
PharmaCo was organized into two types of business units: sales units and production units
(see Figure 2.1). Sales units had the primary purpose of marketing and selling products to
a local or regional market. Within a sales unit, products were assigned to individual prod-
uct managers, who were responsible for creating monthly demand forecasts for their products.
Production units produced active pharmaceutical ingredients, bulk ware or finished goods and
supplied the latter to the global network of sales units. PharmaCo planned and produced en-
tirely to stock. The organizational interface between both units were demand managers on the
part of the sales units and supply managers on the part of the production units. Demand man-
agers collected forecasts from local product managers, translated them into net requirements
and communicated these to the supply managers in the relevant production units. Supply man-
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agers aggregated the net requirements from all sales units and generated production plans.
Sales unit Production unit
Sales unit
Demand forecast
 Markets and 
sells products 
to a local or 
regional market
 Responsible for 
producing a 
monthly 
demand 
forecast
Product 
management
 Collects 
forecasts and 
manages 
inventories
 Responsible for 
providing a 
reliable net 
requirements 
plan
Demand 
management
 Collects and 
aggregates net 
requirements 
from sales units
 Responsible for 
planning 
production 
according to an 
agreed service 
level 
Supply 
management
 Produces 
according to 
production 
plans
 Responsible for 
producing and 
shipping 
finished 
products on 
time
Production and 
logistics
Net requirements Production plan
Finished product
Figure 2.1.: Simplified organization and planning process at PharmaCo
Sales forecasts were made three months in advance and were updated once a month. The
forecasts were discussed in monthly consensus meetings between product managers and demand
managers. While product managers prepared and presented the forecasts, demand managers
challenged the underlying assumptions. In case of disagreement, product managers had the
decision right.
The forecast performance at PharmaCo was measured by means of a forecast accuracy
metric. The forecast accuracy of a particular stock keeping unit (SKU) was measured as the
absolute relative deviation between the forecast and actual sales
FCAit = max
(
1−
∣∣∣∣ASit − FCitASit
∣∣∣∣ , 0) , (2.1)
where ASit were actual unit sales of SKU i in month t and FCit was the unit sales forecast
for SKU i in month t that had been made three months in advance. For an aggregate view
across multiple SKUs, PharmaCo used a non-weighted average of the individual values.
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As shown by the example in Figure 1.1, demand forecasts at PharmaCo were systematically
biased at the time of our investigation. The forecast accuracy differed considerably between
the sales units and individual product managers. Figure 2.2 shows that the average forecast
accuracy across all sales units was 67 % in prescription medicines and 58 % in consumer prod-
ucts in 2009. Comparing the average forecast accuracy to that of the top five sales units in
each segment indicated a considerable room for improvement.
Sequence of events
+7-19 pp
74-86%
Top FiveAverage
67%
Top Five
58%
Average
70-75%
+12-17 pp
Prescription medicines Consumer products
Jan 2008 Jan 2009 Jan 2010 Dec 2010
Announce-
ment
Implemen-
tation
July 2009July 2008
Pre-announcement
phase 
(12 months)
Planning 
phase
(6 months)
Post-implementation
phase
(12 months)
Figure 2.2.: Forecast accuracy at PharmaCo
The forecast bias was not tracked at PharmaCo at the time of our investigation. We measured
the bias as the share of inflated forecasts, i.e., forecasts that were greater than actual demand.
If forecasts are unbiased, the expected value of this measure is 50 %. Values above 50 %
indicate a tendency for overforecasting. Values below indicate a tendency for underforecasting.
At the beginning of our research, the average forecast bias across all sales units was 58 % in
both segments, prescription medicines and consumer products. A more fine-granular analysis
revealed that the forecast bias was significantly greater than 50 % in nearly half of all sales
units (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p < 0.05).
An internal survey at PharmaCo revealed that half of the demand managers in the sales
units where not satisfied with the forecast accuracy. 70 % of them believed that the low fore-
cast accuracy was due to a lack of motivation and the wrong incentives. Only 30 % believed
that the poor performance was due to a lack of skills. Our interviews supported these re-
sults. Product managers prioritized their sales targets over a good forecast performance. The
forecast for a particular month was made three months in advance, often without taking into
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account marketing campaigns or other unusual demand patterns. Product managers took any
opportunity to increase sales, for example, by means of a marketing campaign, and relied on
sufficient safety stock to cover the peak.
“At the moment, we have a huge campaign on [product name]. I know the forecast
process is key, but at the end of the day I want to push sales and add to the bottom
line of the company – even if this hurts my forecast accuracy.”
(Product manager, consumer products, South American sales unit)
Demand managers reported that product managers often submitted overly optimistic forecasts
to ensure sufficient supply and safety stocks. To some extent, demand managers could react
to inflated forecasts by temporarily building up more inventory than planned. However, if the
forecast inflation was too high, they had to cancel orders, which in turn disrupted production
plans or led to excess stock at the plants.
“The only thing they [product managers] experience is running out of stock if the
forecast was too low. To overcome this problem, they report high forecasts. They
always plan with buffers in their forecasts. If the forecast accuracy is 70–80 %, we
can handle it, but sometimes it is much worse. In the end, we [demand managers]
have to cancel orders.”
(Demand manager, Eastern European sales unit)
Next to the low forecast accuracy, demand managers were especially frustrated by the lack of
effort and cooperation on the part of product management.
“For us, accurate forecasts are the basis of our job and we think it is the responsibility
of product managers to improve the forecast. But in the end, they seem to have
other objectives. Forecasting is not one of their priorities, even though it should be.
Sometimes they don’t come to the consensus meetings. There is always an excuse.”
(Demand manager, Western European sales unit)
Some demand managers even felt that they could develop a better forecast than product
managers.
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“I tell you one thing: We can do it much better than them [product managers]. We
have tracked this over the last months. Our forecasts were better than those made
by product managers. But the problem is, if we did the forecast, they would blame
every shortage of supply on us.”
(Demand manager, Western European sales unit)
While demand and supply managers were not allowed to modify the forecast, they would,
however, adapt the net requirements to avoid excessive stock and potential destruction due to
expired shelf life times.
“The forecast is a holy thing. We cannot change it. But if we mistrust the forecast,
we adjust the net requirements and the stocks together with the demand managers.”
(Head of supply management, Southern European production unit)
Overall, there seemed to be a lot of tension between the different functional areas. To un-
derstand this conflict of interest in more detail, we analyzed the incentive systems of product
managers and demand managers. Figure 2.3 depicts the share of different objectives in the
variable compensation (end-of-year bonus payment) of product managers and demand man-
agers in the European country where we conducted the pilot project. The incentive systems
of other countries were similar. Next to individual qualitative objectives (such as the comple-
tion of a certain project) and participation in the overall company profit, both divisions were
incentivized by a set of performance indicators that were related to their respective core func-
tions. The incentive system of product managers contained a bonus for revenues and market
shares, but did not contain any operational objectives, such as forecast quality. Demand man-
agers were incentivized to optimize stock levels, keep requirements plans stable and achieve
the agreed service levels. This clear division of objectives seemed to be one of the reasons be-
hind the silo mentality that we encountered in the interviews and the resulting unsatisfactory
forecast quality.
One idea to improve the collaboration between product and demand managers at PharmaCo
was to make product managers accountable for forecast accuracy by including corresponding
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Figure 2.3.: Incentive system at PharmaCo
objectives in their target agreements and linking them to their variable compensation. We will
next describe how this idea was tested in a local pilot project.
2.2. Introduction of Forecast Accuracy Incentives
The pilot project was implemented in a major European country that comprised both a sales
unit and a production unit. The head of product management and the heads of demand
and supply management were involved from the beginning of the project. Figure 2.4 shows
the timeline of the project. The initiative was announced in July 2009. In the following six
months, a project team developed a formal “inventory policy,” which explained the relationship
between inventories and service levels and highlighted the importance of ccurate forecasts.
The policy defined how forecast accuracy was measured and that forecast accuracy targets
should be included in the incentive systems of product managers. To increase the acceptance
of the proposed changes in product management, the policy did not specify at which weight
or percentage to include forecast accuracy in the target agreements. This decision was left to
the heads of product management and their team leaders. In December 2009, all stakeholders
signed the inventory policy and it became effective in January 2010.
In response to the new policy, the incentive systems in product management were changed.
Figure 2.5 shows an example of the product management team of a major product group
in prescription medicines. The changes in the other product groups and in the segment of
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Figure 2.4.: Timeline of the pilot project
consumer products were similar. Compared to the previous situation (see Figure 2.3), the
share of qualitative objectives of product managers and their team leaders was reduced and a
forecast accuracy target was added with 6 % and 4 % weights respectively. The incentive system
of the head of product management did not change. Note, however, that the overall financial
impact of the forecast accuracy incentive was comparably low. For example, the variable
compensation of a product manager was 12 % of the total annual salary, which corresponds
approximately to one and a half months of salary. Of that part, only 6 % was linked to the
forecast accuracy target.
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Figure 2.5.: New incentive system of product management
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2.3. Results
Figures 2.6 and 2.7 show how the forecast accuracy and forecast bias developed in the pilot sales
unit. We analyze forecasts that were made in the 12 months before the project was announced
(Pre), forecasts that were made in the planning phase (Plan), and forecasts that were made
in the 12 months after implementation (Post). Note that the length of the pre-announcement
phase and post-implementation phase are comparable because they both cover a whole year.
The aggregate data of the planning phase must be interpreted with caution because it might
be distorted by seasonal effects.
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Figure 2.6.: Development of forecast accuracy in pilot sales unit
The average forecast accuracy was 71.0 % in prescription medicines and 55.2 % in consumer
products before the forecast incentive project was announced. In prescription medicines, the
forecast accuracy improved only by a small degree to a value of 72.2 % with the change in
incentives. The difference to the baseline value is weakly significant (Wilcoxon signed-rank
test, p = 0.059). A random effects generalized least squares (GLS) regression of the forecast
accuracy (FCA) on dummy variables of two out of three project phases (PLAN and POST )
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indicates a slightly greater improvement. We formulate the regression function as follows:
FCAit = Intercept + ηPLAN · PLANit + ηPOST · POSTit + vi + uit, (2.2)
where SKUs are indexed by i and months by t. The error term is split into a product-specific
part (vi ∼ N (0, σ2v)) and a part that is independent across all observations (uit ∼ N (0, σ2u)) to
account for the grouped structure of the data. Table 2.1 reports the results. Compared to the
pre-announcement phase, the forecast accuracy improved by 2.9 pp in the post-implementation
phase (z-test, p = 0.015). A possible reason for the limited improvement in forecast accuracy
could be an unexpected governmental decrease of reference prices in the post-implementation
phase. With the announcement of the price adjustment, wholesalers stopped buying until after
the price cut was effective. As a result, demand was shifted between the months of May and
June, which had a negative effect on the forecast accuracy in these two months. We repeat the
above regression, but exclude the data of May and June in both the pre-announcement and
the post-implementation phase. Table 2.1 shows that the forecast accuracy improved by 3.9 pp
after the introduction of the new incentive system and that this effect is highly significant
(z-test, p = 0.003).
Intercept
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ܶ2 (14/3/3)
ܶ3 (12/7/7)
ܶ4 (10/10/1 )
ܶ5 (10/6/4)
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Note: Significance of estimates (ݐ-test): *** ݌ < 0.01, ** ݌ < 0.05, * ݌ < 0.1. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
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ܲܮܣܰ
ܱܲܵܶ
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Note: Significance of estimates (ݖ-test): *** ݌ < 0.01, ** ݌ < 0.05, * ݌ < 0.1. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
0.537
0.052
0.078
***
**
***
(0.022)
(0.022)
(0.018)
0.677
0.004
0.029
***
**
(0.020)
(0.014)
(0.012)
0.674
0.012
0.039
***
***
(0.021)
(0.015)
(0.013)
Full
1,911
76
Excl. May/June
1,657
76
Model
Observations
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Full
1,450
55
Intercept
ܲܮܣܰ
ܱܲܵܶ
Prescription medicines Consumer products
Note: Significance of estimates (ݖ-test): *** ݌ < 0.01, ** ݌ < 0.05, * ݌ < 0.1. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
0.827
-0.367
-0.604
***
**
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**
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Table 2.1.: Estimation results of forecast accuracy by project phase
In consumer products, the forecast accuracy increased significantly from 55.2 % to 62.6 %
after the implementation of the new target agreements (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0.002).
This segment was not affected by the governmental intervention. Table 2.1 reports the results
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of a random effect GLS regression as specified in Equation (2.2). The estimate for the increase
in forecast accuracy between the pre-announcement and post-implementation phase is 7.8 pp
and is highly significantly different from zero (z-test, p < 0.001).
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Figure 2.7.: Development of forecast bias in pilot sales unit
With respect to the forecast bias, the results are visible in both product segments (see Figure
2.7). The average forecast bias in the pre-announcement phase was 58.0 % in prescription
medicines and 68.6 % in consumer products. Both values were significantly greater than 50 %
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p < 0.004). After the new incentives were introduced, the bias
reduced to 52.6 % in prescription medicines and 55.4 % in consumer products. Both values are
significantly smaller than in the pre-announcement phase (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0.044
in prescription medicines and p < 0.001 in consumer products). This analysis is supported by
a random effects logistic regression of the forecast bias (BIAS) on dummy variables of two out
of three project phases (PLAN and POST ):
log
(
P (BIASit = 1)
1− P (BIASit = 1)
)
= Intercept + ηPLAN · PLANit + ηPOST · POSTit + vi, (2.3)
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where SKUs are indexed by i and months by t. P (BIASit = 1) denotes the probability that the
forecast of product i is positively biased in month t. The error term vi captures product-specific
deviations (vi ∼ N (0, σ2v)). Table 2.2 reports the estimated logarithmic odds from which we
can calculate the probability for a positive bias by project phase. In prescription medicines,
the probability of a positive bias was 58.5 % in the pre-announcement phase, which reduced
to 48.2 % in the planning phase (z-test, p = 0.002) and to 52.1 % in the post-implementation
phase (z-test, p = 0.017). The estimates of the reduced dataset excluding the months of May
and June are similar. In consumer products, the probability of a positive bias was 69.6 % in the
pre-announcement phase, which reduced to 61.3 % in the planning phase (z-test, p = 0.016)
and to 55.6 % in the post-implementation phase (z-test, p < 0.001). Hence, even though the
forecast bias was not explicitly incentivized, it was significantly reduced as a result of the
forecast accuracy incentives.
Intercept
߶ (market condition)
߶෠ (forecast)
ܶ2 (14/3/3)
ܶ3 (12/7/7)
ܶ4 (10/10/10)
ܶ5 (10/6/4)
ܶ6 (10/8/2)
ܶ7 (10/10/0)
ܶ8 (10/12/2)
ݐ (period)
ܵܣܨܧ (number of safe choices)
Forecast ߶෠ Quantity ݍVariable
51.781
0.881
-27.102
-33.692
-36.451
-38.128
-48.670
-57.447
-54.941
-0.176
0.557
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
(7.983)
(0.018)
(2.179)
(2.180)
(2.182)
(4.731)
(4.731)
(4.731)
(4.731)
(0.060)
(1.157)
3.247
0.628
13.174
22.559
27.375
30.592
31.605
34.142
34.389
0.051
1.090
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
(5.255)
(0.015)
(2.032)
(2.061)
(2.078)
(3.123)
(3.151)
(3.181)
(3.170)
(0.055)
(0.679)
Note: Significance of estimates (ݐ-test): *** ݌ < 0.01, ** ݌ < 0.05, * ݌ < 0.1. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Intercept
ܲܮܣܰ
ܱܲܵܶ
Prescription medicines Consumer products
Note: Significance of estimates (ݖ-test): *** ݌ < 0.01, ** ݌ < 0.05, * ݌ < 0.1. 
Standard errors ar  reported in parentheses. 
0.537
0.052
0.078
***
**
***
(0.022)
(0.022)
(0.018)
0.677
0.004
0.029
***
**
(0.020)
(0.014)
(0.012)
0.674
0.012
0.039
***
***
(0.021)
(0.015)
(0.013)
Full
1,911
76
Excl. May/June
1,657
76
Model
Ob ervations
Groups
Full
1,450
55
Intercept
ܲܮܣܰ
ܱܲܵܶ
Prescription medicines Consumer products
Note: Significance of estimates (ݖ-test): *** ݌ < 0.01, ** ݌ < 0.05, * ݌ < 0.1. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
0.827
-0.367
-0.604
***
**
***
(0.106)
(0.152)
(0.127)
0.342
-0.413
-0.258
***
***
**
(0.104)
(0.131)
(0.108)
0.328
-0.400
-0.237
***
***
**
(0.106)
(0.135)
(0.118)
Full
1,911
76
Excl. May/June
1,657
76
Model
Observations
Groups
Full
1,450
55
Table 2.2.: Estimation results of forecast bias by project phase
As the above analyses show, the introduction of forecast accuracy incentives in the pilot
country led to improvements in both forecast accuracy and forecast bias. Even though the
monetary incentive was comparably small, not only the quality of the forecasts but also the
overall awareness for the importance of good forecasts increased, as interviews of the post-
implementation phase revealed.
“The weight [on the forecast accuracy target] is still too low. However, for the
break-through moment it was good. For the first time, product managers are con-
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cerned about the quality of their forecasts. We can see that the forecast accuracy is
improving.”
(Head of supply management, pilot country)
“The most important point was to include forecast accuracy in the objectives of
product managers. This showed that it matters.”
(Team leader product management, prescription medicines, pilot country)
In addition, it was made clear that the possibilities for incentivizing forecast accuracy would
always be limited due to the importance of other targets in the incentive systems of product
managers.
“You can never put a lot of weight on forecast accuracy in the variable compensation
of product managers. Their task is to manage a brand, so there will never be a large
bonus payment linked to the forecast accuracy target. But the crucial factor is that
they now have to discuss their achievements with their boss and nobody likes to
present an objective that he did not meet.”
(Head of product management, prescription medicines, pilot country)
The case example illustrates that incentives for forecast accuracy can have a positive effect
on the quality of demand forecasts, even if the monetary impact is comparably small. We
could witness an improvement in forecast accuracy and a reduction in forecast bias. However,
the forecast accuracy is still not at target level and there is still some systematic bias in the
forecasts. Furthermore, there are uncontrollable factors in a single-case field study, which could
have affected the above results. We take the example of PharmaCo therefore as an inspiration
to approach the problem by formal model building and controlled laboratory experiments
in order to increase the reliability of the conclusions. We will next translate the information
exchange between product management and demand management into a game-theoretic model
(Chapter 3) and test it in a series of experiments (Chapter 4).
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3.1. Model Development
We consider a company where Sales is responsible for demand forecasting and Operations is
responsible for ordering. Sales has better information about the market demand than Opera-
tions and provides a demand forecast to Operations. Based on the demand forecast, Operations
decides on the order quantity. We will next describe the demand model and sequence of events
in detail (Section 3.1.1), derive the utility functions of Sales (Section 3.1.2) and Operations
(Section 3.1.3), and consider the perspective of the company (Section 3.1.4).
3.1.1. Demand Model and Sequence of Events
The demand of the product D = Φ +E is stochastic and consists of two components, a market
condition Φ and a symmetric market uncertainty E with mean zero. Sales and Operations both
know the distributions of Φ and E, but only Sales knows the realization of the market condition
φ. The distribution function of the market condition Φ is F (·) and the density function is f(·).
The distribution function of the market uncertainty E is G(·) and the density function is g(·).
The distribution function of demand is the convolution of the market condition and market
uncertainty, i.e., H(·) = F (·) ◦ G(·). All distribution functions are continuous, continuously
differentiable, and supported on R.
The sequence of events is as follows (see Figure 3.1): First, nature draws a realization of the
market condition φ. Sales observes the market condition φ and sends a nonbinding demand
forecast φˆ to Operations. Operations receives the forecast φˆ, updates the belief about the
distribution of the market condition Φ, and orders quantity q. Then, nature draws a realization
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of the market error ε. If the demand d = φ + ε is less than or equal to the order quantity q,
all demand is filled and q− d units are left over (overage quantity). If the demand d is greater
than the order quantity q, q units of the demand are filled and d − q units cannot be filled
(underage quantity). Finally, Sales and Operations receive their compensations.
Sequence of events
Draws
market
condition
Observes
market 
condition
Chooses
forecast
Receives
forecast
Updates 
belief 
Chooses
order 
quantity
Draws
market
error
Receives
compen-
sation
Actor Sequence of events
Nature
Sales
Operations
Receives
compen-
sation
Figure 3.1.: Sequence of events
3.1.2. Utility of Sales
Expected payoff function.
The incentive system of Sales consists of a fixed compensation, a sales bonus, and a forecast
error penalty. The fixed compensation is denoted by CS > 0 and is independent of sales and
demand forecasts. The sales bonus is proportional to the number of units sold and Sales receives
a unit sales bonus of b > 0. The forecast error penalty is proportional to the deviation of the
demand forecast φˆ from the demand realization d. For each unit that the demand forecast φˆ
exceeds the demand realization d, a unit overforecasting penalty of po ≥ 0 is subtracted from
the compensation. For each unit that it falls below the realized demand, a unit underforecasting
penalty of pu ≥ 0 is subtracted. Given market condition φ, the expected payoff of Sales is
ΠS(q, φˆ | φ) = CS + bEEmin(φ+ E, q)− EE
(
po[φˆ− (φ+ E)]+ + pu[(φ+ E)− φˆ]+
)
. (3.1)
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The behavioral OM literature has identified various behavioral factors that affect decision
makers’ utilities. We next present a model that uses two behavioral factors to address important
individual and social preferences and, as we will see, that can explain and predict actual
forecasting and ordering behavior quite well. There are other behavioral aspects that could be
relevant in our setting, some of which can be captured by the factors that we use and others
that require modifications or extensions of the model. We postpone this discussion to Section
5.1.
Forecast error penalty factor.
An expected-payoff-maximizing decision maker is indifferent to the values of the individual
components of the compensation and bases decisions on the total expected payoff (Equation
3.1). However, actual decision makers do not necessarily base decisions on total expected pay-
offs, but might form mental accounts and evaluate elementary outcomes or sets of elementary
outcomes (Thaler, 1985, 1999; Ko˝szegi and Rabin, 2006). If elementary outcomes are segre-
gated, a value is assigned to each elementary outcome and the evaluation of the total outcome
is based on the sum of the values of the elementary outcomes. If elementary outcomes are in-
tegrated, the sum of the elementary outcomes (i.e., the total payoff) is valued. The concept of
mental accounting has proven to be a powerful tool to explain human behavior in OM decisions
(e.g., Ho and Zhang, 2008; Katok and Wu, 2009; Becker-Peth et al., 2013).
Thaler (1985, 1999) uses the value function of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979) to model the evaluation of outcomes. The function assigns value v(x) to an (elementary
or aggregate) outcome x relative to a reference point, where positive and negative deviations
from this reference point have different values. In particular, prospect theory establishes that
“losses loom larger than gains” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, p. 279). The disutility that a
subject experiences from losing is greater than the utility experienced from gaining the same
amount. The nontrivial issue in reference-dependent utility models is defining the reference
point. While some researchers use the status quo, i.e., the endowment at the time of making
a decision (e.g., Kahneman et al., 1990), others suggest that reference points are based on
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expectations (Ko˝szegi and Rabin, 2006), goals (Heath et al., 1999) or other salient pieces of
information (Ockenfels et al., 2015).
For our incentive system of Sales, the elementary outcomes are the fixed compensation,
sales bonus, and forecast error penalties. Whether elementary outcomes are segregated or
integrated in the evaluation process depends on the situation and the frame of the decision
problem (Thaler, 1985). Because theory does not provide clear guidance on how people eval-
uate outcomes in a setting like ours, we conducted a pre-experiment with 48 students at the
University of Cologne using Thaler’s (1985) “who is happier?” approach.
Pre-Experiment Mr. A and Mr. B work for the sales division of a company. At the
beginning of each month, Mr. A and Mr. B must provide a demand forecast for the following
month. At the end of the month, they both receive a fixed compensation and a performance-
based compensation. Last month, Mr. A provided a demand forecast of 1,500 units, demand
was 1,000 units, and 1,000 units were sold. He receives a sales bonus of EUR 100 for the
quantity sold in addition to his regular salary. Mr. B also provided a demand forecast of 1,500
units, demand was 1,000 units, and 1,000 units were sold. He receives a sales bonus of EUR
150 for the quantity sold, minus a penalty of EUR 50 for the deviation between the demand
forecast and actual demand, i.e., Mr. B also receives EUR 100 in addition to his regular salary.
Who is happier? Mr. A (40), Mr. B (1), no difference (7).
Although the total payoffs of Mr. A and Mr. B are the same, 83 % of subjects believe that
Mr. A, who receives only a sales bonus, is happier than Mr. B, who receives both a sales
bonus and a penalty for the forecast error. The result of the pre-experiment is in line with
mental accounting practices where elementary outcomes are segregated, losses are weighted
more heavily than gains and the reference point is zero.
In the more complex incentive system of Sales that we use in our model, Sales might form
different kinds of (expectations-based) reference points. For example, Sales might compare the
forecast decision with alternative possible forecast decisions that result in reference forecast
error penalties. We discuss such alternative reference points in Section 5.1.2 and proceed with
a reference point of zero. We operationalize this reference point using the linear version of the
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value function, v(x) = [x]+ − γ[−x]+, γ ≥ 1, which we apply to the elementary outcomes of
the payoff function (Equation 3.1).
Note that the forecast error-related part of the decision problem of Sales is similar in struc-
ture to the order decision of a newsvendor. One of the biases that has been identified in
newsvendor-type situations is ex-post inventory error minimization, which is proposed as an
explanation for pull-to-center ordering behavior (Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000; Ho et al., 2010;
Kremer et al., 2014). The underlying rationale is that subjects experience a negative utility for
each unit that the order quantity deviates from realized demand. An analogous pattern might
exist for over- and underforecasting. In addition to the monetary forecast error penalties, hu-
man decision makers could feel a negative utility for each unit that the forecast deviates from
realized demand. Following the approach of Schweitzer and Cachon (2000), we could add a
term −ω
∣∣∣φˆ− (φ+ E)∣∣∣ to the payoff function of Sales, where ω is a psychological cost param-
eter for over- and underforecasting, which would increase the unit over- and underforecasting
penalty factors po and pu to po + ω and pu + ω. In our model, we multiply the unit over-
and underforecasting penalty factors po and pu by γ, which has a similar effect as adding ω to
them.
An important difference between the sales bonus payoff stream and the payoffs resulting
from forecast error penalties is not captured by our pre-experiment. This difference goes back
to the findings of Ellsberg (1961), who distinguishes between risk (i.e., uncertainty that can be
represented by measurable probabilities) and ambiguity (i.e., uncertainty with unknown prob-
abilities). For any choice of forecast, Sales can quantify the risk of over- and underforecasting
because the probability distribution of the market error E and hence the probability distribu-
tion of the forecast error are known. With respect to the sales bonus, however, the outcome
depends not only on the distribution of E but is also determined by the decision of Operations.
Since the order decision of Operations is subject to individual beliefs, preferences and biases,
the sales bonus is subject to ambiguity. There exists a large body of theoretical models and
experimental evidence, which shows that most people are ambiguity averse (for a review, see
Camerer and Weber, 1992). The literature suggests that ambiguity aversion is prevalent in
strategic games, where the ambiguity aversion relates to preferences and payoffs, and hence
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the actions of the opponent player (Pulford and Colman, 2007; Eichberger et al., 2008; Kelsey
and le Roux, 2015). Ambiguity aversion can influence decision making in our setting. A higher
valuation of risky payoffs from forecast error penalties compared to ambiguous payoffs from
sales bonus payments would be reflected in a higher behavioral parameter γ.
The discussion indicates that there are multiple theories that suggest a stronger relative
effect of forecast error penalties on the utility of Sales compared to sales bonuses. We do not
differentiate between the individual psychological drivers but rather quantify their combined
effect in the forecast error penalty factor γ.
Lying aversion factor.
Human decisions are affected by concerns about the well-being of others (e.g., Rabin, 1998; Fehr
and Falk, 2002; Cooper and Kagel, 2016). Particularly relevant for our setting is the insight that
people are more trustworthy than standard theory suggests because they experience a disutility
when lying to others (Gneezy, 2005; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Vanberg, 2008; Lundquist
et al., 2009; Hurkens and Kartik, 2009; Erat and Gneezy, 2012; Gneezy et al., 2013; Lo´pez-
Pe´rez and Spiegelman, 2013). There has been extensive discussion in the economics literature
about whether and how lying aversion can be distinguished from other social preferences, such
as fairness and inequity aversion (e.g., Gneezy, 2005) as well as analyses of the underlying
motives for this behavior, such as altruism, guilt aversion or belief-dependent lying aversion
(e.g., Lo´pez-Pe´rez and Spiegelman, 2013). Engaging in these discussions is beyond the scope
of this thesis. Instead, we build on the robust finding that people tend to be more honest in
social interactions than standard theory suggests, even in one-shot interactions like the one
that we consider, where being trustworthy does not “pay” monetarily (Ashraf et al., 2006,
p. 194). This phenomenon has also been observed in supply chain settings, where one party
shares private information that another party needs to make a decision (e.g., O¨zer et al., 2011,
2014; Inderfurth et al., 2013; Beer et al., 2017). To capture the disutility of lying in our setup,
we follow the modeling approach of O¨zer et al. (2011) and include the term −β
∣∣∣φˆ− φ∣∣∣ in the
utility function of Sales. We refer to the factor β ≥ 0 as the lying aversion factor.
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Utility function.
With the above three components, we obtain the utility function of Sales:
US(q, φˆ | φ) = CS+bEEmin(φ+E, q)−γEE
(
po[φˆ− (φ+ E)]+ + pu[(φ+ E)− φˆ]+
)
−β
∣∣∣φˆ− φ∣∣∣ .
(3.2)
We refer to the model with γ = 1 and β = 0 as the standard model and to models with γ > 1
or β > 0 as behavioral models.
In contrast to other models in the literature on sales force incentives (e.g., Albers, 1996), we
have not included an effort parameter in the utility function of Sales for two reasons. First,
in many industry contexts (including the example of PharmaCo in Chapter 2), demand is
comparably stable and can be influenced by means of sales and marketing efforts only in the
long term, whereas production and supply planning is done on a shorter time horizon. Our
model therefore reflects a scenario where Sales has already invested time and effort to shape
demand before the operational forecast is created. Second, our focus is on how behavioral
factors influence the reaction of Sales to different forecast incentive schemes. To separate these
effects from others, we focus on the trade-off between sales volume and forecast accuracy.
Incentive systems.
We consider three types of incentive systems for Sales. All incentive systems use the fixed
compensation CS and the unit sales bonus b, but differ in how they penalize forecast errors.
In a sales-bonus-only incentive system, forecast errors are not penalized (po = pu = 0). This
incentive system corresponds to the initial incentive system at PharmaCo and the one analyzed
by O¨zer et al. (2011). In an absolute forecast error incentive system, the absolute deviation
between demand and forecast is penalized, i.e., over- and underforecasting are penalized at
equal rates (po = pu > 0). Such incentive systems are frequently used in practice (e.g., Reese,
2001; Dershem, 2007; McKenzie, 2011). Even though PharmaCo used a forecast accuracy
measure instead of a forecast error measure, the new incentive system at the pilot sales unit was
similar to an absolute forecast error incentive system because over- and underforecasting were
also penalized at equal rates. In a differentiated forecast error incentive system, overforecasting
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is penalized more heavily than underforecasting (po > pu). Even though this approach has
been suggested in the literature (Gonik, 1978; Mantrala and Raman, 1990; Celikbas et al.,
1999; Chen, 2005; Chen et al., 2016), such incentive systems do not seem to be used in practice
except in rare cases (e.g., Gonik, 1978; Turner et al., 2007). However, as we will see, they can be
more effective and efficient than the other incentive systems to incentivize truthful information
sharing.
3.1.3. Utility of Operations
The incentive system of Operations consists of a fixed compensation and penalties for unfilled
demand and leftovers. The fixed compensation of the incentive system is CO > 0. The penalty
for unfilled demand is proportional to the demand that cannot be filled. For each unit that the
demand d exceeds the order quantity q, a unit underage cost of cu > 0 is subtracted from the
payoff. The penalty for leftovers is proportional to the number of units that are left over after
demand has been filled. For each unit that the order quantity q exceeds the demand d, a unit
overage cost of co > 0 is subtracted from the payoff. Following similar arguments as for the
development of the expected utility function of Sales (see also Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000),
we multiply the expected overage and underage penalties by the behavioral factor γO ≥ 1 and
obtain the following expected utility function of Operations:
UO(q) = CO − γOED
(
co[q −D]+ + cu[D − q]+
)
. (3.3)
If Operations knew the actual market condition φ, the only uncertainty would be the market
uncertainty E and the optimal order quantity would be
qFB(φ) = φ+G−1(α), (3.4)
where α = cu/(cu + co) is the critical ratio of Operations. We refer to q
FB(φ) as the first-best
order quantity. Note that this quantity (as well as all other equilibrium order quantities that
we will analyze later) is independent of γO.
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3.1.4. Company Perspective
While our primary objective is to design incentive systems for truthful forecast information
sharing, we next discuss the conditions under which such incentive systems also maximize the
expected profit of the company. The unit profit margin is m and the unit overage and underage
cost of the company are cCo and c
C
u , respectively. Taking into account that the company has
to pay Sales and Operations their fixed and variable compensations, the expected profit of the
company is
ΠC(q, φˆ) =mED(D)− cCo ED[q −D]+ − cCu ED[D − q]+
−
(
CS + bEDmin(D, q)− ED
(
po[φˆ−D]+ + pu[D − φˆ]+
))
− (CO − ED (co[q −D]+ + cu[D − q]+)) .
(3.5)
We consider situations where the unit overage and underage costs of Operations are aligned
with the objectives of the company (co = κc
C
o and cu = κc
C
u with factor κ > 0) such that the
expected-utility-maximizing solution of Operations qFB maximizes the expected profit of the
company.
The company faces a principal-agent problem, where the agents (Sales and Operations) might
have participation constraints or reservation utilities, such as those resulting from outside op-
tions (e.g., Prendergast, 1999). Let rS and rO denote these reservation utilities. The principal’s
(company’s) objective is to design an incentive system that maximizes the principal’s expected
profit ΠC while meeting the agents’ participation constraints (US ≥ rS and UO ≥ rO).
If we neglect the behavioral factors in the utility functions of Sales and Operations (standard
model), payoffs could be allocated arbitrarily between the company, Sales, and Operations. The
company could maximize its expected profit by calibrating the incentive system such that the
participation constraints are binding (US = rS and UO = rO). It could change the incentive
parameters b, po, pu, co and cu to incentivize first-best order quantities and adapt the fixed
compensations CS and CO to meet the participation constraints. The optimal profit of the
company would be ΠC(q
FB) = mED(D)− cCo ED[qFB −D]+ − cCu ED[D − qFB]+ − rS − rO.
When taking the behavioral factors into account, the valuation of the variable compensation
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elements is different for Sales and Operations than for the company. In that case, incentiviz-
ing first-best order quantities is not necessarily optimal for the company. To illustrate this,
suppose that the participation constraints of Sales and Operations are binding for a given
incentive system that leads to non-first-best order quantities. Suppose further that increasing
the unit forecast error penalties of Sales leads to a change in forecasting behavior that allows
Operations to make a first-best order decision. This change in incentives changes the expected
variable compensation of Sales by ∆ΠS and increases the expected variable compensation of
Operations by ∆ΠO and the expected operational profit of the company by ∆ΠC . In order
to keep the participation constraints satisfied and binding, the company must adapt the fixed
compensations of Sales and Operations, i.e., it must change the fixed compensation of Sales
CS by −γ∆ΠS and decrease the fixed compensation of Operations CO by −γO∆ΠO. Hence,
changing from a non-first-best to a first-best incentive system increases the company’s expected
profit only if the expected increase in the company’s profit ∆ΠC exceeds the additional cost
of the incentive system, i.e., if ∆ΠC > (∆ΠS − γ∆ΠS) + (∆ΠO − γO∆ΠO). To determine
whether implementing such an incentive system is beneficial for the company, one would have
to compute the expected profit of the current and the first-best solution and analyze whether
the inequality is satisfied.
The inequality holds if the changes in the compensations of Sales and Operations are much
smaller than the change in the profit of the company. We consider such situations, and require
that the overage and underage costs of the company (cCo and c
C
u ) be considerably higher
than the variable incentive parameters (b, po, pu, co, cu). This assumption seems reasonable for
real applications. However, if it does not hold, incentivizing first-best order quantities is not
necessarily optimal from a company perspective.
In Section 3.2.2, we will show that different parameterizations of the incentive system of Sales
result in first-best order quantities. Under some parameterizations, Sales distorts the demand
forecast, but Operations is aware of this distortion and corrects the forecast to determine the
actual market condition. Under other parameterizations, Sales reports the demand forecast
truthfully and Operations can rely on the forecast without corrections. We are interested in
identifying incentive systems where the latter case applies, i.e., where forecast information is
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shared truthfully. Such incentive systems are appealing because the sales forecast is often
communicated and used beyond the organizational boundaries of Sales and Operations, where
people might not be aware of the distortion and correction activities. If forecasts are truthful,
they can be used by other departments for planning purposes without causing further biases.
This aspect is not included in the utility and cost functions of our model, but it implies that
an incentive system with first-best order quantities and truthful demand forecasts should be
preferred over one with distorted forecasts.
3.2. Model Analysis
The setting that we consider is a two-stage dynamic game with incomplete information, where
all the parameter values are common knowledge except for the realization of the market con-
dition φ. Because the informed player (Sales) moves first (by sending a demand forecast), our
setting corresponds to a signaling game. We next describe the equilibrium concept that we use
(Section 3.2.1) and then analyze the separating equilibria of the game (Section 3.2.2).
3.2.1. Equilibrium Concept
To solve the signaling game that we consider, we use the concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium
(PBE) (for a formal definition, see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, pp. 324-326). This equilibrium
concept has previously been employed in a similar context by O¨zer et al. (2011). In such an
equilibrium, Sales chooses a demand forecast that maximizes the expected utility of Sales and
takes into account the response strategy of Operations. Operations updates the belief about
the market condition based on Bayes’ rule whenever possible and chooses the order quantity
that maximizes the expected utility of Operations, taking into account the (updated) belief of
the market condition.
Let σS be a signaling strategy of Sales, where σS(φˆ | φ) denotes the probability that Sales
chooses forecast φˆ given a market condition φ
(∫
φˆ σS(φˆ | φ) = 1
)
. Let µ be a belief system of
Operations, where µ(φ | φˆ) represents the belief that the market condition is φ given a demand
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forecast φˆ. Finally, let σO be an ordering strategy of Operations, where σO(q | φˆ) denotes the
probability that Operations chooses quantity q in response to a forecast φˆ
(∫
q σO(q | φˆ) = 1
)
.
A PBE is a set of strategies σS and σO and posterior belief system µ that satisfy the following
conditions:
(i) For all φ, φˆ: σS(φˆ | φ) > 0 if
∫
q
σO(q | φˆ)US(q, φˆ | φ)dq
= max
φˆ′∈R
∫
q
σO(q | φˆ′)US(q, φˆ′ | φ)dq,
(ii) for all q, φˆ: σO(q | φˆ) > 0 if
∫
φ
µ(φ | φˆ)UO(q | φ)dφ = max
q′∈R
∫
φ
µ(φ | φˆ)UO(q′ | φ)dφ,
(iii) for all φ, φˆ: µ(φ | φˆ) = f(φ)σS(φˆ | φ)∫
φ′∈R f(φ
′)σS(φˆ | φ′)dφ′
if
∫
φ′∈R
f(φ′)σS(φˆ | φ′)dφ′ > 0,
otherwise, µ is any probability distribution on R.
Condition (i) states that Sales chooses a demand forecast with positive probability if it
maximizes the expected utility of Sales, taking into account the response strategy of Operations.
Condition (ii) ensures that for any demand forecast sent by Sales, Operations chooses an order
quantity that maximizes the expected utility of Operations, taking into account the (updated)
belief of the market condition. Condition (iii) states that Operations updates the belief about
the market condition based on Bayes’ rule whenever possible.
In the remainder of this thesis, we restrict our analyses to differentiable signaling strategies
(see the discussion in Mailath and von Thadden, 2013). To be more precise, we assume
that signaling strategies are continuous everywhere and differentiable everywhere except for
a countable number of points. For example, we expect that differentiability does not hold at
points where behavior switches from overforecasting to underforecasting or vice versa since the
utility function of Sales is not differentiable at such points.
Various types of equilibria can exist for the signaling game that we analyze (e.g., Sobel, 2009).
In a pooling equilibrium, the demand forecast is uninformative about the market condition
and Operations does not gain any insights beyond the prior belief. In a partially separating
equilibrium, Sales sends with positive probability the same demand forecast for some, but not
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all market conditions, such that Operations can update the prior belief based on the demand
forecast, but cannot distinguish market conditions with certainty. In a separating equilibrium,
Sales sends different demand forecasts for each market condition, which allow Operations to
infer the market condition with certainty. As laid out in Section 3.1.4, it is in the interest of the
company to enable first-best order quantities. Therefore, our focus is on separating equilibria,
where the signaling strategy of Sales is invertible, such that Operations can infer the true
market condition from the demand forecast. In such an equilibrium, the utility function of
Operations UO is strictly concave in the order quantity q and the associated optimal order
quantity is unique (see Proof of Theorem 1 in Appendix A.1). Since the utility function of
Sales US is strictly concave in φˆ for a given q(φˆ), we can limit our attention to pure strategies
of Sales.
We define a separating PBE as the set of an invertible signaling function s∗, a response
function q∗, and posterior belief system µ∗(φ | φˆ) that satisfy the following conditions:
(i) For all φ: s∗(φ) ∈ argmax
φˆ
(
US(q
∗(φˆ), φˆ | φ)
)
,
(ii) for all φˆ: q∗(φˆ) ∈ argmax
q
(∫
φ
µ∗(φ | φˆ)UO(q | φ)dφ
)
,
(iii) for all φ, φˆ: µ∗(φ | φˆ) =

1 for φˆ = s∗(φ),
0 otherwise.
A special case of separating equilibrium is a truth-telling separating equilibrium, where (i)
Sales communicates a truthful demand forecast (s∗(φ) = φ), (ii) Operations determines the
expected-utility-maximizing order quantity based on this demand forecast (q∗(φˆ) = φˆ+G−1(α))
and (iii) Operations believes that Sales reports the market condition truthfully (µ∗(φ | φˆ) = 1,
if φ = φˆ and 0 otherwise). As discussed in Section 3.1.4, we will place particular emphasis on
the analysis of incentive systems that result in truth-telling separating equilibria.
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3.2.2. Analysis of Equilibria
The following theorem describes the conditions under which a Pareto-dominant separating
equilibrium exists. In a Pareto-dominant equilibrium, all the players are at least as well off
as in all the other equilibria and at least one (but not necessarily always the same) player
is strictly better off relative to each of the other equilibria. This definition implies that if a
Pareto-dominant equilibrium exists, it is unique. Since a Pareto-dominant equilibrium is a
focal equilibrium, we cannot be sure but have reason to believe that players coordinate on
this equilibrium (Stamland, 1999; Wang, 2006; Hyndman et al., 2013). All proofs are given in
Appendix A.1.
Theorem 1. If po > (b(1− α)− β)/γ, there exists a Pareto-dominant separating equilibrium
(ssep, qsep, µsep):
(i) For all φ: ssep(φ) = φ+ δsep,
(ii) for all φˆ: qsep(φˆ) = φˆ− δsep +G−1(α),
(iii) for all φ, φˆ: µsep(φ | φˆ) =

1 for φ = φˆ− δsep,
0 otherwise,
with distortion value
δsep =

G−1
(
b(1−α)+γpu−β
γ(pu+po)
)
for po − pu < 2 b(1−α)−βγ ,
0 for 2 b(1−α)−βγ ≤ po − pu ≤ 2 b(1−α)+βγ ,
G−1
(
b(1−α)+γpu+β
γ(pu+po)
)
for po − pu > 2 b(1−α)+βγ .
(3.6)
Otherwise, if po ≤ (b(1− α)− β)/γ, there exists no separating equilibrium.
An important implication of Theorem 1 is that the demand forecast is distorted by a dis-
tortion value δsep that is independent of the market condition φ. Equation (3.6) distinguishes
three cases that depend on the difference between the unit over- and underforecasting penalty.
In the first case, the difference is small and Sales inflates the demand forecast (δsep > 0).
In the second case, the difference is medium and Sales provides a truthful demand forecast
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(δsep = 0). In the third case, the difference is large and Sales deflates the demand forecast
(δsep < 0). In all cases, Operations anticipates the demand forecast distortion of Sales and cor-
rects the forecast such that the order decision is based on the true market condition and hence
qsep = qFB. Since our focus is on truthful forecast information sharing, we are particularly
interested in finding incentive systems that fulfill the condition of the second case. Note that
this condition can be achieved by many different incentive systems. For a given sales bonus
b, for example, all differentiated forecast error incentive systems with po − pu = 2b(1 − α)/γ
lead to truthful information sharing independently of the behavioral parameter β. For β > 0,
truthful information sharing can even be achieved by a range of differences po − pu.
In the proof of Theorem 1, we show that this equilibrium Pareto dominates all other sep-
arating equilibria. In particular, we show that if any other separating equilibrium exists, it
must be based on a signaling strategy s that results in forecasts s(φ) ≥ ssep(φ) for all φ ∈ R
with strict inequality for all φ in some interval I ⊆ R.
We also show that Sales has a unique preferred forecasting strategy spref (φ) = φ + δpref
with distortion value
δpref =

G−1
(
γpu−β
γ(pu+po)
)
for po − pu < −2βγ ,
0 for −2βγ ≤ po − pu ≤ 2βγ ,
G−1
(
γpu+β
γ(pu+po)
)
for po − pu > 2βγ ,
(3.7)
that maximizes the forecast-dependent part of Sales’ utility function
UFCS (φˆ | φ) = −γEE
(
po[φˆ− (φ+ E)]+ + pu[(φ+ E)− φˆ]+
)
− β
∣∣∣φˆ− φ∣∣∣ . (3.8)
Comparing Equations (3.6) and (3.7), it is straightforward to see that for any market con-
dition φ the equilibrium forecast ssep(φ) is weakly higher than the preferred forecast spref (φ).
Strict concavity and unimodality of UFCS further imply that sending signal s
sep(φ) is also
weakly more costly for Sales than sending signal spref (φ). We only have δsep = δpref (and
hence minimal expected signaling costs in equilibrium) if 2(b(1−α)− β)/γ ≤ po − pu ≤ 2β/γ,
i.e., if δsep = δpref = 0. This requires a sufficiently large lying aversion of β ≥ b(1−α). Hence,
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even though the equilibrium of Theorem 1 Pareto dominates all other separating equilibria,
coordination between the two parties is always costly for Sales if the lying aversion is small.
The necessary condition for the existence of a separating equilibrium is for the unit overfore-
casting penalty po to be above the threshold cost p¯ = (b(1−α)−β)/γ, which can be rewritten
as b(1−α) < γpo+β. The left-hand side of the inequality is ∂US/∂q evaluated at q = qFB(φ).
The right-hand side is the limit of −∂US/∂φˆ as φˆ goes to infinity. Hence, for any Sales type φ
in a separating equilibrium, we require the incremental gain from an order quantity q that is
greater than the equilibrium order quantity qFB(φ) to be strictly smaller than the maximum
incremental cost of sending a signal φˆ > ssep(φ). If this condition holds for the standard model
(γ = 1 and β = 0), it also holds for all other values γ > 1 and β > 0, which leads to the
following corollary:
Corollary 1. If a separating equilibrium exists for the standard model, there exists a separating
equilibrium for the behavioral model.
If the lying aversion is large compared to the unit sales bonus (β ≥ b(1− α)), the condition
po > p¯ holds for all overforecasting penalties po ≥ 0. Then, the disutility of lying associated
with each unit of forecast inflation (−β) exceeds the expected gain (b(1 − α)) independently
of the forecast error incentives. For smaller values of the lying aversion factor (β < b(1− α)),
only forecast error incentive systems with po > 0 can fulfill the necessary condition for the
existence of an equilibrium according to Theorem 1. The case distinctions for δsep further
imply that absolute forecast error incentive systems lead to inflated forecasts in equilibrium,
while differentiated forecast error incentive systems can be parameterized such that a truth-
telling equilibrium exists. We summarize the different characteristics of the incentive systems
in the following corollary:
Corollary 2. For a sufficiently small lying aversion (β < b(1 − α)), the following properties
hold:
(a) Sales-bonus-only incentive systems do not result in a separating equilibrium.
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(b) Absolute forecast error incentive systems can be parameterized such that a separating
equilibrium exists, but the demand forecasts are always inflated (δsep > 0). The equilibrium
forecast inflation δsep approaches zero as po = pu go to infinity.
(c) Differentiated forecast error incentive systems can be parameterized such that a truthful
separating equilibrium exists (δsep = 0).
Theorem 1 also implies that differentiated forecast error incentive systems can achieve any
level of forecast distortion more economically than absolute forecast error incentive systems,
which results in the following corollary:
Corollary 3. For every absolute forecast error incentive system with equilibrium forecast dis-
tortion δsep, there exists a differentiated forecast error incentive system with the same equilib-
rium forecast distortion δsep with lower unit forecast error penalties po and pu, and hence with
a lower expected forecast error cost for Sales.
Our theoretical analyses provide insights into the expected effects of the incentive system on
the forecast decisions of Sales and the order decisions of Operations. In the next section, we
derive hypotheses about the expected behavior.
3.3. Hypotheses
In the development of our model, we included two behavioral factors: a forecast error penalty
factor γ and a lying aversion factor β. We argued that loss aversion and other behavioral biases
lead to a forecast error penalty factor γ that is greater than one. The disutility that people
experience from reporting information untruthfully suggests that the lying aversion factor β
is greater than zero, which is also what O¨zer et al. (2011) find in their experiments. If our
modeling assumptions hold and a separating equilibrium exists (po > p¯ = (b(1 − α) − β)/γ),
a model with γ > 1 and β > 0 explains the actual forecasts of Sales and order decisions
of Operations better than a model with γ = 1 and β = 0, which is stated in the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. For incentive systems with po > p¯,
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(a) a forecast error penalty factor γ that is greater than one, and
(b) a lying aversion factor β that is greater than zero
explain actual behavior better than the standard model with γ = 1 and β = 0.
Hypothesis 1 allows us to test whether differences between actual behavior and the standard
model predictions can be explained by the behavioral parameters and their underlying theories.
We cannot state the values of the expected forecast distortions and corrections because they
depend on the values of γ and β, which we do not know. However, for the special case of the
standard model, we know that the equilibrium forecast distortion is
δsepstd = G
−1
(
b (1− α) + pu
pu + po
)
. (3.9)
Comparing Equations (3.6) and (3.9), one can observe that forecasts in a behavioral model
exhibit a directional shift from the standard model solution towards the market condition (effect
of β) and a general shift downwards (effect of γ). If the standard model predicts overforecasting
(po−pu < 2b(1−α)), the behavioral model predicts strictly smaller, and possibly even negative,
forecast distortions. If the standard model predicts truthful forecasting (po − pu = 2b(1− α)),
the behavioral model predicts either the same or negative forecast distortions. If the standard
model predicts underforecasting, there exists no unambiguous directional prediction of the
behavioral model. We summarize these properties in the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. For incentive systems with po > p¯ and po − pu ≤ 2b(1− α),
(a) forecast distortions (φˆ− φ) are (weakly) smaller, and
(b) forecast corrections (q − φˆ) are (weakly) greater
than predicted by the standard model.
In addition to the directional predictions above, we can derive the structure of the forecasting
and ordering behavior from Theorem 1: Sales adds δsep to all market conditions and Operations
subtracts this value from the forecast. O¨zer et al. (2011, 2014) observe a similar pattern in
their experimental data. Hence, we expect to see the following correlations:
Hypothesis 3. For incentive systems with po > p¯, there exist positive correlations between
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(a) the market condition φ and the demand forecast φˆ,
(b) the demand forecast φˆ and the order quantity q, and
(c) the order quantity q and the market condition φ.
For incentive systems with po > p¯, there exists a separating equilibrium and Operations can
derive the market condition from the demand forecast. For incentive systems with po ≤ p¯,
there does not exist a separating equilibrium, but partially separating or pooling equilibria can
exist. According to the definition of these equilibria, the market condition cannot always be
derived from the demand forecast, which we formulate as follows:
Hypothesis 4. For incentive systems with po > p¯, the correlations between
(a) the market condition φ and the demand forecast φˆ,
(b) the demand forecast φˆ and the order quantity q, and
(c) the order quantity q and the market condition φ
are higher than for incentive systems with po ≤ p¯.
We chose the incentive system of Operations such that the order quantity that maximizes
Operations’ profit also maximizes the profit of the company. The better the information that
Operations can deduct from the demand forecast, the better the order decisions it can make.
This leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5. Under incentive systems with po > p¯, the expected cost of Operations is lower
than under incentive systems with po ≤ p¯.
To test the above hypotheses and design incentive systems for truthful forecast informa-
tion sharing, we must know the values of the behavioral parameters γ and β. To estimate
these parameters and test whether human decision makers behave structurally as stated in the
hypotheses, we use a laboratory experiment.
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4.1. Main Experiment
4.1.1. Experimental Design
We conducted an experiment with two sessions and 32 subjects per session. In each session, 16
subjects were assigned to Sales and 16 subjects were assigned to Operations. The design of the
experiment is shown in Table 4.1. All monetary parameters are in experimental currency units
(ECUs) and an exchange rate of 1,000 ECUs per EUR 1 was used. In Session 1, we exposed
the subjects to sales-bonus-only and absolute forecast error incentive systems. In Session 2, we
exposed them to differentiated forecast error incentive systems. Within a session, half of the
subjects played the treatments in the order shown in Table 4.1 and the other half in reverse
order to reduce potential order effects. Within a treatment, the subjects of each subgroup
were randomly matched with another subject of the same subgroup at the beginning of each
period. Each treatment lasted eight periods. The decisions of each period were independent
of previous periods, i.e., excess demand of previous periods was lost and leftovers of previous
periods were discarded. More details, such as screenshots, instructions and questionnaires, can
be found in Section A.3 of the Appendix.
If existent, Table 4.1 reports the equilibrium distortion values δsep of the standard model and
directional predictions of the behavioral model. In the design of the experiment, we rely on
the standard model as opposed to the behavioral model because we cannot specify parameter
values for γ and β prior to the experiment. The treatments are chosen to cover a variety of
incentive schemes. We include the sales-bonus-only incentive system (Treatment 1) to analyze
a treatment where both the standard model and the behavioral model predict that no separat-
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Table 4.1.: Experimental design and model predictions of the main experiment
ing equilibrium exists, assuming that the lying aversion β is sufficiently small. Treatments 2–4
cover the absolute forecast error incentive system, including a setting (Treatment 2) where no
separating equilibrium exists under the standard model. Since we are most interested in de-
signing incentive schemes for truthful forecast information sharing, we include four treatments
(Treatments 5–8) with different parameterizations of the differentiated forecast error scheme,
including two treatments (Treatments 7 and 8) for which the standard model predicts truthful
forecast information sharing.
In all treatments, the market condition Φ is normally distributed with a mean of 100 and a
standard deviation of 30 and the market uncertainty E is normally distributed with a mean
of zero and a standard deviation of 30. To avoid negative demand realizations, we drew
realizations of Φ and E before the experiment and used them in both sessions. The ex-ante
probability of a negative demand for a distribution of D = (Φ + E) ∼ N (100, 42.432) is only
P (d < 0) = 0.0092. In line with Ho et al. (2010, p. 1896), we chose not to encounter subjects
with a truncated normal distribution, which would have added unnecessary complexity to the
experiment.
With respect to Operations, we are interested in analyzing how people process demand fore-
cast information rather than how they make optimal order quantity decisions. Therefore, we
chose a unit overage cost factor of co = 10 that is equal to the unit underage cost factor of
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cu = 10, which results in a critical ratio of α = 0.5. With this critical ratio and a zero-mean
normal distribution of the market uncertainty, the expected-utility-maximizing order quantity
is equal to the market condition. With other critical ratios, computing the expected-utility-
maximizing order quantity is more complex and deviations between the actual order quantities
and expected-utility-maximizing quantities could be due to effects other than demand infor-
mation processing, such as the pull-to-center effect (e.g., Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000). For a
critical ratio of α = 0.5, however, the data of Bostian et al. (2008) suggests that human decision
makers choose order quantities close to the optimum, i.e., close to the mean of a symmetric
distribution. We validated this presumption in our experiment by means of a post-experiment
question on hypothetical order quantities. We report the results in Section 5.3.3.
4.1.2. Experimental Protocol
The experiment was conducted at the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research (CLER)
at the University of Cologne. The laboratory protocol was the same for all sessions and we
followed the good practices proposed by Katok (2011). We used the experimental programming
environment z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects were recruited from the subject pool of
the CLER using the recruitment software ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). Subjects were students
of economics, business administration, and information systems with an average age of 25.0
years. The instructions and screenshots of the software are contained in Sections A.3.1 and
A.3.3 of the Appendix. Additional subject pool characteristics are reported in Section A.3.6
of the Appendix.
After entering the laboratory, until the experiment was officially concluded, subjects were
not allowed to talk to each other and no communication was observed. After being randomly
assigned to seats, subjects received a handout with instructions, including example calculations
of the payoffs. The instructions were first read aloud by the instructor, then silently by each
subject. Subjects had to click a button on the screen to indicate that they were ready to start
the experiment. If subjects had questions, they could raise their hand and ask them quietly.
The instructor did not answer the question but rather directed subjects to the relevant part of
the instructions to ensure that one person was not better informed than another.
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Subjects were told that they were working for a company with a Sales and an Operations
department, where Sales forecasts customer demand and Operations decides on the production
quantity. They were informed of the random nature of the demand and of the activities they
were expected to perform in the experiment. The incentive systems and individual compensa-
tions were explained in detail and subjects were informed that they would be exposed to four
different treatments with eight periods each. They were also informed that they would not
play with the same person more than once within a treatment. Before the start of the actual
experiment, subjects had to answer a pre-experiment quiz (see Section A.3.2 of the Appendix)
to test if they had understood the instructions. To become acquainted with the software,
subjects played four test periods before the 32 periods of the actual experiment started. All
participants kept the role (Sales or Operations) that was assigned to them during the entire
experiment.
The sequence of events within a period was as follows: At the beginning of the period,
the computer randomly matched two players. The identity of the players was not revealed
either during or after the experiment. Then, the realization of the market condition φ was
privately shown to Sales. Sales could use decision support in the form of a table that showed
how the expected payoff of Sales depends on the demand forecast φˆ and the order quantity q
(which Sales did not know, but could only estimate). Then, Sales entered a demand forecast
φˆ and Operations received the demand forecast. Operations could use decision support in the
form of a table that showed how the expected payoff of Operations depends on the market
condition φ (which Operations did not know, but could only estimate) and the order quantity
q. Operations entered the order quantity q, a random error ε was generated, and the payoffs
of Sales and Operations were computed. All results (except for the realization of the market
condition) were shown to both players at the end of a period. The market condition and error
term of a period within a treatment were the same for all subjects.
After the last period was played, subjects could increase their payout by making a set
of Holt–Laury type lottery choices (Holt and Laury, 2002; Eckel and Grossman, 2008) (see
Section A.3.4 of the Appendix). Then, subjects filled out a questionnaire with demographic
data and some additional questions regarding the experiment (see Sections A.3.5 and A.3.6 of
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the Appendix). Finally, subjects were paid privately based on their performance. A session
lasted approximately 120 minutes and subjects earned an average of EUR 21.23, including a
fixed participation fee of EUR 2.50.
Compared to other experiments in economics or OM, the interactive decision task of our
experiment is fairly complex. In Section 5.3.3, we take a closer look at the different measures
that we took to support decision making and to ensure subjects’ understanding of the game.
4.1.3. Overview of Results
The results of the experiment are shown in Figure 4.1. The figure shows three graphs for each
of the eight treatments of the experiment. The left graph of a treatment shows the demand
forecast φˆ plotted against the market condition φ, the middle graph shows the order quantity q
plotted against the demand forecast φˆ, and the right graph shows the order quantity q plotted
against the market condition φ. Each dot corresponds to one observation in the experiment.
The solid line in the left graph corresponds to the truth-telling solution. For incentive systems
for which the standard model (γ = 1, β = 0) has a separating equilibrium, the dashed lines
show the equilibrium forecasting and ordering predictions of the standard model.
Summary statistics are reported in Table 4.2. We use the metric forecast distortion (i.e., the
difference between the market condition and the demand forecast) to analyze the forecasting
behavior of Sales. We use the metric forecast correction (i.e., the difference between the order
quantity and the demand forecast) to analyze the ordering behavior of Operations. In addition,
we use the metric order deviation (i.e., the difference between the order quantity and the market
condition) to characterize the quality of the order decision of Operations. The aggregate results
of Table 4.2 already indicate that Sales subjects forecast considerably less than predicted by
the standard model, which is in line with the predictions of the behavioral model (see Table
4.1). Operations subjects seem to anticipate this behavior and correct forecast distortions.
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 visualize the effect of an incentive system on the payoffs to Sales and
Operations. We use the expected profit of Sales as well as the expected overage and underage
costs of Operations to quantify these effects. Note that the profit of Sales cannot be directly
compared across treatments because the unit sales bonus and forecast error penalties differ.
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Experimente 4 und 5 – rearranged for Diss
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Figure 4.1.: Forecast and order decisions of the main experiment
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Table 4.2.: Summary statistics of the main experiment
Especially in Treatments 1–3, the unit sales bonus is greater than in Treatments 4–8 and hence
profits are comparably high. The unit overage and underage cost of Operations is the same
in all treatments and the overall cost of Operations is comparable across treatments. Because
the critical ratio of Operations is aligned with the critical ratio of the company, we can use the
expected cost of Operations as a proxy for the profit of the company. Figure 4.3 suggests that
the cost of Operations is particularly high in the sales-bonus-only Treatment 1 and somewhat
high in Treatment 2, which is in line with the predictions of Table 4.1.
Because we used a within-subject design for each session, we analyzed the data for time and
treatment order effects. The detailed regression results are discussed in Section 5.3.1.
We next use the data of the experiment to estimate the behavioral parameters γ and β before
proceeding to test our hypotheses.
4.1.4. Estimation of Behavioral Parameters
Since we do not know whether a separating equilibrium exists for Treatments 1 and 2 (see
Table 4.1), we use the data of Treatments 3–8 to estimate the forecast error penalty factor γ
and the lying aversion factor β by maximum likelihood (ML) estimation. Based on Theorem
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Figure 4.2.: Expected profit of Sales in the main experiment
Main experiment
Note: Excluding fixed compensation ܥை. Expectations are taken with respect to ܧ. 
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Figure 4.3.: Expected cost of Operations in the main experiment
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1, we formulate a nonlinear mixed effects model
δit = uit +

G−1
(
bit(1−α)+γipu,it−βi
γi(pu,it+po,it)
)
for bit(1−α)−βiγi < po,it < pu,it + 2
bit(1−α)−βi
γi
,
0 for pu,it + 2
bit(1−α)−βi
γi
≤ po,it ≤ pu,it + 2 bit(1−α)+βiγi ,
G−1
(
bit(1−α)+γipu,it+βi
γi(pu,it+po,it)
)
for po,it > pu,it + 2
bit(1−α)+βi
γi
,
where subjects are indexed by i and periods are indexed by t. The within-subject errors uit
are independently distributed as N (0, σ2u). We model the parameters γ and β as random
coefficients to allow for time-constant unobserved heterogeneity among subjects. We separate
the fixed effects from the random effects of the parameters by defining γi = µγ + rγ,i and
βi = µβ + rβ,i, where µ =
( µγ
µβ
)
are the fixed effects of the parameters and ri =
( rγ,i
rβ,i
)
are the
subject-specific random effects, which follow a multivariate normal distribution N (0,Ψ) with
variance-covariance matrix Ψ =
(
σ2γ ρσγσβ
ρσγσβ σ
2
β
)
. Since the observations between subjects are
independent, but those within subjects are jointly conditional upon the random effects ri, we
use the likelihood function
L (µ,Ψ, σ2u | δ) =∏
i
∫
p
(
δi | µ, ri, σ2u
)
p (ri | Ψ) dri
=
∏
i
∫
1
(2piσ2u)
Ti/2
· exp
(
− 1
2σ2u
∥∥δi − δsepi ∥∥2) (4.1)
· 1
2piσγσβ
√
1− ρ2 · exp
(
− 1
2(1− ρ2)
(
rγ,i
σ2γ
+
rβ,i
σ2β
− 2rγ,irβ,iρ
σγσβ
))
dri,
where p(δi | ·) and p(ri | ·) are the densities of the corresponding multivariate normal distribu-
tions, Ti is the number of observations for subject i, and δ
sep
i is a vector with the equilibrium
distortions according to Equation (3.6) given the respective values of the subject-specific pa-
rameters γi, βi and covariate vectors bi,po,i, and pu,i.
To estimate the parameters, we use the Lindstrom and Bates (1990) algorithm implemented
in the nlme package for R (Pinheiro et al., 2017). By reparameterizing γ˜i = log(γi), β˜i = log(βi)
and setting γi = exp(γ˜i), βi = exp(β˜i) in Equation (4.1), we restrict the optimization to positive
values for γ and β while keeping the optimization problem unconstrained (Pinheiro and Bates,
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2000, p. 351). Following up on the assumptions above, γ˜ and β˜ follow a multivariate normal
distribution and γ and β follow a multivariate log-normal distribution. We use µγ˜ , µβ˜, σγ˜ , σβ˜, ρ˜
to denote the distributional characteristics of the transformed variables.
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. All fixed effects are significant at the 1% level (t-test). 
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ߛ
ߚ
Table 4.3.: Estimation results of behavioral models with γ and β
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 summarize the estimation results. We use the logarithm of the likelihood
(log(L)) and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC), defined as BIC = −2 log(L) + k log(n),
where n is the number of observations and k is the number of parameters, to assess the fit of
alternative models.
The random effects estimated in a model where both γ˜ and β˜ are treated as random coeffi-
cients (Model 1) are highly correlated (ρ˜ = −0.998). This result can be explained by the fact
that in the majority of treatments (Treatments 3–6) both behavioral parameters γ and β affect
forecast decisions in the same irection, i.e., they reduce the forecast inflation compared to the
standard model. In particular for subjects in Session 1, where we only use Treatments 3 and 4
for the estimation proc dure, the s andard mod l predicts overforecasting in both treatments
and either values of γ > 1 or values of β > 0 could be the reason for the more truthful forecast-
52
4. Laboratory Experiments
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. All fixed effects are significant at the 1% level (t-test). 
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Mean
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ߤఉ෩
ߪఉ෩
ߪ௨
Mode
Mean
Std. Dev.
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ߛ
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Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. All fixed effects are significant at the 1% 
level (ݐ-test). 
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Model 1
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Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. All fixed effects are significant at the 1% 
level (ݐ-test). 
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-3,269
6,558
Model 5
1.509 (0.063)
0.151
17.000
4.419
4.572
0.693
-3,067
6,154
1.157 (0.120)
0.596
2.230
3.799
2.480
Model 4
12.558
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of ߛ and ߚ
Goodness of
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6,301
Model 6
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0.808
1.045
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 ߛ ൌ 1
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Table 4.4.: Estimation results of reduced behavioral models
ing behavior that we observe in the experiment. We therefore follow the guidelines of Pinheiro
and Bates (2000) for the selection of random effects and test two alternative models with β˜
random only (Model 2) and γ˜ random only (Model 3) (Pinheiro and Bates, 2000, pp. 282–284
and pp. 359–360).
In Model 2, the standard deviation of β is approximately zero and the model provides a
significantly worse fit than Model 1 (likelihood ratio test, p < 0.001). In Model 3, we do not
lose explanatory power (likelihood ratio test, p = 0.8402) and obtain a lower BIC than for
Model 1. We conclude that Model 3 fits our data better than Models 1 and 2.
In Model 3, the forecast error penalty factor γ is log-normally distributed with a mean
of 3.571 and the lying aversion factor β is 1.805. The interpretation is that subjects evaluate
forecast error penalties 3.571 times higher on average than the equivalent sales bonus payments
and experience a negative utility of 1.805 ECUs for every unit of forecast distortion.
We further test the specification of our model by comparing Model 3 with three reduced
models, where only γ (Model 4) or β (Models 5 and 6) is included as an explanatory variable
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(Table 4.4). In Model 4, we set β = 0 and in Model 5, we set γ = 1, i.e., we use the parameter
values of the standard model. In Model 6, we set γ = 2 to test whether a “typical” loss aversion
factor of prospect theory is sufficient to explain the observed behavior (for a discussion on the
values of loss aversion factors, see Abdellaoui et al., 2007). The log-likelihood of Model 3 is
significantly higher than that of the reduced models (likelihood-ratio test, p < 0.001 for all
comparisons) and the BIC of Model 3 is lower than the BIC of the reduced models. These
results show that neither the overproportional weighting of forecast error penalties nor lying
aversion alone can explain the observed behavior as well as the combination of both effects.
The worse fit of Model 6 compared to Models 2 and 3 (likelihood-ratio test, p < 0.001 for
both comparisons) further indicates that the estimated value of the parameter γ is significantly
greater than two. This supports the presumption that the forecast error penalty factor γ
includes various behavioral drivers that influence behavior in the same direction rather than
loss aversion alone. We can further see from Figure 4.4 that the in-sample predicted forecasts
based on the parameter estimates of Model 3 are well aligned with the actual forecast decisions
made in each of the treatments.
The estimation procedure that we follow above builds upon the assumption that the within-
subject errors uit are independent and identically normally distributed with mean zero and
variance σ2u. We use the within-subject residuals of the ML estimation to verify this assump-
tion. The histogram and quantile-normal plot in Figure 4.5 indicate that the distribution of
residuals is slightly leptokurtic. A Kolmogorov–Smirnov test confirms a significant deviation
from a normal distribution (p < 0.001) due to a kurtosis of 4.747. However, the residuals
are symmetrically distributed (skewness = 0.004) such that we can expect consistent, albeit
slightly inefficient estimates (Pinheiro and Bates, 2000, p. 180).
4.1.5. Tests of Hypotheses
To test our hypotheses, we must distinguish between treatments where a separating equilibrium
exists from those where we do not know if a separating equilibrium exists. Based on Corollary
1, we can conclude that an equilibrium along the lines of Theorem 1 exists for Treatments 3–8.
With respect to the sales-bonus-only incentive scheme of Treatment 1, the results of the ML
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estimation (Model 3 in Table 4.3) indicate that there is no such equilibrium. In order for a
separating equilibrium to exist, the condition po > (b(1−α)−β)/γ must hold. For Treatment
1, this requires β > b(1 − α) = 8, which is far above our estimate of β = 1.805. We further
corroborate this finding by analyzing subject-level ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of
β. There is only one subject with an estimate of β = 8.69 > 8. For Treatment 2, it is unclear
whether a separating equilibrium exists. In order for a separating equilibrium to exist, we
require γ > (b(1−α)−β)/po = 1.732. The behavioral parameter γ is a random coefficient and
there is a nonnegligible probability that it is smaller than this value (P (γ < 1.732) = 10.6 %).
We will therefore only use Treatment 1 to compare the behavior of Sales and Operations in
a setting where no separating equilibrium exists to the behavior in Treatments 3–8, where a
separating equilibrium does exist. Unless stated otherwise, we use two-sided Wilcoxon signed-
rank tests and Mann–Whitney U tests based on subject-level averages by treatment to establish
statistical validity.
Hypothesis 1 predicts that a model with γ > 1 and β > 0 better explains actual behavior
than the standard model. The estimation results support this hypothesis. The mean estimate
of γ is significantly different from 1 and the estimate of β is significantly different from 0 (t-test,
p < 0.001 for both comparisons). Also, the explanatory power of Model 3 is significantly better
(likelihood ratio tests, p < 0.001) than that of Models 4 and 5, where γ and β are set to 1 and
0 respectively.
Hypothesis 2 states that forecast distortions are smaller and forecast corrections are greater
than predicted by the standard model. Figure 4.1 shows that the actual forecast distortions and
forecast corrections deviate systematically from the solutions of the standard model (dashed
lines) and Table 4.2 reports the corresponding averages. For Treatments 3–6, the standard
model predicts positive forecast distortions and negative forecast corrections. In line with
Hypothesis 2, the actual average forecast distortions are significantly smaller and the actual
average forecast corrections are significantly greater than predicted by the standard model
(one-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p < 0.001 for all comparisons). For Treatments 7 and 8,
the standard model predicts forecast distortions and corrections of zero. The actual average
forecast distortions are significantly smaller than zero and the average forecast corrections
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are significantly greater than zero (one-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p < 0.001 for all
comparisons). We conclude that actual behavior is different from the behavior predicted by
the standard model and that the behavioral model correctly describes the direction of deviation.
Hypothesis 3 predicts positive correlations between market conditions and forecasts, forecasts
and order quantities, and order quantities and market conditions. The scatter plots in Figure
4.1 indicate positive correlations between all three pairs. The corresponding correlation coef-
ficients are shown in Table 4.2. All correlations are significantly greater than zero (t-test after
Fisher z-transformation, p < 0.001 for all treatments), which provides support for Hypothesis
3.
The positive correlations of Treatment 1 provide robustness to the experimental results of
O¨zer et al. (2011, 2014), who also found that positive correlations under a sales-bonus-only
incentive system exist. In contrast to O¨zer et al. (2011, 2014), we differentiate between treat-
ments where a separating equilibrium exists (Treatments 3–8) and treatments where it does
not (Treatment 1). Hypothesis 4 states that the above correlations are higher in Treatments
3–8 than in Treatment 1. We can see from Figure 4.1 and Table 4.2 that the forecast distor-
tions and forecast corrections vary more in Treatment 1 than in Treatments 3–8. In support
of the hypothesis, the correlation coefficients ρ(φˆ, φ), ρ(q, φˆ) and ρ(q, φ) in Treatment 1 are
significantly lower than in Treatments 3–8 (t-test after Fisher z-transformation, p < 0.01 for
all comparisons).
Hypothesis 5 suggests that the expected cost of Operations is lower in Treatments 3–8 than
in Treatment 1. Because the operational costs of the company are proportional to the overage
and underage costs of Operations, this hypothesis is also indicative for the overall company
profit. Table 4.2 shows that the average expected cost of Operations is significantly higher in
Treatment 1 than in Treatments 3–8 (Wilcoxon signed-rank test for within-subject comparisons
to Treatments 3 and 4, p < 0.001; Mann–Whitney U test for between-subject comparisons to
Treatments 5–8, p < 0.001), which provides support for Hypothesis 5.
We conclude that the structural predictions of the behavioral model are supported by the
experimental data. In particular, the sales-bonus-only incentive system of Treatment 1 leads
to higher forecast inflations, lower correlations and higher expected operational costs than the
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incentive systems with forecast error penalties in Treatments 3–8.
Table 4.2 indicates that the actual average forecast distortions of Treatments 4 and 5 are
close to zero. While the actual average forecast distortion is significantly different from zero
in Treatment 4 (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p < 0.01), it is not significantly different from
zero in Treatment 5 (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0.570). Using the mean parameter
estimates γ = 3.571 and β = 1.805, we can compute the in-sample predictions for Treatment
4 (δsep = 3.372) and Treatment 5 (δsep = 0). By coincidence, Treatment 5 covers the truthful
forecast sharing case. While this finding is generally in line with Corollary 2, it is based
on in-sample parameter estimates and hence has little external validity. To provide such a
validation, we next analyze how well the model works with out-of-sample subjects and out-of-
sample treatments.
4.2. Validation Experiment
4.2.1. Experimental Design and Results
In the validation experiment we used four treatments. Table 4.5 summarizes the design and re-
sults of the experiment. Treatments 9 and 10 were designed to incentivize truthful information
sharing based on the behavioral model. To obtain the parameter values for over- and under-
forecasting penalties, we used the mean values of the forecast error penalty factor (γ = 3.571)
and the lying aversion factor (β = 1.805) that we estimated above and selected two treatments
with integer parameter values (po−pu) ∈ [1.80; 3.81] that result in a distortion value of δsep = 0.
Treatments 11 and 12 were designed similarly based on the predictions of the standard model
requiring po − pu = 10.
We used the same experimental setup and protocol as in the main experiment and conducted
the validation experiment with 32 new subjects. Figure 4.6 shows the individual decisions of
the experiment. Table 4.5 summarizes the predictions of the standard model, the predictions
of the behavioral model, the average forecast distortions and the average forecast corrections
that we observed in the experiment. We use two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank tests to compare
actual averages with the predictions of both models.
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Experiment 7 – overview of decisions
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Figure 4.6.: Forecast and order decisions of the validation experiment
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Note: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Correlation is the Pearson correlation coefficient. Expected cost of Operations and expected profit of 
Sales are reported in ECU, excluding fixed compensations ܥௌ and ܥை and expectations are taken with respect to ܧ.
(10/12/10)
(10/7/5)
(10/20/10)
(10/15/5)
14.2
29.0
0.0
0.0
Standard 
model
0.0
0.0
-7.8
-11.9
Behavioral
model
-0.2
3.6
-6.9
-8.4
Actual
average
-14.2
-29.0
0.0
0.0
Standard 
model
0.0
0.0
7.8
11.9
Behavioral
model
-1.6
-2.9
7.8
2.8
Actual
average
***
***
***
***
*
*
***
***
***
**
***
Forecast distortion ߶෠ െ ߶ Forecast correction ݍ െ ߶෠
(12.7)
(11.6)
(9.6)
(11.4)
(11.4)
(12.8)
(10.4)
(14.6)
Treatment
(ܾ/݌݋/݌ݑ)
Expected 
cost of 
Operations 
273 (51.2)
273 (55.0)
266 (36.6)
280 (52.1)
0.91
0.92
0.95
0.93
Correlation
ߩ(߶෠, ߶)
0.92
0.90
0.93
0.87
Correlation
ߩ(ݍ, ߶෠)
Expected 
profit of 
Sales
568 (276)
727 (279)
509 (286)
619 (301)
9
10 
11 
12
Too wide for
Diss
Note: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Correlation is the Pearson correlation coefficient. Expected 
cost of Operations are reported in ECUs, excluding fixed compensation ܥை. Expectations are taken with respect to ܧ.
(10/12/10)
(10/7/5)
(10/20/10)
(10/15/5)
14.2
29.0
0.0
0.0
Std.
model
0.0
0.0
-7.8
-11.9
Beh.
model
-0.2
3.6
-6.9
-8.4
Actual
average
-14.2
-29.0
0.0
0.0
Std.
model
0.0
0.0
7.8
11.9
Beh.
model
-1.6
-2.9
7.8
2.8
Actual
average
*
*
***
***
***
**
***
Forecast distortion ߶෠ െ ߶ Forecast correction ݍ െ ߶෠
(12.7)
(11.6)
(9.6)
(11.4)
(11.4)
(12.8)
(10.4)
(14.6)
Treatment
(ܾ/݌݋/݌ݑ)
Expected 
cost of 
Operations 
273 (51.2)
273 (55.0)
266 (36.6)
280 (52.1)
0.91
0.92
0.95
0.93
Corr.
(߶෠, ߶)
0.92
0.90
0.93
0.87
Corr.
(ݍ, ߶෠)
9
10 
11 
12
Table 4.5.: Design and results of the validation experiment
Treatments 9 and 10, which were designed with the behavioral model, have actual average
forecast distortions that are not significantly (Treatment 9, p = 0.836) or only weakly sig-
nificantly (Treatment 10, p = 0.093) different from zero. The standard model predicts much
greater distortions that are highly significantly different from the actual averages (p < 0.001
for both comparisons). The results are similar for the forecast corrections.
Treatments 11 and 12, which were designed with the standard model, have actual average
forecast distortions that are significantly below the prediction of the standard model (p < 0.003
for both comparisons). The behavioral model correctly predicts the underforecasting that we
observe and the actual forecast distortions are not significantly (Treatment 11, p = 0.642) or
only weakly significantly (Treatment 12, p = 0.079) different from these predictions. For the
forecast corrections, we obtain mixed results. In Treatment 11, the actual average correction
differs significantly from the prediction of the standard model (p < 0.001), but not from the
prediction of the behavioral model (p = 0.877). In Treatment 12, the actual average correction
does not differ significantly from the prediction of the standard model (p = 0.146), but differs
significantly from the prediction of the behavioral model (p < 0.002).
In addition to the statistical tests above, Figure 4.7 compares the individual decisions of
both Sales and Operations to the predicted values of the behavioral model. The visualization
supports the finding that actual forecast and order decisions are generally in line with the
predictions of the behavioral model. Note that, in contrast to the main experiment (Figure 4.4),
the predicted values for forecast distortions and corrections are based on the mean parameter
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Experiment 7 – predicted vs actuals
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Figure 4.7.: Predicted versus actual decisions of the validation experiment
estimates of the main experiment, and are hence the same for all subjects.
The results of the validation experiment show that the behavioral model generalizes well
and provides good estimates of the forecasting and ordering behavior of out-of-sample subjects
with out-of-sample treatments. The treatments that we designed with the behavioral model
perform well and deliver what they were designed for: They incentivize demand forecasts that
are only minimally distorted by Sales and minimally corrected by Operations.
4.2.2. Sensitivity Analysis
The sensitivity of the equilibrium behavior under different truth-telling incentive schemes de-
pends on the choice of forecast error incentives po and pu. For a normally distributed market
uncertainty E, it can be shown that the equilibrium forecast distortion δsep (see Equation 3.6)
is less sensitive to changes in the behavioral parameters γ and β for high unit forecast error
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penalties than for low ones if the difference po − pu is the same. More formally, for any two
sets of sales incentive parameters (b, po, pu) and (b, p¯o, p¯u) with po − pu = p¯o − p¯u and p¯o > po,
p¯u > pu, the following proposition holds:
Proposition 1. If an equilibrium forecast distortion δsep exists, then it is weakly less sensitive
to changes in the behavioral parameters γ and β under the incentive scheme (b, p¯o, p¯u) compared
to the incentive scheme (b, po, pu).
We use the same difference of po− pu = 2 in both Treatment 9 and 10, but the unit forecast
error penalties po and pu are lower in Treatment 10 than in Treatment 9. Hence, estimation
errors of the behavioral parameters and subject-specific deviations from the mean values of γ
and β can lead to higher forecast distortions in Treatment 10 than in Treatment 9. A similar
observation holds for Treatments 11 and 12, where the actual average forecast distortions of
Treatment 12 differ more strongly from the prediction of the behavioral model than the forecast
distortions of Treatment 11.
To visualize this property for the incentive systems of Treatments 9 and 10, Figure 4.8 shows
the equilibrium forecast distortion for different values of γ (horizontal axis) and β (vertical axis).
The white zone indicates parameter combinations for which the behavioral model predicts
truthful information sharing. The lines indicate parameter combinations of equal forecast
distortion with increasing distortion values (shown in white circles) towards γ = 1 and β = 0.
The points mark our estimates γ = 3.571 and β = 1.805 as well as deviations of plus/minus
50 % from the mean estimates. We can observe that larger values for γ and β do not change
the equilibrium prediction of zero inflation within the parameter space that we consider. If γ
and β become smaller, however, the prediction changes from truthful information sharing to
overforecasting. If both parameters deviate by −50 % from the mean, for example, our model
predicts forecast inflations of 4.4 units in Treatment 9 and 8.2 units in Treatment 10.
The results of the sensitivity analysis can also explain the comparably low expected cost
of Operations (267 ECUs) in the absolute forecast error incentive Treatment 4 of the main
experiment. Compared to all other treatments of the main experiment, Treatment 4 has the
highest unit forecast error penalties po and pu, which could be the reason why we observe the
lowest variances in forecast and order decisions and the lowest expected cost of Operations
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Figure 4.8.: Sensitivity of forecast distortions depending on behavioral parameter values
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in this treatment. However, as discussed in Section 4.1.5, the forecasts of Treatment 4 are
still significantly biased. We can use Treatment 9 of the validation experiment to verify that a
differentiated forecast error incentive system with a similar magnitude of forecast error penalties
incentivizes truthful forecasts, while leading to similar expected cost of Operations (273 ECUs)
that are not significantly different from the cost in Treatment 4 (Mann–Whitney U test, p =
0.366).
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While the behavioral model that we specified in Section 3.1 is grounded in theory and fits
the data well (both in-sample as well as out-of-sample), there are other potential explanations
for the behavior that we observe in the experiments. In the following, we therefore present
alternative models and their fit to our experimental data (Section 5.1), additional experimental
data (Section 5.2), and supplementary analyses of the data of the main experiment (Section
5.3) that provide robustness to our previous results.
5.1. Alternative Models
5.1.1. Non-Bayesian Belief Updating
To derive the separating equilibria of our behavioral model, we use the concept of PBE, which
assumes that signal receivers update their belief based on Bayes’ rule whenever possible (see
Section 3.2.1). Previous research has shown that this assumption can be violated in practice
(e.g., Charness and Levin, 2005). To see if the Bayesian concept captures belief updating in
our setting well, we test two alternative models that relax this assumption.
Trust model.
In the specific context of forecast information sharing, O¨zer et al. (2011) identify trust on the
part of the forecast receiver as the driving factor of belief updating. To test whether such an
approach explains the behavior better than the approach we used, we follow O¨zer et al. (2011)
and formulate a model where Operations applies a simple updating rule by forming a weighted
average of the observed forecast φˆ and the prior distribution of the market condition Φ. We
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formulate the new belief
µξ(φ | φˆ) = fξ(φ | φˆ),
where fξ is the density function of ξφˆ+ (1− ξ)Φ and ξ ∈ (0; 1] is a trust factor. According to
the definition of the trust factor, equilibria in this model cannot be separating, i.e., Operations
cannot infer the true market condition, except for the special case of ξ = 1 and truthful
forecasts φˆ = φ. We describe a set of equilibrium strategies for Sales and Operations under
trust-based belief updating in the following proposition:
Proposition 2. If Operations uses a trust-based belief updating rule µξ(φ | φˆ) = fξ(φ | φˆ), and
if at least po > 0 or β > 0, there exists the following equilibrium:
(a) The best response of Operations to a forecast φˆ is the quantity
qξ(φˆ) = ξφˆ+ F
−1
Z (α),
where FZ is the distribution function of Z = (1− ξ)Φ + E.
(b) The best response of Sales is the forecast φˆξ that solves the first-order condition
bξ
(
1−G
(
ξφˆξ + F
−1
Z (α)− φ
))
= γ(po + pu)G
(
φˆξ − φ
)
− γpu

+β for po − pu < 2γ
[
bξ
(
1−G ((ξ − 1)φ+ F−1Z (α)))− β],
−β for po − pu > 2γ
[
bξ
(
1−G ((ξ − 1)φ+ F−1Z (α)))+ β].
For 2γ
[
bξ
(
1−G ((ξ − 1)φ+ F−1Z (α)))− β] ≤ po−pu ≤ 2γ [bξ (1−G ((ξ − 1)φ+ F−1Z (α)))+ β],
the best response of Sales is the truthful forecast, i.e., φˆξ = φ.
Note that qξ is independent of the incentive parameters. Operations interprets a forecast
φˆ in the same way across all experimental treatments. For our experimental data with Φ ∼
N (100, 302), E ∼ N (0, 302) and α = 0.5, we have Z normally distributed with mean (1−ξ)·100
and hence F−1Z (α) = (1−ξ)·100. Hence, for all ξ < 1 Operations corrects big forecasts (φˆ > 100)
downwards and small forecasts (φˆ < 100) upwards. Both predictions of the model are at odds
with what we observe in the experiments. For example, forecast corrections in Figure 4.1 and
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Table 4.2 differ depending on the treatment and the direction of forecast correction does not
depend on the magnitude of the forecast.
Since we do not have a closed-form solution for the forecasting behavior of Sales in the
trust model, we use subject-level OLS in order to estimate the behavioral parameters of the
trust model. We compare the model fit based on the BIC, which we calculate as BIC =
log(n)k+n log(RSS/n), where n is the number of observations, k is the number of parameters
and RSS is the sum of squared residuals. Table 5.1 compares the fit of alternative belief models
with that of our original behavioral model (Bayesian model) using the simplified estimation
procedure. Note that the estimates for γ and β of the Bayesian model in Table 5.1 are slightly
different from the estimates in Table 4.3 due to different assumptions regarding the distribution
of γ and β and the different estimation procedures. The higher BIC of the trust model indicates
that the Bayesian model provides a better fit to our data than the trust model. Note that
the median of the estimates for ξ is 1, implying that the majority of Sales subjects (25 out of
32 subjects) do not expect Operations to follow a strategy where the direction of the forecast
correction depends on the size of the forecast.
Note: Reported numbers are the mean, [median] and (standard deviation) of the subject-level estimates. 
ߛ
ߚ
ߦ
ߠ
Bayesian Model
4,159
4.059 [2.227] (4.599)
2.610 [1.566] (2.600)
Estimates
BIC
Trust Model
4,348
3.728 [1.857] (4.754)
1.429 [0.476] (1.778)
0.871 [1.000] (0.335)
Naïveté Model
4,343
3.954 [1.857] (4.664)
1.949 [0.952] (2.238)
0.543 [0.500] (0.434)
Treatment
(ܾ/݌݋/݌ݑ)
R1 (14/3/3)
R2 (10/6/4)
R3 (10/12/2)
Corr.
ߩ(߶෠, ߶)
0.95
0.91
0.89
Std. model
(one-shot)
n/a
38.4
0.0
Act. average 
(repeated)
8.0
-0.6
-8.6
Forecast distortion ߶෠ െ ߶
(12.2)
(15.2)
(16.8)
Note: Significances of differences between model predictions and actual averages (Wilcoxon signed-rank test): *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
Standard deviations reported in parentheses. Correlation is the Pearson correlation coefficient.
Beh. model 
(one-shot)
19.5
0.0
-17.6
***
**
***
**
Corr.
ߩ(ݍ,߶෠)
0.84
0.82
0.82
Std. model
(one-shot)
n/a
-38.4
0.0
Act. average 
(repeated)
-6.8
-3.5
3.6
Forecast correction ݍ െ ߶෠
(16.2)
(19.2)
(15.5)
Beh. model 
(one-shot)
-19.5
0.0
17.6
***
***
***
*
Number of 
subjects
30
22
30
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Estimation
results
ߤఊ෥
ߪఊ෥
1.084 (0.125)
0.614
Mode
Mean
Std. dev.
2.028
3.571
2.416
Distribution 
of ߛ, ߚ, ߬, ߣ
Reference 
Point Model 2Original Model
Reference 
Point Model 1
log(ࣦ)
BIC
-3,021
6,076
-3,023
6,073
Goodness
of fit
-3,019
6,084
ߤఉ෩ 0.563 (0.164)0.591 (0.133) 0.661 (0.157)
Mean 1.7561.805 1.936
ߤఛ෤
ߪఛ෤
0.640 (0.222)
0.975
0.698 (0.239)
1.048
ߤఒ෩
ߪఒ෩
-0.025 (0.077)-0.079 (0.074)
0.000
Mode
Mean
Std. dev.
0.733
3.053
3.849
0.671
3.480
4.919
ߪ௨ 11.876 11.849 11.887
Mode
Mean
Std. dev.
0.976
0.976
0.924
0.924
0.000
Not used!
ߛ
ߚ
߬
ߣ
Table 5.1.: Estimation results of models with alternative belief updating
Na¨ıvete´ model.
An alternative approach to behavioral belief updating in signaling games is grounded in the
idea of sophisticated and na¨ıve (or credulous) responses on the part of the signal receiver
(Crawford, 2003; Kartik et al., 2007). Suppose Sales played some invertible strategy s(φ).
A sophisticated response would be if Operations correctly inferred the forecast distortion and
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updated the belief to µ(φ | φˆ) = 1 for φ = s−1(φˆ) (and 0 otherwise). A na¨ıve response would be
if Operations fully trusted the forecast and updated the belief to µ(φ | φˆ) = 1 for φ = φˆ (and 0
otherwise). Our experimental data suggests that subjects seem to be quite sophisticated since
the average value of forecast corrections approximately offsets the average value of forecast
distortions (see Table 4.2). However, it is possible that some subjects do not fully adjust to
the sophisticated response but are more credulous than others. We use a factor θ ∈ (0; 1] to
indicate the “degree of na¨ıvete´” and we model the belief of Operations as
µθ(φ | φˆ) =

1 for φ = θφˆ+ (1− θ)s−1(φˆ),
0 otherwise.
Note that the na¨ıvete´-based belief is similar to the trust-based belief because both place some
weight on the actual forecast. The advantage of the na¨ıvete´ model is that it takes into account
different incentive parameterizations because the remaining weight (1− θ) is not attributed to
the prior distribution Φ but to the inverted signal s−1(φˆ).
Based on the knowledge that, for a given set of incentive parameters, subjects seem to distort
forecasts by a fixed value that is independent of the market condition, we limit attention to
linear signaling strategies of the form sθ(φ) = φ + δ with s
′
θ(φ) = 1. Then, the following
proposition describes a set of equilibrium strategies for Sales and Operations:
Proposition 3. If Operations uses a na¨ıvete´-based belief updating rule µθ, and if at least po > 0
or β > 0, there exists the following equilibrium:
(a) The best response of Operations to a forecast φˆ is the quantity
qθ(φˆ) = θφˆ+ (1− θ)s−1(φˆ) +G−1(α).
(b) The best response of Sales is the strategy sθ(φ) = φ+ δθ, where δθ solves the first-order
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condition
b
[
1−G (θδθ +G−1 (α))] = γ [(po + pu)G (δθ)− pu]

+β for po − pu < 2γ (b(1− α)− β),
−β for po − pu > 2γ (b(1− α) + β).
For 2γ (b(1− α)− β) ≤ po − pu ≤ 2γ (b(1− α) + β), the best response of Sales is the truthful
forecast, i.e., δθ = 0.
Table 5.1 reports the results of subject-level OLS estimations. The estimates for θ suggest
that Sales expects Operations to be partly na¨ıve and partly sophisticated. However, the BIC
of the na¨ıvete´ model is bigger than the BIC of the base model, indicating that the base model
provides a better fit to our data due to a more economical use of parameters.
5.1.2. Expectations-Based Reference Points
In the formulation of the utility function of Sales (Section 3.1.2), we assume a status quo-based
reference point in the evaluation of forecast errors. As a result, all forecast error penalties are
perceived as losses and the effect of loss aversion is captured by the forecast error penalty
factor γ. Because we do not know if a status quo-based reference point of zero adequately
captures reference-dependent valuations in our setting, we next analyze alternative reference
points. Since there is no externally given reference point in our experiments, such as a goal or
target bonus level (e.g., Heath et al., 1999; Ockenfels et al., 2015), we explore the possibility
of expectations-based reference points in more depth.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) had already acknowledged that “there are situations in which
gains and losses are coded relative to an expectation or aspiration level that differs from
the status quo” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, p. 286). According to Ko˝szegi and Rabin
(2006), expectations-based reference points are “determined endogenously” by the decision
maker (Ko˝szegi and Rabin, 2006, p. 1133) and as Ho et al. (2010) argue, these reference points
are likely to be formed based on salient pieces of information that the decision maker receives
or expects to receive.
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With regard to the forecast decision in our setting, the two most salient pieces of information
are the market condition φ and the demand realization d = φ + e. Hence, Sales could form
reference forecast error penalties by imagining a situation where the forecast matches the
market condition (the truthful forecast) or where the forecast matches actual demand and as
such causes no forecast error penalty. To test these two reference points formally, we follow the
approach of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) and split the forecast error related part of the utility
function into “consumption utilities”
UPS (φˆ | φ) = −EE
(
po[φˆ− (φ+ E)]+
)
,
UNS (φˆ | φ) = −EE
(
pu[(φ+ E)− φˆ]+
)
,
and “gain-loss utilities”
v¯
(
poEE
(
[φˆR − (φ+ E)]+ − [φˆ− (φ+ E)]+
))
,
v¯
(
puEE
(
[(φ+ E)− φˆR]+ − [(φ+ E)− φˆ]+
))
,
where φˆR is the reference forecast and v¯ is a value function. Compared to our original model,
we use a slightly modified version of the value function v¯(x) = τ [x]+−λτ [−x]+, where τ is the
weight on the gain-loss utility and λ ≥ 1 is a loss aversion factor.
If the reference forecast is the realized demand (φˆR = d), Sales evaluates deviations from
the expected forecast error that would result if Sales forecasted realized demand correctly.
Then we have [φˆR − (φ + E)]+ = [(φ + E) − φˆR]+ = 0 and the value function is applied to
the negative consumption utilities UPS (φˆ | φ), UNS (φˆ | φ), which results in a total reference-
dependent forecast error utility of (1 +λτ)
(
UPS (φˆ | φ) + UNS (φˆ | φ)
)
. This model is equivalent
to our original model where the reference forecast error penalty is also equal to zero, with the
only difference that we have γ = 1 + λτ . Hence, we do not analyze this model further.
If the reference forecast is the market condition (φˆR = φ), Sales evaluates deviations from
the expected forecast error that would result from a truthful forecast. Note that the resulting
reference point, i.e., the reference forecast error penalty from setting φˆR = φ, is still stochastic
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due to the remaining uncertainty in E. Adding the respective gain-loss utilities to the utility
function of Sales gives
URS (q, φˆ | φ) =CS + bEE (min(φ+ E), q)− EE
(
po[φˆ− (φ+ E)]+ + pu[(φ+ E)− φˆ]+
)
+ τ
(
poEE
[
[−E]+ − [φˆ− (φ+ E)]+
]+
+ puEE
[
[E]+ − [(φ+ E)− φˆ]+
]+)
− λτ
(
poEE
[
[φˆ− (φ+ E)]+ − [−E]+
]+
+ puEE
[
[(φ+ E)− φˆ]+ − [E]+
]+)
− β
∣∣∣φˆ− φ∣∣∣ .
(5.1)
The following proposition describes an equilibrium, which is structurally equivalent to the
equilibrium of Theorem 1, but based on the utility function of Equation (5.1):
Proposition 4. If Sales evaluates forecast error penalties relative to an expectations-based
reference point of φˆR = φ, and if po > (b(1 − α) − β)/(1 + λτ), there exists a separating
equilibrium (ssepR , q
sep
R , µ
sep
R ):
(i) For all φ: ssepR (φ) = φ+ δ
sep
R ,
(ii) for all φˆ: qsepR (φˆ) = φˆ− δsepR +G−1(α),
(iii) for all φ, φˆ: µsepR (φ | φˆ) =

1 for φ = φˆ− δsepR ,
0 otherwise,
with distortion value
δsepR =

G−1
(
b(1−α)+(1+τ)pu−β
(1+τ)pu+(1+λτ)po
)
for po <
(1+τ)
(1+λτ)pu + 2
b(1−α)−β
(1+λτ) ,
0 for (1+τ)(1+λτ)pu + 2
b(1−α)−β
(1+λτ) ≤ po ≤ (1+λτ)(1+τ) pu + 2 b(1−α)+β(1+τ) ,
G−1
(
b(1−α)+(1+λτ)pu+β
(1+λτ)pu+(1+τ)po
)
for po >
(1+λτ)
(1+τ) pu + 2
b(1−α)+β
(1+τ) .
(5.2)
The equilibrium of this model is structurally equivalent to the equilibrium of the original
behavioral model (see Theorem 1). The main difference is that γ is now replaced by either
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(1 + τ) or (1 + λτ). For example, in the domain of inflated forecasts (first case of δsepR ),
the expected overforecasting penalty is bigger than the expected overforecasting penalty from
reporting the true market condition. Hence po is weighed by (1 + λτ). On the contrary, the
expected underforecasting penalty is smaller than the expected underforecasting penalty from
reporting the true market condition. Hence pu is weighed by (1 + τ). Note that we cannot
keep the original parameter γ as a factor that scales the forecast error penalties and captures
the possible effects of ex-post forecast error minimization or ambiguity aversion because the
model would be overparameterized.
We use the equilibrium prediction δsepR in order to estimate the parameters τ, λ, and β
by ML estimation with mixed effects. Table 5.2 summarizes the estimation results of the
original behavioral model (Model 3 of Table 4.3) and two reference point models. Similar to
the estimation in Section 4.1.4, we assume that τ and λ are log-normally distributed random
coefficients and that β is a log-transformed fixed coefficient (Reference Point Model 1). We find
that the explanatory power of this model is slightly better than that of the original model but
at the cost of an additional parameter, which results in a slightly higher information criterion
(a BIC of 6,084 versus a BIC of 6,073). The random coefficients in Reference Point Model 1
are highly correlated (ρ = −0.987), indicating that the random effects of both parameters are
redundant. Besides, the standard deviation of λ is estimated to be zero, which suggests that
the random effect of the parameter does not yield additional value to the model.
We therefore reduce Reference Point Model 1 to a model where only τ is assumed to be
random (Reference Point Model 2). The BIC improves compared to Reference Point Model
1 and the removal of one parameter does not lead to a worse model fit (likelihood ratio test,
p > 0.05). However, the reduced model also falls slightly behind the goodness of fit of the
original model (a BIC of 6,076 versus a BIC of 6,073), indicating that the expectations-based
reference point that we consider does not provide a better explanation of the data than the
status quo-based reference point. Additionally, the interpretation of the estimates of Reference
Point Model 2 is similar to the original model: The estimate for λ is 0.976 and not significantly
different from 1 (t-test, p = 0.75). This implies that there is not a clear change in preferences
between the domains of gains and losses at the assumed reference point. Given λ ≈ 1, the
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Note: Reported numbers are the mean, [median] and (standard deviation) of the subject-level estimates. 
ߛ
ߚ
ݐ
ߠ
Bayesian Model
4,159
4.059 [2.227] (4.599)
2.610 [1.566] (2.600)
Estimates
BIC
Trust Model
4,348
3.728 [1.857] (4.754)
1.429 [0.476] (1.778)
0.871 [1.000] (0.335)
Naïveté Model
4,343
3.954 [1.857] (4.664)
1.949 [0.952] (2.238)
0.543 [0.500] (0.434)
Treatment
(ܾ/݌݋/݌ݑ)
R1 (14/3/3)
R2 (10/6/4)
R3 (10/12/2)
Corr.
ߩ(߶෠, ߶)
0.95
0.91
0.89
Std. model
(one-shot)
n/a
38.4
0.0
Act. average 
(repeated)
8.0
-0.6
-8.6
Forecast distortion ߶෠ െ ߶
(12.2)
(15.2)
(16.8)
Note: Significances of differences between model predictions and actual averages (Wilcoxon signed-rank test): *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
Standard deviations reported in parentheses. Correlation is the Pearson correlation coefficient.
Beh. model 
(one-shot)
19.5
0.0
-17.6
***
**
***
**
Corr.
ߩ(ݍ,߶෠)
0.84
0.82
0.82
Std. model
(one-shot)
n/a
-38.4
0.0
Act. average 
(repeated)
-6.8
-3.5
3.6
Forecast correction ݍ െ ߶෠
(16.2)
(19.2)
(15.5)
Beh. model 
(one-shot)
-19.5
0.0
17.6
***
***
***
*
Number of 
subjects
30
22
30
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Estimation
results
ߤఊ෥
ߪఊ෥
1.084 (0.125)
0.614
Mode
Mean
Std. dev.
2.028
3.571
2.416
Distribution 
of ߛ, ߚ, ߬, ߣ
Reference 
Point Model 2Original Model
Reference 
Point Model 1
log(ࣦ)
BIC
-3,021
6,076
-3,023
6,073
Goodness
of fit
-3,019
6,084
ߤఉ෩ 0.563 (0.164)0.591 (0.133) 0.661 (0.157)
Mean 1.7561.805 1.936
ߤఛ෤
ߪఛ෤
0.640 (0.222)
0.975
0.698 (0.239)
1.048
ߤఒ෩
ߪఒ෩
-0.025 (0.077)-0.079 (0.074)
0.000
Mode
Mean
Std. dev.
0.733
3.053
3.849
0.671
3.480
4.919
ߪ௨ 11.876 11.849 11.887
Mode
Mean
Std. dev.
0.976
0.976
0.924
0.924
0.000
Not used!
ߛ
ߚ
߬
ߣ
Table 5.2.: Estimation results of reference point models
only difference between δsep and δsepR is that the forecast error penalty factor γ of the original
model is replaced by (1 + τ) in the expectations-based reference point model. The estimates
of γ = 3.571 and (1 + τ) = 4.053 are similar in value as well. The same is true for the
estimates of the lying aversion factor β in both models (β = 1.805 in the original model and
β = 1.756 in Reference Point Model 2). Hence, we conclude that a model with a reference
forecast φˆR = φ does not deliver a better explanation of our data than the original model and
that the interpretation of the parameters supports a reference point of zero.
We acknowledge that the discussion above only scratches the surface of the complex issue of
reference-dependent utility. Subjects might form all kinds of (potentially different and time-
varying) reference points based on their individual experience and subjective expectations. We
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have taken the two most salient pieces of information in our setting and used them to form
a reference point with regard to the forecast decision. The analyses indicate that a status
quo-based reference point provides a good explanation of the behavior that we observe in our
experiments.
5.2. Additional Experiments
5.2.1. Computerized Order Decisions
To further support our choice of behavioral parameters, we tested the extent to which their
effects are driven by the interaction between two human beings. We ran an experiment where
16 Sales subjects interacted with a computer instead of a human counterpart, repeating Treat-
ments 5–8 of the main experiment with the same choice of incentive parameters for Sales.
Again, half of the subjects played the treatments in the order shown in Table 4.1, and the
other half in reverse order. The design of the experiment and the results are summarized in
Table 5.3. Subjects received the same briefing as in the main experiment, with the only differ-
ence that their forecast now served as data input for a production planning system. We used
the rounded standard model predictions for the behavior of Operations as the decision rule
for the planning system. For example, in Treatment 5C the system planned to produce the
forecast minus 38 units. Subjects were informed about these automated decision rules. They
could use a decision support table, which showed that their expected profits were maximized
when choosing exactly the same amount of inflation that the system would subsequently deduct
from the forecast.
The best response of Sales in the computerized setting varies from the original setting because
the order decision of the computer is now a deterministic function qc(φˆ) = φˆ− c, where c is the
constant that the computer deducts from the forecast. The following proposition summarizes
the optimal response of Sales to such an ordering strategy:
Proposition 5. If the (automated) order decision is qc(φˆ) = φˆ − c and if at least po > 0 or
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β > 0, the best response of Sales is the forecast φˆc that solves the first-order condition
b
(
1−G
(
φˆc − φ− c
))
= γ(po + pu)G
(
φˆc − φ
)
− γpu

+β for po − pu < 2γ [b(1−G(−c))− β],
−β for po − pu > 2γ [b(1−G(−c)) + β].
(5.3)
For 2γ [b(1−G(−c))− β] ≤ po − pu ≤ 2γ [b(1−G(−c)) + β], the best response of Sales is the
truthful forecast φˆc = φ.
Note: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Expected cost of Operations are reported in ECUs, 
excluding fixed compensation ܥை. Expectations are taken with respect to ܧ. 
Treatment
(ܾ/݌݋/݌ݑ)
5C (10/6/4)
6C (10/8/2)
7C (10/10/0)
8C (10/12/2)
Standard 
model
38.1
15.9
0.0
0.0
Actual average 
(comp. experiment)
29.8
10.5
-3.5
-2.4
Forecast distortion ߶෠ െ ߶
(17.5)
(13.3)
(12.4)
(10.4)
Actual average 
(main experiment)
1.2
-8.4
-16.7
-14.8
(14.4)
(14.2)
(17.1)
(14.0)
Forecast 
correction by 
computer
-38.0
-16.0
0.0
0.0
Expected 
cost of 
Operations
283
264
259
254
(55.3)
(33.2)
(25.2)
(15.4)
Note: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
Treatment
(ܾ/݌݋/݌ݑ)
5C (10/6/4)
6C (10/8/2)
7C (10/10/0)
8C (10/12/2)
Standard 
model
38.1
15.9
0.0
0.0
Actual average 
(computerized experiment)
29.8
10.5
-3.5
-2.4
Forecast distortion ߶෠ െ ߶
(17.5)
(13.3)
(12.4)
(10.4)
Actual average 
(main experiment)
1.2
-8.4
-16.7
-14.8
(14.4)
(14.2)
(17.1)
(14.0)
Forecast correction 
by computer
-38.0
-16.0
0.0
0.0
Changed for
DIss
Table 5.3.: Design and results of the computerized order decisions experiment
As argued in Section 3.1.2, payoffs in the incentive system of Sales differ in their level of
uncertainty when interacting with a human Operations player. While payoffs from forecast
error penalties depend on the known uncertainty in the market error E, the sales bonus is
ambiguous because it also depends on the (individual) quantity choice of Operations. Even
though we set α = 0.5 in the main experiment to minimize the potential biases in Operations’
order decision, Sales subjects cannot be sure that Operations players update their beliefs as
assumed and translate this belief into a rational order decision. Letting a computer make
this decision based on a known algorithm removes this ambiguity. In other words, for a given
forecast decision, Sales knows the order quantity with certainty and can hence compute the
expected sales bonus based on the known uncertainty in the market error E. Consequently,
forecast decisions in the computerized experiment should not be biased towards optimizing the
forecast error penalty, which we expect to result in a smaller parameter value γ. Note that
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the other drivers of γ (loss aversion and ex-post forecast error minimization) are not related
to the strategic nature of the game and should therefore still be reflected in the forecast error
penalty factor γ. Hence, we have the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6. The forecast error penalty factor γ in the computerized experiment is smaller
than in the main experiment, but larger than in the standard model, i.e., 1 < γ < 3.571.
In addition to removing the effect of ambiguity aversion, the modifications in the computer-
ized experiment should also eliminate social concerns (Katok and Wu, 2009). As discussed in
Section 3.1.2, we expect Sales to experience a disutility when lying to Operations. In the exist-
ing literature, lying aversion has only been studied in economic settings with social interactions.
We are not aware of any studies that test whether lying aversion prevails in interactions with
nonhuman players. Instead, all concurrent explanations for the phenomenon of lying aversion,
ranging from “guilt aversion” (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006) to people having a “preference
for promise-keeping per se” (Vanberg, 2008), suggest that it is rooted in the interaction with
another human being. Hence, we do not expect subjects in the computerized experiment to
feel a disutility from reporting untruthful forecasts, which is formulated in the next hypothesis:
Hypothesis 7. The lying aversion factor β in the computerized experiment
(a) is smaller than in the main experiment, i.e., β < 1.805, and
(b) does not improve the fit of the model compared to a model without a lying aversion factor.
Figure 5.1 shows the results of the experiment, i.e., the individual forecast decisions and the
resulting order quantities. The dashed lines mark the equilibrium of Proposition 5 based on
the standard model assumptions (γ = 1, β = 0). Table 5.3 summarizes the predicted forecast
distortions under standard model assumptions, the actual average forecast distortions of the
main experiment and the actual average forecast distortions of the computerized experiment.
The average forecast distortions of the computerized experiment differ considerably from the
forecast distortions of the main experiment (Mann–Whitney U test, p < 0.001 for all compar-
isons). Furthermore, they are not significantly different from the predictions of the standard
model (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p > 0.140 for all treatments).
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Experiment 6 (computer) – overview of
decisions
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Figure 5.1.: Forecast and order decisions of the computerized order decisions experiment
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Since we do not have a closed-form solution for the forecasting behavior of Sales (Equation
5.3), we use subject-level OLS to generate estimates for γ and β (see Computer Model 1 in
Table 5.4). In support of Hypothesis 6, the average estimate of γ = 1.585 is significantly
different from both the average ML estimate (γ = 3.571) and the average OLS estimate (γ =
4.059) of the main experiment (Mann–Whitney U test, p < 0.01 for both comparisons) but
significantly greater than one (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0.005). Similarly, in support
of Hypothesis 7(a), the average estimate of β = 0.770 is significantly different from the ML
estimate (β = 1.805, Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0.008) and the average OLS estimate
(β = 2.610, Mann–Whitney U test, p = 0.006) of the main experiment.
Due to a restriction of β ≥ 0 in the estimation procedure to ensure existence of equilibria,
the average estimate of β = 0.770 is significantly greater than zero (Wilcoxon signed-rank
test, p = 0.008). Note, however, that the median estimate of β = 0.051 is close to zero. We
therefore estimate a restricted model (Computer Model 2) with β = 0. Computer Model 2
results in a slightly better aggregate model fit (BIC = 2,538) than Computer Model 1 (BIC =
2,542), which supports Hypothesis 7(b). Moreover, on the level of the individual subject, the
unrestricted model (Computer Model 1) delivers a significantly better fit to the data for only
two out of 16 subjects (F -test, p > 0.163 for 14 subjects, p < 0.05 for two subjects). Note that
we do not use likelihood ratio tests for model comparison as in the main experiment due to
the different estimation procedures.
Note: Reported numbers are the mean, [median], and (standard deviation) of 
the subject-level estimates. 
ߛ
ߚ
Computer Model 1
2,542
1.585 [1.091] (0.881)
0.770 [0.051] (1.698)
Estimates
BIC
Computer Model 2 
2,538
1.508 [1.090] (0.804)
Intercept
߶ (market condition)
߶෠ (forecast)
ܶ2 (14/3/3)
ܶ3 (12/7/7)
ܶ4 (10/10/10)
ܶ5 (10/6/4)
ܶ6 (10/8/2)
ܶ7 (10/10/0)
ܶ8 (10/12/2)
ݐ (period)
Forecast ߶෠ Quantity ݍVariable
56.282
0.872
-27.495
-34.061
-37.157
-39.868
-49.373
-57.565
-55.461
-0.154
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
(3.602)
(0.017)
(2.052)
(2.052)
(2.052)
(4.332)
(4.332)
(4.332)
(4.332)
(0.099)
10.258
0.643
13.398
22.116
25.628
26.831
27.740
30.289
30.610
0.111
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
**
(3.499)
(0.014)
(1.938)
(1.963)
(1.979)
(3.874)
(3.895)
(3.916)
(3.907)
(0.051)
Note: Significance of estimates (ݐ-test): *** ݌ < 0.01, ** ݌ < 0.05, * ݌ < 0.1. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Note: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Expected cost of Operations are reported in ECUs, excluding fixed compensation ܥை and expectations are taken with respect to ܧ.
1 (16/0/0)
2 (14/3/3)
3 (12/7/7)
4 (10/10/10)
Treatment
(ܾ/݌݋/݌ݑ)
5 (10/6/4)
6 (10/8/2)
7 (10/10/0)
8 (10/12/2)
40.7
13.3
6.9
3.9
All 
subjects
1.2
-8.4
-16.7
-14.8
Forecast distortion ߶෠ െ ߶
(41.6)
(16.0)
(12.3)
(11.8)
(14.4)
(14.2)
(17.1)
(14.0)
-38.9
-15.4
-3.9
1.0
All 
subjects
3.2
7.1
12.3
11.6
Forecast correction ݍ െ ߶෠
(46.0)
(20.3)
(14.4)
(9.7)
(13.2)
(14.9)
(15.0)
(15.2)
374
308
280
267
(169.0)
(87.4)
(67.9)
(39.7)
285
288
298
284
(72.1)
(66.9)
(80.6)
(68.1)
44.4
14.3
7.0
4.3
Normal 
order
3.5
-8.0
-19.1
-16.0
(53.3)
(19.4)
(13.0)
(9.7)
(15.5)
(15.2)
(20.1)
(11.8)
37.0
12.4
6.8
3.6
Reverse 
order
-1.0
-8.8
-14.4
-13.5
(25.0)
(11.7)
(11.7)
(13.6)
(12.9)
(13.4)
(13.2)
(15.9)
-48.0
-21.0
-9.1
-1.6
Normal 
order
5.7
10.4
16.0
15.6
(55.0)
(16.9)
(10.2)
(6.3)
(13.8)
(16.9)
(15.1)
(14.8)
-29.7
-9.7
1.2
3.6
Reverse 
order
0.6
3.9
8.6
7.5
(33.1)
(21.9)
(16.1)
(11.7)
(12.3)
(11.9)
(14.2)
(14.5)
All 
subjects
Expected cost of Operations
360
304
271
255
Normal 
order
293
295
305
270
(150.5)
(77.4)
(56.9)
(22.5)
(86.2)
(81.4)
(94.8)
(59.3)
386
312
290
278
Reverse 
order
277
281
292
298
(186.0)
(96.6)
(76.5)
(49.0)
(54.2)
(47.9)
(63.5)
(73.6)
Note: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. 
1 (16/0/0)
2 (14/3/3)
3 (12/7/7)
4 (10/10/10)
Treatment
(ܾ/݌݋/݌ݑ)
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6 (10/8/2)
7 (10/10/0)
8 (10/12/2)
40.7
13.3
6.9
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subjects
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(41.6)
(16.0)
(12.3)
(11.8)
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(17.1)
(14.0)
-38.9
-15.4
-3.9
1.0
All 
subjects
3.2
7.1
12.3
11.6
Forecast correction ݍ െ ߶෠
(46.0)
(20.3)
(14.4)
(9.7)
(13.2)
(14.9)
(15.0)
(15.2)
44.4
14.3
7.0
4.3
Normal 
order
3.5
-8.0
-19.1
-16.0
(53.3)
(19.4)
(13.0)
(9.7)
(15.5)
(15.2)
(20.1)
(11.8)
37.0
12.4
6.8
3.6
Reverse 
order
-1.0
-8.8
-14.4
-13.5
(25.0)
(11.7)
(11.7)
(13.6)
(12.9)
(13.4)
(13.2)
(15.9)
-48.0
-21.0
-9.1
-1.6
Normal 
order
5.7
10.4
16.0
15.6
(55.0)
(16.9)
(10.2)
(6.3)
(13.8)
(16.9)
(15.1)
(14.8)
-29.7
-9.7
1.2
3.6
Reverse 
order
0.6
3.9
8.6
7.5
(33.1)
(21.9)
(16.1)
(11.7)
(12.3)
(11.9)
(14.2)
(14.5)
Too w
D
Table 5.4.: Estimation results of the computerized order decisions experiment
While the experiment with automated order decisions does not exclude alternative behavioral
factors as drivers for the forecast and order decisions that we observe in the main experiment,
it does provide support for our choice of behavioral parameters: Both γ and β change with
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respect to the direction predicted by their underlying theories when we replace the human
Operations player with a computerized one.
5.2.2. Repeated Interactions
In our behavioral model and in the main experiment, we assume that Sales and Operations do
not know each other and interact only once. Their decisions are assumed to be independent
of any past experience or future expectations regarding the behavior of their counterpart.
Interactions between departments of one company, however, are likely to occur repeatedly. In
the case of forecast information sharing, this may happen on a monthly basis as shown in the
case example of PharmaCo (Chapter2). We therefore ran two additional experimental sessions,
where Sales subjects interacted with the same Operations player over the course of 30 periods.
The design of the experiment and the results are summarized in Table 5.5. Figure 5.2 shows
the individual forecast and order decisions of all subjects. Dashed lines mark the predictions
of the one-shot behavioral model (γ = 3.571, β = 1.805).
We chose one treatment of the main experiment with inflated forecasts to model the situation
that we frequently observed in practice (Treatment 2) and one treatment with truthful forecasts
(Treatment 5). Each treatment was played with a different group of subjects (30 subjects in
Treatment 2R and 22 subjects in Treatment 5R). Subjects received the same briefing as in the
main experiment, except that they were informed about the fact that they would interact with
the same partner throughout the entire experiment. Also, they were told that the experiment
would last between 20 and 40 periods in order to avoid endgame behavior. We excluded one
observation from the data where a Sales subject accidentally entered an order quantity of 1,000
instead of 100 in period 28, which (s)he reported to the experimenter when collecting the payoff.
Excluding all observations of this subject and his/her fellow player does not change the results
of our analyses. The analyses below are therefore based on all but this single observation.
Previous research has shown that repeated interactions and their resulting effect on reputa-
tion foster cooperation (Dal Bo´, 2005). Unlike cooperative actions that are based on reciprocity
or fairness (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), cooperative behavior in
repeated interactions is mainly due to the fact that the actors “expect future material benefits
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Treatment
(ܾ/݌݋/݌ݑ)
R1 (14/3/3)
R2 (10/6/4)
Corr.
ߩ(߶෠, ߶)
0.95
0.91
Std. model
(one-shot)
n/a
38.4
Act. average 
(repeated)
8.0
-0.6
Forecast distortion ߶෠ െ ߶
(12.2)
(15.2)
Note: Significances of differences between model predictions and actual averages (Wilcoxon signed-rank test): *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
Standard deviations reported in parentheses. Correlation is the Pearson correlation coefficient.
Beh. model 
(one-shot)
19.5
0.0
***
***
Corr.
ߩ(ݍ,߶෠)
0.84
0.82
Std. model
(one-shot)
n/a
-38.4
Act. average 
(repeated)
-6.8
-3.5
Forecast correction ݍ െ ߶෠
(16.2)
(19.2)
Beh. model 
(one-shot)
-19.5
0.0
***
***
Number of 
subjects
30
22
Treatment
(ܾ/݌݋/݌ݑ)
R1 (14/3/3)
R2 (10/6/4)
Corr.
ߩ(߶෠, ߶)
0.95
0.91
Std. model
(one-shot)
n/a
38.4
Act. average 
(repeated)
8.0
-0.6
Forecast distortion ߶෠ െ ߶
(12.2)
(15.2)
Note: Standard deviations reported in parentheses. Correlation is the Pearson correlation coefficient.
Beh. model 
(one-shot)
19.5
0.0
Corr.
ߩ(ݍ,߶෠)
0.84
0.82
Std. model
(one-shot)
n/a
-38.4
Act. average 
(repeated)
-6.8
-3.5
Forecast correction ݍ െ ߶෠
(16.2)
(19.2)
Beh. model 
(one-shot)
-19.5
0.0
Number of 
subjects
30
22
Note: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Correlation is the Pearson correlation coefficient.
Treatment
(ܾ/݌݋/݌ݑ)
R1 (14/3/3)
R2 (10/6/4)
Corr.
ߩ(߶෠, ߶)
0.95
0.91
Std. model
(one-shot)
n/a
38.4
Act. average 
(repeated)
8.0
-0.6
Forecast distortion ߶෠ െ ߶
(12.2)
(15.2)
Beh. model 
(one-shot)
19.5
0.0
Corr.
ߩ(ݍ,߶෠)
0.84
0.82
Std. model
(one-shot)
n/a
-38.4
Act. average 
(repeated)
-6.8
-3.5
Forecast correction ݍ െ ߶෠
(16.2)
(19.2)
Beh. model 
(one-shot)
-19.5
0.0
Number of 
subjects
30
22
Number of 
subjects
30
22
Note: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. 
Treatment
(ܾ/݌݋/݌ݑ)
2R (14/3/3)
5R (10/6/4)
Forecast distortion ߶෠ െ ߶
Act. avg. 
(repeated)
8.0
-0.5
(12.3)
(15.3)
Behavioral 
model
19.5
0.0
Forecast correction ݍ െ ߶෠
Act. avg.
(one-shot)
13.3
1.2
(16.0)
(14.4)
-6.8
-4.0
(16.2)
(19.1)
Act. avg. 
(repeated)
-15.4
3.2
(20.3)
(13.2)
Act. avg.
(one-shot)
-19.5
0.0
Behavioral 
model
Order deviation ݍ െ ߶
1.2
-4.7
(20.1)
(20.8)
Act. avg. 
(repeated)
-2.0
4.4
(24.3)
(19.3)
Act. avg.
(one-shot)
0.0
0.0
Behavioral 
model
Not used!
Not used!
Not used!
Note: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Expected cost of Operations are reported in ECUs, excluding 
fixed compensation ܥை. Expectations are taken with respect to ܧ. 
Treatment
(ܾ/݌݋/݌ݑ)
2R (14/3/3)
5R (10/6/4)
Forecast distortion ߶෠ െ ߶
Act. avg. 
(repeated)
8.0
-0.5
(12.3)
(15.3)
Beh.
model
19.5
0.0
Forecast correction ݍ െ ߶෠
Act. avg.
(one-shot)
13.3
1.2
(16.0)
(14.4)
-6.8
-4.0
(16.2)
(19.1)
Act. avg. 
(repeated)
-15.4
3.2
(20.3)
(13.2)
Act. avg.
(one-shot)
-19.5
0.0
Beh.
model
Expected cost of
Operations
285
291
(30.4)
(30.4)
Act. avg. 
(repeated)
308
285
(87.4)
(72.1)
Act. avg.
(one-shot)
Too wide for
Diss
Table 5.5.: Design and results of the repeated interactions experiment
from their actions” (Fehr and Falk, 2002, p. 689). For example, in the case of signaling games,
the use of trigger or review strategies by the signal receiver (in our case Operations) can help
to uncover untruthful forecasting behavior (for a discussion and further references, see Ren
et al., 2010).
For their game of forecast information sharing with sales-bonus-only incentives, the exper-
imental data of O¨zer et al. (2011) suggests that forecasts are more truthful in a repeated
interaction than a one-time interaction but that some forecast distortion remains if Operations
cannot perfectly verify the amount of forecast distortion ex-post. Hence, we formulate the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 8. The absolute values of forecast distortions and corrections in a repeated inter-
action are
(a) smaller than those predicted by the one-shot behavioral model, and
(b) smaller than those observed in the one-shot experiment.
For incentive systems where the behavioral model predicts inflated forecasts and where
we observe inflated forecasts in the main experiment (Treatment 2R), Hypothesis 8 implies
that forecasts will be less inflated in a repeated interaction. For incentive systems where the
behavioral model predicts truthful forecasting and where we observe truthful forecasts in the
main experiment (Treatment 5R), the hypothesis implies that forecasts will also be truthful in
a repeated interaction.
Table 5.5 shows the predictions of the behavioral model (γ = 3.571, β = 1.805) under one-
shot assumptions next to the results of the one-shot and repeated interactions experiment. We
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Experiment 8 (repeated)
Treatment 2R (ܾ ൌ 14, ݌௢ ൌ 3, ݌௨ ൌ 3)
Treatment 5R (ܾ ൌ 10, ݌௢ ൌ 6, ݌௨ ൌ 4)
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Figure 5.2.: Forecast and order decisions of the repeated interactions experiment
find support for Hypothesis 8(a) in both treatments of the experiment. In Treatment 2R, the
actual average forecast inflation in the experiment is 8.0. It is significantly smaller than the
behavioral model prediction (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0.001), but significantly greater
than zero (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0.002). Similarly, the absolute average forecast
correction of 6.8 is significantly smaller than predicted by the behavioral model (Wilcoxon
signed-rank test, p = 0.001), but significantly greater than zero (Wilcoxon signed-rank test,
p = 0.004). For Treatment 5R, the one-shot behavioral model predicts truthful information
sharing and the results are in line with the prediction: The average forecast distortions and
corrections are not significantly different from zero (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p > 0.5 in both
cases).
In order to test Hypothesis 8(b), we run GLS random effects regressions based on the data
of Treatments 2 and 5 of the main experiment and Treatments 2R and 5R of the repeated
interactions experiment. We regress the forecast φˆ on the market condition φ, on a dummy
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variable T2 that differentiates Treatments 2 and 2R (T2 = 1) from Treatments 5 and 5R
(T2 = 0) and on two dummy variables that mark the repeated interaction treatments (T2R and
T5R). Note that we add two dummy variables for the repeated interaction setting because we
expect different effects of the repeated interaction in Treatment 2R compared to Treatment 5R.
Due to the different experimental setups of the main experiment (subjects played four different
treatments over eight periods each) and the repeated interactions experiment (subjects played
only one treatment over 30 periods), there could be other factors than the repeated interaction
that affect behavior. We try to control for part of these factors by adding the period t, and the
period within a treatment (tT ) as variables that represent the experience of a subject in the
regression. We run a similar regression for the order quantity q, except that we use the forecast
φˆ as an explanatory variable instead of the market condition φ. The regression functions are
as follows:
φˆit = Intercept+ηφ ·φit+ηFCT2 ·T2it+ηFCT2R ·T2Rit+ηFCT5R ·T5Rit+ηFCt ·t+ηFCtT ·tT +vFCi +uFCit ,
and
qit = Intercept + ηφˆ · φˆit + ηQT2 · T2it + ηQT2R · T2Rit + ηQT5R · T5Rit + ηQt · t+ ηQtT · tT + v
Q
i + u
Q
it ,
where subjects are indexed by i and periods by t. The error terms are split into a subject-
specific part (vFCi ∼ N (0, σ2v,FC), vQi ∼ N (0, σ2v,Q)) and a part that is independent across all
observations (uFCit ∼ N (0, σ2u,FC), uQit ∼ N (0, σ2u,Q)) to account for the grouped structure of
the data.
Table 5.6 summarizes the results of both regressions. Because the overall experience t and
the experience within a treatment tT are highly correlated, including both variables causes
a multicollinearity problem. Therefore, we included only the time variable with the higher
explanatory power in each of the regressions. Confirming previous results, the treatment
dummy variable T2 is highly significant and indicates that, on average, subjects forecast 12.254
units more and order 15.744 units less in Treatment 2 (14/3/3) than in Treatment 5 (10/6/4).
In line with Hypothesis 8(b), we find that when playing Treatment 2 repeatedly with the
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3 (12/7/7)
4 (10/10/10)
Treatment (ܾ/݌݋/݌ݑ)
5 (10/6/4)
6 (10/8/2)
7 (10/10/0)
8 (10/12/2)
3.04
3.54
Mean
5.13
5.98
4.14
5.35
Forecast error penalty factor ߛ
2.73
3.27
Median
2.73
6.50
3.18
5.36
2.19
2.16
Std. dev.
3.93
3.59
2.59
3.37
OLS estimates by treatment
OLS estimates across all treatments
Random effects ML estimates
4.53
4.06
3.57
3.36
2.23
2.96
3.15
4.60
2.42
2.65
2.47
Mean
0.75
3.09
4.84
3.52
Lying aversion factor ߚ
3.03
1.62
Median
0.61
1.52
4.34
3.99
2.09
1.72
Std. dev.
0.97
3.52
3.31
3.34
2.89
2.61
1.80
2.52
1.57
1.80
2.49
2.60
n. a.
Intercept
߶ (market condition)
߶෠ (forecast)
ܶ2 (14/3/3)
ܶ2ܴ (14/3/3 repeated)
ܶ5ܴ (10/6/4 repeated)
ݐ (period)
ݐ் (period within treatment)
Forecast ߶෠
Variable
8.016
0.928
12.254
-5.758
-2.184
0.069
Estimate p-valueStd. Err.
2.869
0.009
3.836
3.843
4.169
0.043
0.005
0.000
0.001
0.134
0.600
0.104
Quantity ݍ
19.890
0.805
-15.744
8.573
-6.119
0.168
Estimate p-valueStd. Err.
3.021
0.012
3.679
3.581
3.877
0.054
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.017
0.115
0.002
Intercept
߶ (market condition)
߶෠ (forecast)
ܶ2 (14/3/3)
ܶ2ܴ (14/3/3 repeated)
ܶ5ܴ (10/6/4 repeated)
ݐ (period)
ݐ் (period within treatment)
Forecast ߶෠ Quantity ݍVariable
8.016
0.928
12.254
-5.758
-2.184
0.069
***
***
***
*
(2.869)
(0.009)
(3.836)
(3.843)
(4.169)
(0.043)
19.890
0.805
-15.744
8.573
-6.119
0.168
***
***
***
**
***
(3.021)
(0.012)
(3.679)
(3.581)
(3.877)
(0.054)
Note: Significance of estimates (ݖ-test): *** ݌ < 0.01, ** ݌ < 0.05, * ݌ < 0.1. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Not used
Table 5.6.: Regression results of repeated interaction effects
same partner (T2R), subjects forecast less (−5.758 units) and order more (8.573 units) than
in the one-shot interaction. This effect is significant for the order quantities (p = 0.017), but
it does not attain conventional levels of statistical significance for the forecasts (p = 0.134).
When playing Treatment 5 repeatedly (T5R), we do not expect to find behavior that differs
from the one-shot interaction and the regressions show that neither forecasts (p = 0.600) nor
order quantities (p = 0.115) are significantly different from those in a one-shot interaction. We
conclude that we find directional support for Hypothesis 8(b).
Figure 5.3 shows the average forecast distortions over time for the two treatments. We
analyzed the data for time and learning effects by conducting a random effects GLS regression
of the forecasts on the market conditions and periods. Period is not a significant explanatory
variable (z-test, p > 0.2 for both treatments), which indicates that forecasting behavior does
not change significantly over time.
Figure 5.4 shows the average forecast corrections over time. The ordering behavior is more
volatile than the forecasting behavior, especially in the first half of the experiment. A random
effects GLS regression of the order quantities on the forecasts and periods reveals that period
is a significant explanatory variable in at least one of the treatments (z-test, p = 0.001 in
Treatment 2R and p = 0.104 in Treatment 5R). In both treatments, order quantities increase
over time (0.23 units per period in Treatments 2R and 0.15 units per period in Treatment 5R).
This observation is consistent with the regression results in Table 5.6 that Operations subjects
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Figure 5.3.: Average forecast distortions over time in the repeated interactions experiment
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Figure 5.4.: Average forecast corrections over time in the repeated interactions experiment
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tend to become slightly more cooperative over time. We will further investigate this finding in
the one-shot setting of the main experiment in Section 5.3.1.
We conclude that repeated interactions alleviate the problem of distorted forecast infor-
mation to some extent, but do not entirely remedy forecast biases in the case of ill-defined
forecast incentives. This finding is in line with our observations at PharmaCo, where some
bias remained in the forecasts after the implementation of forecast accuracy incentives (see
Section 2.3). Additionally, the above analyses suggest that incentive schemes which lead to
truthful information sharing in one-time interactions also support truthful forecasts in a re-
peated game setting. Hence, companies can use the behavioral model of Chapters 3 and 4 to
design incentive systems for truthful forecast information sharing despite a potential violation
of the one-time interaction assumption.
5.3. Supporting Data Analyses
5.3.1. Analysis of Time and Order Effects
In our main experiment, each subject played multiple periods under multiple treatment con-
ditions. We hence run a set of random effects GLS regressions to identify possible time trends
over the course of 32 periods as well as potential treatment order effects caused by the within-
subject design used in each of the two sessions (for a detailed discussion on between- and
within-subject designs, see Charness et al., 2012).
Time effects.
To test if the behavior of subjects in our experiment changes systematically over time, we
regress the forecast φˆ on the market condition φ, dummy variables for seven out of eight
treatments (T2 to T8) and the period t (t = 1..32). We run a similar regression for the order
quantity q, except that we use the forecast φˆ as an explanatory variable instead of the market
condition φ. We formulate the regression functions as
φˆit = Intercept + ηφ · φit + ηFCT2 · T2it + ...+ ηFCT8 · T8it + ηFCt · t+ vFCi + uFCit , (5.4)
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and
qit = Intercept + ηφˆ · φˆit + ηQT2 · T2it + ...+ ηQT8 · T8it + ηQt · t+ vQi + uQit , (5.5)
where subjects are indexed by i and periods by t. The error terms are split into a subject-
specific part (vFCi ∼ N (0, σ2v,FC), vQi ∼ N (0, σ2v,Q)) and a part that is independent across all
observations (uFCit ∼ N (0, σ2u,FC), uQit ∼ N (0, σ2u,Q)) to account for the grouped structure of
the data. We also tested for learning effects within a treatment by adding another variable
to Equations (5.4) and (5.5) that marks the period within a treatment, tT = 1..8, however,
the estimates were not significantly different from zero in the forecast or the order quantity
regression (z-test, p > 0.5).
Note: Reported numbers are the mean, [median], and (standard deviation) of 
the subject-level estimates. 
ߛ
ߚ
Computer Model 1
2,542
1.585 [1.091] (0.881)
0.770 [0.051] (1.698)
Estimates
BIC
Computer Model 2 
2,538
1.508 [1.090] (0.804)
Intercept
߶ (market condition)
߶෠ (forecast)
ܶ2 (14/3/3)
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ܶ6 (10/8/2)
ܶ7 (10/10/0)
ܶ8 (10/12/2)
ݐ (period)
Forecast ߶෠ Quantity ݍVariable
56.282
0.872
-27.495
-34.061
-37.157
-39.868
-49.373
-57.565
-55.461
-0.154
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
(3.602)
(0.017)
(2.052)
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(2.052)
(4.332)
(4.332)
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(0.099)
10.258
0.643
13.398
22.116
25.628
26.831
27.740
30.289
30.610
0.111
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***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
**
(3.499)
(0.014)
(1.938)
(1.963)
(1.979)
(3.874)
(3.895)
(3.916)
(3.907)
(0.051)
Note: Significance of estimates (ݖ-test): *** ݌ < 0.01, ** ݌ < 0.05, * ݌ < 0.1. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Note: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Expected cost of Operations are reported in ECUs, excluding fixed compensation ܥை and expectations are taken with respect to ܧ.
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Table 5.7.: Regression results of time effects in the main experiment
Table 5.7 shows the coefficient estimates for both regressions. The significantly positive
estimates for ηφ and ηφˆ support our previous finding that (a) forecasts depend on the market
condition and (b) order decisions are driven by the forecast (compare Section 4.1.5). The
comparably low estimate ηφˆ = 0.643 in the order quantity regression is considerably driven
by the sales-bonus-only treatment (Treatment 1). Individual regressions by treatment result
in estimates ηφˆ = 0.278 for Treatment 1 and in estimates ηφˆ ∈ (0.700; 0.889) for all other
treatments. The coefficients of the treatment dummies are all significantly different from zero,
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confirming that the use of forecast error incentive schemes leads to different levels of forecasting
and ordering than a sales-bonus-only incentive scheme.
We find time effects in both the forecast decisions of Sales and in the order decisions of
Operations. The size of these effects is moderate: On average, Sales inflates the forecast 4.9
units less and Operations orders 3.6 units more at the end of each session compared to the
beginning. Both trends indicate an increased level of cooperation over time. However, since
both parties adjust their decisions over time, this adaptation is not reflected in the overall
operational performance. When regressing the expected cost of Operations on the treatment
dummies and the period, the time trend is not significant (z-test, p = 0.250).
Interestingly, the time trends in both the forecast and order decisions are at odds with the
time trends that O¨zer et al. (2011) find in their data. Under their sales-bonus-only incentive
system, forecast inflation increases and order decisions decrease over time, hence cooperation
seems to deteriorate over time. These different observations could be an indicator that the
more truthful forecasting behavior under forecast error incentive systems has a positive effect
on cooperation over time. However, additional experimental data would be needed to test if
this reversal in time effects is truly a result of the different incentive systems or rather a result
of the different experimental setups, e.g., due to the use of multiple treatments per subject in
our setting versus one treatment per subject in the experiment of O¨zer et al. (2011).
To analyze whether the time trends found in the above regressions are driven by our experi-
mental design, we run separate regressions by session. We regress the forecast φˆ on the market
condition φ, dummy variables for three out of four treatments (T2 to T4 for Session 1 and T6
to T8 for Session 2), the period t and a dummy SG that indicates whether a subject played
the treatments in the order shown in Table 4.1 (SG = 0) or in reverse order (SG = 1). We also
tested for interaction effects between period and subgroup, but did not find any of significance
(z-tests, p > 0.1 in all regressions). Again, we run a similar regression for the order quantity
q, except that we use the forecast φˆ as an explanatory variable instead of the market condition
φ.
Table 5.8 shows the coefficient estimates for both sessions. The time coefficients ηFCt and
ηQt have the same signs as in the regression on the entire data set. With respect to the forecast
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decisions, the time effect is significant only in Session 2. With respect to the order decisions,
the time effect is significant only in Session 1. We conclude that the time trends reported in
Table 5.7 are prevalent (though not necessarily significant anymore) in both sessions of our
experiment. However, the overall effect is moderate and we limit its impact on behavior in
each of the treatments by the use of a reverse order design for half of the subjects. Hence,
we do not investigate this issue any further, but acknowledge that it is a by-product of our
repeated one-shot interaction design.
Intercept
߶ (market condition)
߶෠ (forecast)
ܶ2 (14/3/3)
ܶ3 (12/7/7)
ܶ4 (10/10/10)
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(1.414)
(1.406)
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(2.997)
Note: Significance of estimates (ݐ-test): *** ݌ < 0.01, ** ݌ < 0.05, * ݌ < 0.1. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 5.8.: Regression results of time and order effects by session of the main experiment
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Order effects.
While the regressions on the session level (see Table 5.8) do not point to any systematic
differences in the behavior of the subgroups over time, they do show evidence of order effects.
The estimates of ηFCSG and η
Q
SG indicate that the order of treatments does not seem to matter
for the Sales subjects, but that it plays a significant role in the decisions of the Operations
subjects. We use the subgroup-specific statistics reported in Table 5.9 and Figure 5.5 to verify
this pattern. In Session 1, Operations subjects who experienced rather truthful forecasting
behavior in Treatment 4 (10/10/10) at the beginning of the experiment ordered ηQSG = 10.182
units more on average than those who experienced high levels of inflation in the sales-bonus-only
treatment (Treatment 1 (16/0/0)) first. When regressing the data of each treatment separately,
this effect is significant at the 5 % confidence level in Treatment 4 only (ηQSG = 5.163) even
though the estimates in Treatments 1–3 are all positive (ηQSG ∈ (10.675; 13.000)). A similar logic
applies to Session 2: Operations subjects who were first exposed to rather truthful forecasting
behavior in Treatment 5 (10/6/4) place higher orders than the subjects who are confronted with
considerable forecast distortions in Treatments 7 (10/10/0) and 8 (10/12/2) at the beginning
of the game (ηQSG = −6.700). Separate regressions by treatment of Session 2 show that the
subgroup is a significant determinant of order decisions at the 5 % level in Treatments 5 and
6 (ηQSG = −5.865 and ηQSG = −6.803 respectively). While not significant, the estimates in
Treatments 7 and 8 have similar values (ηQSG = −6.209 and ηQSG = −7.479 respectively). It
thus seems that subjects consider the history of the game and the experience of previous
treatments even though they play anonymously with different partners in each period.
A possible explanation for the systematically different behavior of the subgroups lies in the
concept of reciprocity. Reciprocal people “reward kind actions and punish unkind ones” (Falk
and Fischbacher, 2006, p. 293). The mechanism of reciprocity was originally studied in the
context of bilateral interactions (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000).
However, further research in this area has shown that a person A tends to reciprocate the
behavior experienced in an interaction with person B to a third person C who was not part
of the original interaction (for the concept of “indirect reciprocity,” see Nowak and Sigmund,
2005). Hence, Operations subjects who experienced truthful forecasts at the beginning of the
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Table 5.9.: Summary statistics by order of play of the main experiment
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game might reciprocate this seemingly cooperative behavior by choosing higher order quantities
in later periods.
While there could be other reasons for why subjects behave differently in the two subgroups,
our main interest is whether the existence of order effects biases the results of our main exper-
iment in Section 4.1. Thanks to the reverse order design between the two subgroups in each
session, we cover both the case of positive and negative social experience at the beginning of
the game in the data of our main experiment. Hence, the spread of decisions in our data might
be comparably high, but the data should not be systematically distorted due to experimen-
tal order effects. To further substantiate this presumption, we analyze the experimental data
based on only the first treatment that a subject played. For subjects in Session 1, we use the
data of Treatments 1 and 4, depending on the order of play, and for subjects in Session 2, we
use the data of Treatments 5 and 8.
To estimate the behavioral parameters γ and β based on the reduced data set, we run the
nonlinear mixed effects ML regression specified in Section 4.1.4 based on the data of Treatments
4, 5 and 8 only. As in the original estimation, we exclude Treatment 1 because we do not have
an equilibrium prediction for it. In analogy to Table 4.4, we compare the estimation results of
the full data set (Model 3) to the new estimation results based on the reduced data set (Model
7) in Table 5.10. In Model 7, the random effects are degenerated (σγ˜ ≈ 0), which can be
attributed to the small sample size (24 subjects, 8 observations per subject). The fixed effect
of γ is highly significant (t-test, p < 0.001), whereas the fixed effect of β is not significantly
different from zero (p = 0.154). To test whether both behavioral parameters are needed to
explain the data, we run two additional regressions, where only γ (Model 8) or only β (Model
9) are included as (random) explanatory variables. By comparison of the BIC, we find that
Model 8 fits the data better than Model 7, while the fit of Model 9 is worse than that of Model
7. Hence, based on the reduced data set, a lying aversion factor β > 0 does not seem to be
needed, whereas the forecast error penalty factor γ improves the explanatory power of the
model.
With respect to our hypotheses (see Sections 3.3 and 4.1.5), the reduced data set supports
nearly all previous findings. For Hypotheses 2–5, the analyses of the reduced data set deliver
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Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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results
ߤఉ෩
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Distribution 
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2.553
0.000
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ߛ
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Table 5.10.: Estimation results based on the first treatments of the main experiment
similar significant results as the analyses of the full data set. For Hypothesis 1, the findings
are mixed: Based on the estimation results above, we find support for the hypothesis that
the behavioral model explains actual decisions better than the standard model. However,
only the forecast error penalty factor γ seems to be relevant in this context and we do not
find evidence for the existence of a lying aversion factor β > 0. Given the reduced set of
treatments, however, this deviation from previous results can be explained. As indicated in
Section 4.1.4, there is an overlap in the directional effects of γ and β: In the behavioral model,
both parameters predict a reduction in forecast inflation if the standard model predicts forecasts
that are higher than the actual market condition. This is the case in Treatments 4 and 5 and
the experimental observation is in line with this prediction. In Treatment 8, the standard model
predicts truthful forecasts, but average forecasts in the experiment are deflated. This effect
can only be explained by a forecast error penalty factor γ > 1 (a lying aversion factor β > 0
would support the prediction of the standard model). Hence, only for one third of observations
(and subjects) of the reduced data set do the behavioral effects that we investigate influence
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decisions in different directions. Given that subjects play only one treatment in the reduced
data set, the decisions of Treatment 8 could be attributed to comparably low individual values
of γ for these subjects, rather than average values of γ whose “downward effect” is partially
offset by an “upward effect” of β. Therefore, the forecast error penalty factor γ is sufficient to
explain all of the observed behavior in this subset of treatments and the lying aversion factor
β does not increase the explanatory power of the model.
To summarize, we acknowledge that there are order effects caused by the within-subject
design of our experiment. However, we limited the impact of order effects on our results by
the reverse order of play for half of the subject pool. As a result, the spread of decisions in our
data set is comparably wide, but we can confirm that almost all of our previous results hold
when analyzing a reduced data set which eliminates potential order effects.
5.3.2. Estimation of Treatment-Level Parameters
The parameter estimation in Section 4.1.4 is based on the data of all treatments of the main
experiment, where we know that a separating equilibrium exists based on Corollary 1. To
analyze, if the magnitude of the behavioral parameters γ and β depends on the incentive
parameters, we estimate the behavioral parameters separately for each treatment of the main
experiments. Since the small sample size of only eight observations per subject and treatment
causes convergence problems in the ML procedure that we use in Section 4.1.4, we estimate
the treatment-level parameters based on OLS by subject.
Table 5.11 summarizes the results. The mean estimate of the forecast error penalty factor γ
varies from 3.04 in Treatment 3 to a value of 5.98 in Treatment 6. The mean estimate of the
lying aversion factor β varies from 0.75 in Treatment 5 to a value of 4.84 in Treatment 7. This
comparably wide spread of estimates could be explained by (a) the small sample size of eight
data points per regression and (b) the directional overlap of the behavioral parameters that we
discuss in Section 4.1.4, which makes it difficult to differentiate between the effects of γ and
β in some of the treatments. The high standard deviations of the estimates indicate that the
estimates are not very precise. In fact, for the estimates of the forecast error penalty factor γ,
we only find a significant difference when comparing Treatment 6 with Treatments 3 (Mann–
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3 (12/7/7)
4 (10/10/10)
Treatment (ܾ/݌݋/݌ݑ)
5 (10/6/4)
6 (10/8/2)
7 (10/10/0)
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3.93
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ݐ (period)
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Variable
8.016
0.928
12.254
-5.758
-2.184
0.069
Estimate p-valueStd. Err.
2.869
0.009
3.836
3.843
4.169
0.043
0.005
0.000
0.001
0.134
0.600
0.104
Quantity ݍ
19.890
0.805
-15.744
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Estimate p-valueStd. Err.
3.021
0.012
3.679
3.581
3.877
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0.000
0.000
0.000
0.017
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0.002
Table 5.11.: Estimation results by treatment of the main experiment
Whitney U test, p = 0.036) and 7 (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0.013). For the estimates
of the lying aversion factor β, only the estimates of Treatment 5 differ significantly from the
estimates of the other treatments (Mann–Whitney U test for between-subject comparisons, p ∈
(0.001; 0.011); Wilcoxon signed-rank test for within-subject comparisons, p ∈ (0.001; 0.043)).
The last three lines of Table 5.11 provide a comparison of the average treatment-level OLS
estimates to average subject-level OLS estimates across all treatments and to the random
effects ML estimates of Section 4.1.4. The comparison shows that the average results of the
different estimation approaches are similar.
5.3.3. Measures of Quality Control
Due to the complexity of the main experiment, we took different measures to ensure that
subjects had a good understanding of the game. In particular, we used the pre-experiment
quiz and the post-experiment questionnaire to validate the understanding. Additionally, we
provided decision support tables that relieved subjects of calculating expected values, but
which allowed them to concentrate on the dynamic decision problem.
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Pre-Experiment Quiz.
Before the experiment started, subjects answered a multiple choice quiz on screen to test their
understanding of the sequence of events, the basic rules of the probability distribution, and the
calculation of profits (see Section A.3.2 of the Appendix). We clustered nine multiple-choice
questions in blocks of three on the screen and subjects could only advance to the next screen
after having answered all three questions correctly. If one question was answered incorrectly,
subjects were only told that there was an error, i.e., the incorrectly answered question was not
revealed in order to avoid a “trial-and-error” strategy. They were incentivized by a payment
of 1,000 ECUs (= EUR 1) for each block of questions that they answered correctly in the first
try. The experiment did not start before all subjects had completed the quiz and answered
all questions correctly. To test if subjects understood the rules and logic of the game well, we
analyzed the number of errors they made in the pre-experiment quiz. An error occurred if at
least one of three questions on the screen was answered incorrectly. The histogram in Figure 5.6
summarizes the results. One third of all subjects (31 %) answered the quiz without any errors.
The vast majority of subjects (88 %) had a maximum of three errors. Given that subjects did
not receive feedback on which one of three questions they had answered incorrectly, this shows
that they had a fairly good understanding of the game.
Hypothetical Order Quantities.
In Section 4.1.1, we argue that a critical ratio of α = 0.5 for Operations should lead to
comparably unbiased order decisions. We validated this assumption by means of a question in
the post-experiment questionnaire (see Section A.3.5 of the Appendix). 31 out of 32 Operations
subjects in both sessions answered the questionnaire. We asked them which order quantity they
would choose if they knew that the true market condition was 75 (100, 125). The majority of
subjects, i.e., 80.6 % (83.9 %, 80.6 %) chose the market condition and hence the optimal order
quantity. The remaining subjects chose both too low and too high order quantities, resulting
in average order quantities of 76.03 (101.23, 124.35) that are close to and not significantly
different from the true market condition (t-test, p > 0.05). The histograms in Figure 5.7 show
the distribution of choices for each of the market conditions.
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Decision support.
In each period, both Sales and Operations subjects could use a decision support table (see
screenshots in Figures A.4 and A.5 of the Appendix). We tracked the use of the button that
triggered the display of the table in order to see how intensively the decision support was used.
Figure 5.8 displays the share of subjects across periods that looked at the decision support
tables.
As expected, the majority (72 %) of both Sales and Operations subjects displayed the table
in the first test period. In the remaining test periods, 30 % of Sales and 19 % of Operations
subjects on average used the decision support. During the 32 actual periods of the game, 17 %
of Sales and 7 % of Operations subjects on average made use of the tables. Given that their
decision matrix was static across the entire game, it is not surprising that Operations subjects
used the decision support significantly less than Sales subjects (Mann–Whitney U test based on
averages by period, p < 0.001), whose decision matrix changed based on the incentive system
and market condition. Overall, the pattern of use suggests that decision support was needed
at the beginning of the game, but that most subjects became confident in their decisions and
developed their own strategies over time.
5.3.4. Analysis of Risk Attitudes
After the 32 regular rounds of the main experiment were finished, we gave subjects a set
of lottery decisions to elicit their risk attitudes. We followed the basic design of Holt and
Laury (2002) and adapted the monetary values to our payout system. Table 5.12 shows the
ten decision tasks that we used. In each decision task, subjects had the choice between a
comparably safe option (Option A) and a more risky option (Option B). In the end, a random
number was drawn to choose which lottery would be played. The respective profit was added
to the profit that had previously been achieved in the experiment.
The decision tasks are designed such that the expected payouts of both options are increasing
from decision task 1 to 10. However, the expected payout of Option A is increasing slowly,
whereas the expected payout of Option B is increasing quickly. In decision task 1, the expected
payout of Option A (820 ECUs) is considerably higher than that of Option B (238 ECUs). In
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Figure 5.8.: Use of decision support in the main experiment
decision task 9, the expected payout of Option B (1,738 ECUs) is considerably higher than
that of Option A (980 ECUs). A risk-neutral decision maker would choose the safe option
(A) in decision tasks 1 to 4 and the risky option (B) in decision tasks 5 to 9. Decision task
10 serves as a sanity check since both options are safe payouts, i.e., all subjects, independent
of their risk attitudes, should choose Option B with the higher payout. If people assess risks
consistently, they should only switch once from Option A to Option B over the course of the
ten decisions.
Figure 5.9 shows the distribution of safe choices, i.e., the choices of Option A, across the ten
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Number of subjects
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Demographics
 Age (years)
 Gender
 Female
 Male
Study background
 Semester of studies
 Level of studies
 Bachelor
 Master
 Course of studies
 Business Administration
 Economics
 Information Systems
 Other
 Attended basic OM course
 Yes
 No
Sales
25.9 (3.1)
43.8%
56.2%
7.2 (4.1)
46.9%
53.1%
59.4%
28.1%
9.4%
3.1%
68.8%
31.2%
32
Operations
24.2 (3.6)
43.8%
56.2%
6.2 (4.9)
62.5%
37.5%
65.6%
25.0%
6.3%
3.1%
68.8%
31.2%
32
Total
25.0 (3.4)
43.8%
56.2%
6.7 (4.5)
54.7%
45.3%
62.5%
26.6%
7.8%
3.1%
68.8%
31.2%
64
1,000 ECUs 800 ECUsDecision
Option A
1,925 ECUs 50 ECUs
1 10% 90% 10% 90%
Option B
2 20% 80% 20% 80%
3 30% 70% 30% 70%
4 40% 60% 40% 60%
5 50% 50% 50% 50%
6 60% 40% 60% 40%
7 70% 30% 70% 30%
8 80% 20% 80% 20%
9 90% 10% 90% 10%
10 100% 0% 100% 0%
Table 5.12.: Design of the risk aversion task
decision tasks. The graph is based on the responses of 58 out of 64 subjects. We excluded four
subjects due to preference reversals in the sense that they switched multiple times between
Options A and B starting with decision task 1 through to 10. We excluded an additional two
subjects because they chose the option with the lower safe payout in decision task 10.
Due to the switching point of a risk-neutral decision maker between decisions 4 and 5, we
classify all subjects with five or more safe choices as risk-averse (Holt and Laury, 2002). Across
all subjects, 82.8 % are risk-averse with slightly more prevalence among Sales subjects (89.7 %)
than Operations subjects (75.9 %). The average number of safe choices is 6.2, which also
reflects the more risk-averse attitude of Sales subjects with an average value of 6.4 safe choices
compared to 5.7 safe choices among Operations subjects. Risk preferences in our subject pool
are generally in line with findings in previous research, which show that most people behave
in a risk-averse manner (Holt and Laury, 2002; Eckel and Grossman, 2008).
Extending the analyses of Section 5.3.1, we run a random effects GLS regression of the
forecast φˆ on the market condition φ, dummy variables for seven out of eight treatments (T2
to T8), the period t (t = 1..32) and the number of safe choices (SAFE). We run a comparable
regression for the order quantity q, except that we use the forecast φˆ as an explanatory variable
instead of the market condition φ. Each regression is based on the data of 29 out of 32 subjects.
Table 5.13 summarizes the regression results. We do not find evidence that the risk attitude
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(0.015)
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Note: Significance of estimates (ݖ-test): *** ݌ < 0.01, ** ݌ < 0.05, * ݌ < 0.1. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Intercept
ܲܮܣܰ
ܱܲܵܶ
Prescription medicines Consumer products
Note: Significance of estimates (ݖ-test): *** ݌ < 0.01, ** ݌ < 0.05, * ݌ < 0.1. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
0.537
0.052
0.078
***
**
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(0.022)
(0.022)
(0.018)
0.677
0.004
0.029
***
**
(0.020)
(0.014)
(0.012)
0.674
0.012
0.039
***
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(0.021)
(0.015)
(0.013)
Full
1,911
76
Excl. May/June
1,657
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Model
Observations
Groups
Full
1,450
55
Intercept
ܲܮܣܰ
ܱܲܵܶ
Prescription medicines Consumer products
Note: Significance of estimates (ݖ-test): *** ݌ < 0.01, ** ݌ < 0.05, * ݌ < 0.1. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
0.827
-0.367
-0.604
***
**
***
(0.106)
(0.152)
(0.127)
0.342
-0.413
-0.258
***
***
**
(0.104)
(0.131)
(0.108)
0.328
-0.400
-0.237
***
***
**
(0.106)
(0.135)
(0.118)
Full
1,911
76
Excl. May/June
1,657
76
Model
Observations
Groups
Full
1,450
55
Table 5.13.: Regression results of risk aversion effects
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is a significant explanatory variable in either the forecast decision of Sales (z-test, p = 0.630)
or in the order decision of Operations (p = 0.108). This finding is generally in line with
the underlying theories of our behavioral model and the design of the main experiment. As
discussed in Section 3.1.2, the elements of the expected payoff of Sales differ in their levels of
uncertainty. The forecast error penalty is subject to a quantifiable risk given by the uncertainty
in the random market error E. The sales bonus is not only subject to the uncertainty in the
market error but also to an unknown uncertainty in the order quantity decision of Operations.
In other words, the sales bonus is the result of a compound lottery with an ambiguous stage
(the order decision of Operations) followed by a risky stage (the realization of the market error).
In our experiments, we never vary the market risk, which is always E ∼ N (0; 30). Hence, it
is not surprising that the concept of risk aversion cannot explain the different valuations of
the two payoff streams. Instead, as argued before, ambiguity aversion could be a driving force
for the increased weight on the forecast error penalty compared to the sales bonus, which is
represented by the forecast error penalty factor γ in the utility function of Sales.
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6.1. Summary of Results
In this thesis, we investigated the impact of forecast-based incentive systems on the accuracy
of demand forecasts within a firm. We motivated and contextualized our research by a case
study of a global pharmaceutical company that introduced forecast accuracy incentives in the
target agreements of their sales and marketing personnel. The qualitative results showed that
forecast accuracy incentives increased the overall awareness for the importance of good forecasts
and improved the collaboration between sales and operations departments. The quantitative
analyses showed an improvement in forecast accuracy and a reduction in forecast bias.
Due to the high number of uncontrollable effects in a single case field study, we transferred
the forecast information exchange to a game-theoretic model. In this model, we considered a
company where Sales is responsible for demand forecasting and Operations is responsible for
ordering. Our interest was to examine the effect of different forecast error incentive systems
for Sales on demand forecasting and order decisions. We developed utility functions of Sales
and Operations and included behavioral factors that capture an overproportional reaction to
forecast error penalties and an aversion to lying to other people. We modeled the demand fore-
casting and ordering process as a signaling game and derived the Pareto-dominant separating
equilibria of the game.
In a next step, we tested the model in a laboratory experiment and showed that actual forecast
and order decisions deviate significantly from those of an expected-payoff-maximizing decision
maker. We estimated the behavioral parameters to design incentive systems for truthful fore-
cast information sharing. We conducted a validation experiment, which showed that (close to)
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truthful information sharing can be achieved and that the incentive systems designed with the
behavioral model outperform those that were designed with the standard model. We further
tested the design of our behavior model by constructing alternative models with non-Bayesian
belief updating and expectations-based reference points, but found that our behavioral model
provides the better fit to the data of our experiments. We also showed that actual behavior
in nonhuman and repeated interactions changes as expected based on the behavioral theories
underlying our model.
Our research shows that forecast-based incentives can improve the accuracy of demand
forecasts. It further shows that it does not suffice to consider the monetary elements of an
incentive system to model forecasting behavior accurately, but that behavioral factors are also
important. For incentive system designers, it is critical that they acknowledge the relevance of
these factors because incentive systems that ignore them may perform poorly. In settings like
the one we described, a natural human aversion to lying and repeated interactions between
decision makers can cause forecasts to be more truthful than standard theory would suggest,
even without formal incentives. To improve forecast accuracy further, managers can include a
forecast-based component in the incentive system for their sales personnel.
6.2. Design Implications
We can use the behavioral model of Chapter 3 and the experimental results of Chapter 4 to
derive implications for the design of sales incentive systems in practice. We argued that it is
in the best interest of a company to choose an incentive system that enables truthful forecast
information sharing. As our analyses show, there are multiple design options that fulfill this
condition. In the following, we briefly discuss their differences in order to provide guidance to
managers who are interested in reducing forecast biases and increasing the efficiency of their
supply chain.
First, an incentive system designer needs to choose the class of incentive system. Both
theory (Corollary 2(a)) and experimental results (Treatment 1) suggest that a sales-bonus-only
incentive system leads to distorted forecasts. Unless the sales bonus is small (such that the
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natural aversion to lying offsets the incentive to inflate the forecast), means such as using
forecast error incentive systems are required to achieve truthful forecasting. With regard to
absolute forecast error incentive systems, theory predicts that forecasts will be inflated unless
the sales bonus is small. In contrast to the sales-bonus-only incentive system, this inflation
trends to zero as the forecast error incentives become large (Corollary 2(b) and Treatment
4). A differentiated forecast error incentive system can be parameterized for truthful forecast
information sharing (Corollary 2(c) and Treatments 5, 9 and 10). In particular, it is more
economical in terms of requiring smaller forecast error penalties than an absolute forecast error
incentive system to achieve the same level of (potentially small) forecast distortion (Corollary
3).
Our analyses indicate that only differentiated forecast error incentive systems incentivize
truthful forecast information sharing. However, there are practical considerations that may
favor an absolute forecast error incentive system. For example, an absolute forecast error
incentive system is less complex due to the smaller number of parameters. It also has a more
intuitive interpretation that forecasts should neither be too high nor too low, which might be
a desirable message when introducing forecast error incentives. Finally, if the forecast error
incentives are sufficiently high, the remaining bias in the forecasts might be small. Hence,
depending on the context, an absolute forecast error incentive system can be the preferred
option in practice even if a small forecast bias remains.
Second, an incentive system designer must choose the parameters b, po, and pu. For a dif-
ferentiated forecast error incentive system, Theorem 1 shows that all parameter combinations
with (po − pu) ∈ [2(b(1 − α) − β)/γ; 2(b(1 − α) + β)/γ] fulfill the condition of zero forecast
inflation. For a given unit sales bonus b, the choice of the unit forecast error penalties po and
pu depends on the objectives of the company. On the one hand, it may be necessary to limit
the impact of forecast error incentives on the incentive system of Sales by setting low unit
forecast error penalties. For example, at PharmaCo, the sales and marketing division used the
variable compensation budget of their employees to incentivize typical sales targets and was
hesitant to include variable compensation elements that were intended to improve operational
performance. The smaller po and pu, the smaller the share of the variable compensation budget
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that is required to support these incentives. On the other hand, as the analysis in Section 4.2.2
shows, there is an argument for robustness that prefers incentive systems with high unit fore-
cast error penalties: The higher po and pu, the less sensitive an equilibrium prediction of (close
to) zero inflation is to deviations in the behavioral parameters γ and β. Hence, there is no
unanimous recommendation regarding the size of the forecast error penalties. Incentive system
designers need to balance both arguments when choosing the parameters for their respective
setting.
Even if the particular setup in a company differs from the one that we investigated in our
model and experiments, we believe that our general results hold across a range of applications
for several reasons: (i) As long as the demand forecast is used to trigger supply, the inherent
conflict between sales maximization and forecast error minimization remains. Hence, forecast
error penalties can be used to incentivize Sales to forecast truthfully. (ii) With respect to
the choice of incentive parameters, the conditions that we derived for a truth-telling incentive
scheme allow for a range of truth-telling parameter combinations. A truth-telling solution
is therefore quite robust to small changes in the values of both incentive parameters and
behavioral parameters. Incentive system designers can furthermore increase the robustness of
a truth-telling parameter combination by choosing higher forecast error penalties. (iii) If the
interaction between Sales and Operations is repeated over time, the truth-telling parameter
combinations of the one-shot model still hold and deviations from the truth-telling solution
are even more unlikely. (iv) Beyond the conditions of a truth-telling solution, monotonicity
of the distortion function further implies that the direction of change in human behavior is
predictable. Hence, in practice, the parameters of an incentive scheme can be calibrated over
time to fit a particular setting.
6.3. Boundaries and Future Research
Our research takes a multimethod approach to the question of how to incentivize truthful
forecast information sharing within a firm. We have shown that forecast-based incentives have
the potential to improve the forecasting performance in theory as well as in practice. The
105
6. Conclusion
combination of field research and game-theoretic modeling covers two ends of a spectrum. On
the one hand, the case study at PharmaCo is complex, rich in information and subject to a large
number of uncontrollable factors. On the other hand, our behavioral model is a highly simplified
representation of reality that captures a small number of factors only. Both approaches offer
valuable insights into the effect of forecast-based incentives on demand forecasts, but are also
limited in their very own ways.
First, it is a natural limitation of a case study that it is highly specific to the object of
investigation and its outcomes might hence not be externally valid (for an extended discussion,
see Yin, 2009). For example, the organizational setup, the forecasting processes, and the
existing incentive landscape at PharmaCo are probably unique and influence the way forecasts
are created and interpreted. Also, the highly regulated market environment of a pharmaceutical
company is special and different from that of other industries. Hence, our field research would
benefit from replications in other organizations to substantiate the findings of our particular
case and to help identify moderating effects that influence the way forecast-based incentives
affect forecasting decisions. Another limitation of our case study is that the implementation of
forecast accuracy incentives at PharmaCo did not follow a top-down plan but was the result of
a process that was shaped by various stakeholders. As researchers, we were primarily observers
rather than designers of this process. A fruitful avenue of future research in this respect could
be field experiments that allow for more control over the implementation of new incentives. For
example, one could test a differentiated forecast error incentive system in one treatment group
versus an absolute forecast error incentive system in another treatment group to investigate if
the efficiency advantage of our experimental analyses holds in practice.
Second, it is an inherent property of a theoretical model that it is a reduced mapping of the
real world (see, e.g., the model definition of Stachowiak, 1973). We have designed a model
that is reduced to the incentives under investigation and that captures selected behavioral
elements. By choosing a high level of reduction, we kept our model analytically tractable
and could derive equilibria with the potential to predict human behavior. However, there
are many elements of a real world setting that our model does not capture. For example,
personal relationships between Sales and Operations, career concerns or other nonmonetary
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incentives could naturally dampen forecast distortions. This becomes obvious in the case
study of PharmaCo, where forecasts are not as distorted as one might expect in the absence
of forecast-related incentives. An interesting pursuit in the future would be to test how these
factors influence forecast accuracy beyond the effect of forecast-based incentives.
Besides adding factors that our model does not capture, there is also potential to better
understand the current parameters of the model. We have used two behavioral parameters
to capture various human biases that could be relevant in our setting. Our estimation results
combined with additional experiments have shown that these two factors explain actual behav-
ior well and can be used to design incentive systems for truthful forecast information sharing
in our setting. However, it would be interesting to analyze the underlying behavioral drivers in
more detail to make even better behavioral predictions under different conditions. This could
be achieved by decomposing the forecast error penalty factor γ into its basic elements and
testing their individual effects in targeted experiments, e.g., by using priming techniques or
post-experiment survey questions.
Moreover, incentive systems in organizations can differ from the simple one that we con-
sidered and implementations could require adaptations of our incentive system design. For
instance, if a company uses a particular performance measure to quantify forecast accuracy
(such as the mean absolute percentage error that was used at PharmaCo), it might want to
link incentives to this performance measure as opposed to using the penalty function that we
used. Given what is known about mental accounting and reference-dependent preferences (see
Section 3.1.2), changes in the structure of the incentive system are likely to change human
behavior. For example, forecast accuracy targets might provide external reference points that
change the evaluation of gains and losses. Previous research also suggests that it matters
whether incentives in an organization are common knowledge or private information of the
respective actor. The disclosure of incentive conflicts may lead to perverse effects in the sense
that it increases the bias in information exchange between an informed and uninformed party
(Cain et al., 2005). Hence, future research could investigate the effect of different variants of
forecast-based incentives on forecasting decisions and how the level of incentive information
matters.
107
6. Conclusion
Lastly, there is reason to believe that the effect of economic incentives on behavior does
not always follow a monotonic relationship. One line of research in economics suggests that
monetary incentives may backfire, i.e., they may reduce intrinsic motivation and crowd out
socially desired behavior, such as trust and lying aversion (e.g., Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002;
Malhotra and Murnighan, 2002; Bowles, 2009). There is, however, no unanimous answer with
regard to the conditions under which this is the case. While some research suggests that
incentives must be sufficiently large to avoid such negative effects (Gneezy and Rustichini,
2000), other studies suggest that even small monetary incentives motivate people to be honest
when they could obtain a much larger amount by lying (Wang and Murnighan, 2017). It would
therefore be interesting to investigate further how the size of forecast-based incentives affects
behavior and whether, e.g., small incentives bear the risk of increasing forecast distortions
instead of reducing them.
To summarize, there are multiple directions for future research in the field of behavioral
OM that emerge from this thesis. Our limited understanding of the complex mechanisms
in human decision making offer ample potential for more research on the effect of (forecast-
based) incentives under different conditions. A promising and insightful way forward seems
to be the combination of theory-based laboratory experiments and field research. On the one
hand, controlled experiments allow for a rigorous and comparably simple test of the effect of
individual treatment variables. On the other hand, field research ensures that the practically
relevant variables are tested and that the experimental results are replicable in practice.
108
A. Appendix
A.1. Proofs
A.1.1. Proof of Theorem 1
We will first show that (ssep, qsep, µsep) is a separating equilibrium of the forecast information
sharing game if po > (b(1 − α) − β)/γ. We will then show that this equilibrium Pareto-
dominates all other differentiable separating equilibria. We conclude the proof by showing
that no differentiable separating equilibrium exists if po ≤ (b(1−α)− β)/γ. Supporting phase
line diagrams and vector field plots are contained in Appendix A.2.
It is straightforward to verify that µsep satisfies Bayesian consistency of beliefs. Also,
qsep(φˆ) = φˆ − δsep + G−1(α) is a sequentially rational response for Operations to a signal
φˆ given the updated belief µsep(φ | φˆ). To see this, rewrite UO for a given φ as
UO(q | φ) = CO − γO
(
co
∫ q−φ
−∞
G(x)dx+ cu
(
EE(E) + φ− q +
∫ q−φ
−∞
G(x)dx
))
and take the first derivative with respect to q: ∂UO(q|φ)∂q = −γO ((cu + co)G(q − φ)− cu). Setting
∂UO(q|φ)
∂q = 0, solving for q and setting φ = φˆ − δsep according to µsep yields qsep(φˆ) = φˆ −
δsep + G−1(α). The second derivative ∂
2UO(q|φ)
∂q2
= −γO(cu + co)g(q − φ) confirms that UO is
strictly concave over the support of g and hence qsep is the unique maximizer of UO given s
sep
and µsep. We proceed by showing that ssep is a sequentially rational strategy for Sales in a
separating equilibrium.
Suppose that, in equilibrium, Sales adopts some invertible, differentiable signaling function
s : R→ R (see assumption in Section 3.2). Let s(φ) be the signal sent by type φ. A separating
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equilibrium requires Operations to be able to infer the type that sent the signal and to react
sequentially rationally. Hence, Operations updates the belief to µ(φ | s(φ)) = 1 if φ = s−1(s(φ))
and 0 otherwise. Based on this belief, Operations sets q(s(φ)) = s−1(s(φ)) + G−1(α) =
φ + G−1(α). For s to be a sequentially rational strategy for Sales given the belief system
µ and response function q, there must be no incentive for a type φ to mimic some other type
φ¯ 6= φ. Hence, in order to verify that the particular strategy ssep satisfies sequential rationality
in a separating equilibrium, we will show that the first- and second-order conditions
∂US(q(s(φ¯)), s(φ¯) | φ)
∂φ¯
∣∣∣∣
φ¯=φ
= 0, and
∂2US(q(s(φ¯)), s(φ¯) | φ)
∂φ¯2
≤ 0 for all φ¯,
hold for s = ssep at every point where US and s
sep are differentiable. We first rewrite US as
US(q, φˆ | φ) = CS + b
(
q −
∫ q−φ
−∞
G(x)dx
)
− γpo
∫ φˆ−φ
−∞
G(x)dx
− γpu
(∫ φˆ−φ
−∞
G(x)dx+ EE(E)− (φˆ− φ)
)
− β
∣∣∣φˆ− φ∣∣∣ , (A.1)
making use of EEmin(φ + E, q) =
∫ q−φ
−∞ (φ + x)g(x)dx +
∫∞
q−φ qg(x)dx = q −
∫ q−φ
−∞ G(x)dx,
EE
[
φˆ− (φ+ E)
]+
=
∫ φˆ−φ
−∞ ((φˆ − φ) − x)g(x)dx =
∫ φˆ−φ
−∞ G(x)dx, and EE
[
(φ+ E)− φˆ
]+
=∫∞
φˆ−φ(x− (φˆ− φ))g(x)dx =
∫ φˆ−φ
−∞ G(x)dx+ EE(E)− (φˆ− φ). We express the expected utility
of Sales in equilibrium for a market condition of φ when sending a signal s(φ¯) that triggers
reaction q(s(φ¯)) as
US(q(s(φ¯)), s(φ¯) | φ) =CS + b
(
φ¯+G−1(α)−
∫ φ¯−φ+G−1(α)
−∞
G(x)dx
)
− γpo
∫ s(φ¯)−φ
−∞
G(x)dx
− γpu
(∫ s(φ¯)−φ
−∞
G(x)dx+ EE(E)− (s(φ¯)− φ)
)
− β ∣∣s(φ¯)− φ∣∣ .
(A.2)
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Differentiating Equation (A.2) with respect to φ¯ gives
∂US(q(s(φ¯)), s(φ¯) | φ)
∂φ¯
=b
(
1−G (φ¯+G−1(α)− φ))− γ ((po + pu)G(s(φ¯)− φ)− pu) s′(φ¯)
−βs′(φ¯) for s(φ¯) > φ,
+βs′(φ¯) for s(φ¯) < φ,
(A.3)
where s′(φ¯) denotes the first derivative of s with respect to φ¯. Evaluating Equation (A.3) at
φ¯ = φ and setting equal to 0 gives the first-order condition as a differential equation:
s′(φ) =

b(1−α)
γ[(po+pu)G(s(φ)−φ)−pu]+β for s(φ) > φ,
b(1−α)
γ[(po+pu)G(s(φ)−φ)−pu]−β for s(φ) < φ.
(A.4)
Setting s = ssep, with (ssep)′(φ) = 1, Equation (A.4) holds for b(1−α)−βγ < po < 2
b(1−α)−β
γ + pu
and for po > 2
b(1−α)+β
γ + pu. For 2
b(1−α)−β
γ + pu ≤ po ≤ 2 b(1−α)+βγ + pu, we have ssep(φ) = φ
and Equation (A.4) is not defined, but we can verify for this case that the right hand side of
Equation (A.3) evaluated at φ¯ = φ is > 0 for s(φ) < φ and < 0 for s(φ) > φ.
The second derivative of Equation (A.2) is
∂2US(q(s(φ¯)), s(φ¯) | φ)
∂φ¯2
=− bg (φ¯+G−1(α)− φ)− γ(po + pu)g(s(φ¯)− φ)s′(φ¯)s′(φ¯)
− γ ((po + pu)G(s(φ¯)− φ)− pu) s′′(φ¯)

−βs′′(φ¯) for s(φ¯) > φ,
+βs′′(φ¯) for s(φ¯) < φ.
(A.5)
Setting s = ssep, with (ssep)′(φ¯) = 1 and (ssep)′′(φ¯) = 0, the right hand side of Equation (A.5)
simplifies to −bg (φ¯+G−1(α)− φ) − γ(po + pu)g(φ¯ + δsep − φ) < 0 for ssep(φ¯) 6= φ, i.e., US
is strictly concave in φ¯ for signals ssep(φ¯) to the left and to the right of φ. Since we have
β ≥ 0 by assumption, concavity extends to ssep(φ¯) = φ. Hence we can conclude that ssep is a
sequentially rational strategy for Sales and that (ssep, qsep, µsep) is a separating equilibrium of
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the game.
To prove that (ssep, qsep, µsep) Pareto-dominates all other differentiable separating equilibria,
we analyze all additional candidate equilibrium signaling strategies of Sales in a differentiable
separating equilibrium. A candidate equilibrium signaling strategy sc must be continuous,
invertible, differentiable everywhere except for a countable number of points and where it is
differentiable it must satisfy Equation (A.4). Where Equation (A.4) is not defined (sc(φ) = φ),
it must satisfy
lim
sc(φ)→φ−
∂US(q(sc(φ¯)), sc(φ¯) | φ)
∂φ¯
∣∣∣∣
φ¯=φ
≥ 0, and
lim
sc(φ)→φ+
∂US(q(sc(φ¯)), sc(φ¯) | φ)
∂φ¯
∣∣∣∣
φ¯=φ
≤ 0.
In the following, we first develop some general arguments for the evaluation of potential
candidate equilibrium signaling strategies, before differentiating several cases based on the
values of b, po and pu. For ease of analysis, we substitute u(φ) = s(φ)−φ and u′(φ) = s′(φ)−1
to transform Equation (A.4) into an autonomous differential equation
u′(φ) =

b(1−α)
γ[(po+pu)G(u(φ))−pu]+β − 1 for u(φ) > 0,
b(1−α)
γ[(po+pu)G(u(φ))−pu]−β − 1 for u(φ) < 0,
(A.6)
where u expresses the forecast distortion as a function of the type φ. Any candidate equilibrium
signaling strategy sc has a corresponding candidate equilibrium distortion strategy uc defined
by uc(φ) = sc(φ)− φ.
We start by making use of the requirement that a candidate equilibrium signaling strategy
sc and hence a candidate equilibrium distortion strategy uc must be continuous.
Lemma 1. Any candidate equilibrium distortion strategy uc must have a single interval co-
domain C ⊆ R.
Proof. Proof of Lemma 1. The proof follows directly from the requirement of continuity, i.e.,
lim
φ→φ0
uc(φ) = uc(φ0) for all φ0 ∈ R. 
We next exploit the fact that Equation (A.6) is an autonomous differential equation.
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Lemma 2. Any candidate equilibrium distortion strategy uc must be monotonic.
Proof. Proof of Lemma 2. Let uc be a candidate equilibrium distortion strategy, i.e., uc is
continuous and differentiable everywhere except for a countable number of points and, where
it is differentiable, it satisfies Equation (A.6). Suppose uc is nonmonotonic. Then we can
find types φ1 < φ2 < φ3 such that we either have uc(φ2) < min{uc(φ1), uc(φ3)} or uc(φ2) >
max{uc(φ1), uc(φ3)}. We analyze the first case only, the second case is analogous. Also assume
that uc(φ1) ≥ uc(φ3), the remaining subcase is analogous. Since uc is nondifferentiable at a
countable number of points only and uc(φ2) < uc(φ3), there exists φ4 ∈ (φ2, φ3) with uc(φ4) ∈
(uc(φ2), uc(φ3)) and u
′
c(φ4) > 0. Denote u0 = uc(φ4). Let A = {φ ∈ (φ1, φ2) | uc(φ) = u0}.
By the intermediate value theorem this set is nonempty and continuity of uc implies that the
maximum of this set is well defined. Denote this maximum by φ5. With uc being the solution
to an autonomous differential equation, we have u′c(φ5) = u′c(φ4) > 0 implying there exists
some  > 0 with  < φ2 − φ5 such that uc(φ5 + ) > uc(φ5) = u0. The intermediate value
theorem then implies the existence of φ6 ∈ (φ5 + , φ2) with uc(φ6) = u0. This contradicts φ5
being the maximum of A. We conclude that uc is monotonic. 
Next, we exploit the requirement that a candidate equilibrium signaling strategy sc must
be invertible. Note first, that the utility function of Sales is separable. Let USBS (q | φ) =
bEEmin((φ + E), q) be the quantity-dependent and UFCS (φˆ | φ) = −γEE(po[φˆ − (φ + E)]+ +
pu[(φ+E)− φˆ]+)−β
∣∣∣φˆ− φ∣∣∣ be the forecast-dependent part of the expected utility function of
Sales. By setting
∂UFCS
∂φˆ
equal to 0, solving for φˆ and verifying that
∂2UFCS
∂φˆ2
= −γ(po + pu)g(φˆ−
φ) < 0 for all φˆ 6= φ, we find that Sales has a unique preferred forecast φˆpref (φ) = φ + δpref
with distortion value
δpref =

G−1
(
γpu−β
γ(pu+po)
)
for po < pu − 2βγ ,
0 for pu − 2βγ ≤ po ≤ pu + 2βγ ,
G−1
(
γpu+β
γ(pu+po)
)
for po > pu +
2β
γ ,
(A.7)
that maximizes UFCS .
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Lemma 3. Any candidate equilibrium distortion strategy uc must take values uc(φ) ≥ δpref
for all φ.
Proof. Proof of Lemma 3. Invertibility requires a continuous candidate signaling strategy sc to
be strictly monotonic. Hence (as uc(φ) = sc(φ)−φ), in the analysis of the candidate distortion
strategy uc we require either u
′
c(φ) ≤ −1 for all φ or u′c(φ) ≥ −1 for all φ. Using Equation
(A.6) it is straightforward to verify that we have u′c(φ) < −1 for all φ ∈
{
φ | uc(φ) < δpref
}
and
u′c(φ) > −1 for all φ ∈
{
φ | uc(φ) > δpref
}
. Since we have u′c(φ) < −1 but uc(φ) < δpref bound
from above, there exists no candidate distortion strategy uc that takes on values uc(φ) < δ
pref
while covering the entire type space. We conclude that uc can only take on distortion values
uc(φ) ≥ δpref . 
We continue by ruling out linear signaling strategies of the form sc(φ) = φ + δ for δ 6= δsep
and hence constant distortion strategies uc(φ) = δ for δ 6= δsep. We use the following lemma
to further restrict cases where Equation (A.6) is not defined (uc(φ) = 0 and uc(φ) = δ
pref ).
Lemma 4. A candidate equilibrium distortion strategy uc can only take values uc(φ) = δ for
all φ in some interval I ⊆ R if δ = δsep.
Proof. Proof of Lemma 4. Assuming that Sales plays strategy uc(φ) = δ for all φ ∈ I, the
sequentially rational response for Operations is q(φˆ) = φˆ−δ+G−1(α) to all signals φˆ associated
with types in I. As defined above, a candidate equilibrium distortion strategy uc must satisfy
Equation (A.6). It is straightforward to verify for δ > 0 (i.e., uc(φ) > 0) that uc satisfies
Equation (A.6) if and only if δ = δsep = G−1
(
b(1−α)+γpu−β
γ(pu+po)
)
. Similarly, for δ < 0 (i.e.,
uc(φ) < 0) uc satisfies Equation (A.6) if and only if δ = δ
sep = G−1
(
b(1−α)+γpu+β
γ(pu+po)
)
. For δ = 0
we require
lim
uc(φ)→0+
∂US(q(φ¯+ uc(φ¯)), φ¯+ uc(φ¯) | φ)
∂φ¯
∣∣∣∣
φ¯=φ
≤ 0, and
lim
uc(φ)→0−
∂US(q(φ¯+ uc(φ¯)), φ¯+ uc(φ¯) | φ)
∂φ¯
∣∣∣∣
φ¯=φ
≥ 0.
This holds if and only if 2 b(1−α)−βγ + pu ≤ po ≤ 2 b(1−α)+βγ + pu, i.e., if δ = δsep = 0. 
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Finally, we exploit the requirement of Pareto dominance. In a separating equilibrium, Oper-
ations always chooses qFB(φ). Hence the expected utility of Operations UO(q
FB(φ)) and the
quantity-dependent expected utility of Sales USBS (q
FB(φ) | φ) are the same in all separating
equilibria. It follows that a separating equilibrium with signaling strategy s1 Pareto dominates
another separating equilibrium with signaling strategy s2 if U
FC
S (s1(φ) | φ) ≥ UFCS (s2(φ) | φ)
for all φ and UFCS (s1(φ) | φ) > UFCS (s2(φ) | φ) for at least one φ. We will also say that
one signaling (distortion) strategy Pareto dominates another if the corresponding separating
equilibrium Pareto dominates the other.
Lemma 5. A candidate equilibrium distortion strategy uc that takes on values uc(φ) > δ
sep
for all φ in some interval I ⊆ R and takes on values uc(φ) = δsep for all φ ∈ R \ I is Pareto
dominated by the strategy usep that takes on distortion values usep(φ) = δsep for all φ ∈ R.
Proof. Proof of Lemma 5. We can see from the definitions of δsep (Equation 3.6) and δpref
(Equation A.7) that we have δsep ≥ δpref for any combination of parameter values. If Sales
plays strategy uc(φ) then we have U
FC
S (φ + uc(φ) | φ) = UFCS (φ + δsep | φ) for all φ ∈ R \ I.
For all φ ∈ I, we have UFCS (φ + uc(φ) | φ) < UFCS (φ + δsep | φ) because uc(φ) > δsep ≥ δpref
for all φ ∈ I and δpref is the optimum of the strictly concave function UFCS . Since Φ is a
continuous random variable with domain R, there is a positive probability of having φ ∈ I and
we conclude that usep Pareto dominates uc. 
We now differentiate four cases based on the values of b, po, pu and the properties of Equation
(A.6). We use the function w given by
w(u) =

b(1−α)
γ[(po+pu)G(u)−pu]+β − 1 for u > 0,
b(1−α)
γ[(po+pu)G(u)−pu]−β − 1 for u < 0,
(A.8)
to examine the first derivative of u as a function of u only and hence ease the following
expositions. It is straightforward to verify that we have w′(u) < 0 always. The following cases
are supported by phase line diagrams and example vector field plots in Appendix A.2.
Case 1:
(
po > 2
b(1−α)+β
γ + pu
)
. We have δsep = G−1
(
b(1−α)+γpu+β
γ(pu+po)
)
< 0 and δpref =
G−1
(
γpu+β
γ(pu+po)
)
< 0 with δpref < δsep and distinguish seven regions of forecast distortions:
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(1.i) For u > 0, we have −1 < w(u) < 0 with lim
u→0+
w(u) = b(1−α)1
2
γ(po−pu)+β − 1 and limu→∞w(u) =
b(1−α)
γpo+β
− 1.
(1.ii) For u = 0, w(u) is not defined.
(1.iii) For δsep < u < 0, we have −1 < w(u) < 0 with lim
u→δsep+
w(u) = 0 and lim
u→0−
w(u) =
b(1−α)
1
2
γ(po−pu)−β − 1.
(1.iv) For u = δsep, we have w(u) = 0.
(1.v) For δpref < u < δsep, we have w(u) > 0, w′(u) with lim
u→δpref+
w(u) = ∞ and
lim
u→δsep−
w(u) = 0.
(1.vi) For u = δpref , w(u) is not defined.
(1.vii) For u < δpref we have w(u) < −1 with lim
u→−∞w(u) = −
b(1−α)
γpu+β
−1 and lim
u→δpref−
w(u) =
−∞.
Note the following for this and all subsequent cases: First, given Lemma 1, a candidate
equilibrium distortion strategy uc must take values in one region only or in several adjacent
regions. Second, given Lemma 2, in these adjacent regions a strategy uc must be either all
increasing (w(uc) ≥ 0) or all decreasing (w(uc) ≤ 0).
In case 1, region (1.iv) covers the Pareto-dominant equilibrium distortion strategy usep(φ) =
δsep. We rule out all distortion strategies that take values in region (1.vii) by Lemma 3. We
further rule out distortion strategies that take more than an isolated value in region (1.vi) by
Lemma 4. Also, no candidate equilibrium distortion strategy uc exists with values in region
(1.v) because uc must be concave (w(uc) > 0 and w
′(uc) < 0) in this region and therefore
cannot stay in the region for φ→ −∞. Finally, any candidate equilibrium distortion strategy
in regions (1.i) to (1.iii) is Pareto dominated by usep (see Lemma 5).
Case 2
(
2 b(1−α)−βγ + pu ≤ po ≤ 2 b(1−α)+βγ + pu
)
. We have δsep = 0. Based on the value of
δpref , we differentiate two subcases:
Case 2a
(
po > pu +
2β
γ
)
. We have δpref = G−1
(
γpu+β
γ(pu+po)
)
< 0 and distinguish five regions
of forecast distortions:
(2a.i) For u > 0, we have −1 < w(u) < 0 with lim
u→0+
w(u) = b(1−α)1
2
γ(po−pu)+β −1 and limu→∞w(u) =
b(1−α)
γpo+β
− 1.
(2a.ii) For u = δsep = 0, w(u) is not defined.
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(2a.iii) For δpref < u < 0, we have w(u) > 0 with lim
u→δpref+
w(u) = ∞ and lim
u→0−
w(u) =
b(1−α)
1
2
γ(po−pu)−β − 1.
(2a.iv) For u = δpref , w(u) is not defined.
(2a.v) For u < δpref , we have w(u) < −1 with lim
u→δpref−
w(u) = −∞ and lim
u→−∞w(u) =
− b(1−α)γpu+β − 1.
Region (2a.ii) covers the Pareto-dominant equilibrium distortion strategy usep(φ) = δsep = 0.
Similar to the line of arguments in case 1, we rule out all distortion strategies that take values
in region (2a.v) by Lemma 3. We further exclude distortion strategies that take more than
an isolated value in region (2a.iv) by Lemma 4. Also, there does not exist any candidate
equilibrium distortion strategy with values in region (2a.iii) because such a strategy must be
concave in this region and can hence not stay in the region for all φ. Finally, any candidate
equilibrium distortion strategy that takes values in region (2a.i) is Pareto dominated according
to Lemma 5.
Case 2b
(
po ≤ pu + 2βγ
)
. We have δpref = 0 and distinguish three regions of forecast distor-
tions:
(2b.i) For u > 0, we have −1 < w(u) < 0 with lim
u→0+
w(u) = b(1−α)1
2
γ(po−pu)+β −1 and limu→∞w(u) =
b(1−α)
γpo+β
− 1.
(2b.ii) For u = δsep = δpref = 0, w(u) is not defined.
(2b.iii) For u < 0, we have w(u) < −1 with lim
u→0−
w(u) = b(1−α)1
2
γ(po−pu)−β − 1 and limu→−∞w(u) =
− b(1−α)γpu+β − 1.
Region (2b.ii) covers the Pareto-dominant equilibrium distortion strategy usep(φ) = δsep =
δpref = 0. Distortion strategies with values in region (2b.iii) can be ruled out based on Lemma 3
and distortion strategies with values in region (2b.i) are Pareto dominated by usep (see Lemma
5).
Case 3
(
b(1−α)−β
γ < po < 2
b(1−α)−β
γ + pu
)
. We have δsep = G−1
(
b(1−α)+γpu−β
γ(pu+po)
)
> 0 and
differentiate three subcases based on the value of δpref :
Case 3a
(
po > pu +
2β
γ
)
. We have δpref = G−1
(
γpu+β
γ(pu+po)
)
< 0 and distinguish seven regions
of forecast distortions:
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(3a.i) For u > δsep, we have −1 < w(u) < 0 with lim
u→δsep+
w(u) = 0 and lim
u→∞w(u) =
b(1−α)
γpo+β
− 1.
(3a.ii) For u = δsep, we have w(u) = 0.
(3a.iii) For 0 < u < δsep, we have w(u) > 0 with lim
u→δsep−
w(u) = 0 and lim
u→0+
w(u) =
b(1−α)
1
2
γ(po−pu)+β − 1.
(3a.iv) For u = 0, w(u) is not defined.
(3a.v) For δpref < u < 0, we have w(u) > 0 with lim
u→δpref+
w(u) = ∞ and lim
u→0−
w(u) =
b(1−α)
1
2
γ(po−pu)−β − 1.
(3a.vi) For u = δpref , w(u) is not defined.
(3a.vii) For u < δpref we have w(u) < −1 with lim
u→−∞w(u) = −
b(1−α)
γpu+β
−1 and lim
u→δpref−
w(u) =
−∞.
Region (3a.ii) covers the Pareto-dominant equilibrium distortion strategy usep(φ) = δsep.
Distortion strategies that take values in region (3a.vii) are not possible due to Lemma 3. We
can also rule out distortion strategies that take more than an isolated value in regions (3a.iv)
or (3a.vi) by Lemma 4. Further, no candidate equilibrium distortion strategy uc exists with
values in regions (3a.iii), (3a.v) or in a combination of regions (3a.iii)-(3a.v) because uc must be
concave in these regions and therefore cannot cover the entire type space while staying within
these regions. Lastly, any candidate equilibrium distortion strategy with values in region (3a.i)
is Pareto dominated by usep according to Lemma 5.
Case 3b
(
pu − 2βγ ≤ po ≤ pu + 2βγ
)
. We have δpref = 0 and distinguish five regions of forecast
distortions:
(3b.i) For u > δsep, we have −1 < w(u) < 0 with lim
u→δsep+
w(u) = 0 and lim
u→∞w(u) =
b(1−α)
γpo+β
− 1.
(3b.ii) For u = δsep, we have w(u) = 0.
(3b.iii) For 0 < u < δsep, we have w(u) > 0 with lim
u→δsep−
w(u) = 0 and lim
u→0+
w(u) =
b(1−α)
1
2
γ(po−pu)+β − 1.
(3b.iv) For u = 0, w(u) is not defined.
(3b.v) For u < 0, we have w(u) < −1 with lim
u→0−
w(u) = b(1−α)1
2
γ(po−pu)−β − 1 and limu→−∞w(u) =
− b(1−α)γpu+β − 1.
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Region (3b.ii) covers the Pareto-dominant equilibrium distortion strategy usep(φ) = δsep.
Distortion strategies in region (3b.v) are not allowed due to Lemma 3. We can also exclude
distortion strategies that take more than an isolated value in region (3b.iv) by Lemma 4. Since
any candidate equilibrium distortion strategy with values in region (3b.iii) must be concave
in this region, there is no such strategy that stays within the region for all φ. Finally, any
candidate equilibrium distortion strategy that takes values in region (3b.i) is Pareto dominated
by usep (see Lemma 5).
Case 3c
(
po < pu − 2βγ
)
. We have δpref = G−1
(
γpu−β
γ(pu+po)
)
> 0 and distinguish seven regions
of forecast distortions:
(3c.i) For u > δsep, we have −1 < w(u) < 0 with lim
u→δsep+
w(u) = 0 and lim
u→∞w(u) =
b(1−α)
γpo+β
− 1.
(3c.ii) For u = δsep, we have w(u) = 0.
(3c.iii) For δpref < u < δsep, we have w(u) > 0 with lim
u→δsep−
w(u) = 0 and lim
u→δpref+
w(u) =
∞.
(3c.iv) For u = δpref , w(u) is not defined.
(3c.v) For 0 < u < δpref , we have w(u) > 0 with lim
u→δpref−
w(u) = −∞ and lim
u→0+
w(u) =
b(1−α)
1
2
γ(po−pu)+β − 1.
(3c.vi) For u = 0, w(u) is not defined.
(3c.vii) For u < 0, we have w(u) < −1 with lim
u→0−
w(u) = b(1−α)1
2
γ(po−pu)−β − 1 and limu→−∞w(u) =
− b(1−α)γpu+β − 1.
Region (3c.ii) covers the Pareto-dominant equilibrium distortion strategy usep(φ) = δsep.
Values in regions (3c.v)-(3c.vii) cannot be part of a candidate equilibrium distortion strategy
due to Lemma 3. Also, not more than an isolated point of region (3c.iv) can be part of a
candidate equilibrium distortion strategy (see Lemma 4). Any candidate equilibrium distortion
strategy with values in region (3c.iii) must be concave in this region and therefore cannot cover
the entire type space without leaving the region. Lastly, any candidate equilibrium distortion
strategy that takes values in region (3c.i) is Pareto dominated by usep (see Lemma 5).
Case 4
(
po ≤ b(1−α)−βγ
)
. δsep does not exist. We differentiate three subcases based on the
value of δpref :
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Case 4a
(
po > pu +
2β
γ
)
. We have δpref = G−1
(
γpu+β
γ(pu+po)
)
< 0 and distinguish five regions
of forecast distortions:
(4a.i) For u > 0, we have w(u) > 0 with lim
u→∞w(u) =
b(1−α)
γpo+β
− 1 and lim
u→0+
w(u) =
b(1−α)
1
2
γ(po−pu)+β − 1.
(4a.ii) For u = 0, w(u) is not defined.
(4a.iii) For δpref < u < 0, we have w(u) > 0 with lim
u→0−
w(u) = b(1−α)1
2
γ(po−pu)−β − 1 and
lim
u→δpref+
w(u) =∞.
(4a.iv) For u = δpref , w(u) is not defined.
(4a.v) For u < δpref , we have w(u) < −1 with lim
u→δpref−
w(u) = −∞ and lim
u→−∞w(u) =
− b(1−α)γpu+β − 1.
Distortion strategies with values in region (4a.v) are not allowed due to Lemma 3. Further,
a candidate equilibrium distortion strategy can at most take an isolated value in regions (4a.ii)
and (4a.iv) based on Lemma 4. Finally, any candidate equilibrium distortion strategy that
goes through regions (4a.i) and (4a.iii) must be concave and therefore cannot stay within
these regions while covering the entire type space. We conclude that no candidate equilibrium
distortion strategy exists in case 4a.
Case 4b
(
pu − 2βγ ≤ po ≤ pu + 2βγ
)
. We have δpref = 0 and distinguish three regions of
forecast distortions:
(4b.i) For u > 0, we have w(u) > 0 with lim
u→∞w(u) =
b(1−α)
γpo+β
− 1 and lim
u→0+
w(u) =
b(1−α)
1
2
γ(po−pu)+β − 1.
(4b.ii) For u = 0, w(u) is not defined.
(4b.iii) For u < 0, we have w(u) < −1 with lim
u→0−
w(u) = b(1−α)1
2
γ(po−pu)−β − 1 and limu→−∞w(u) =
− b(1−α)γpu+β − 1.
Distortion strategies in region (4b.iii) are excluded based on Lemma 3. In region (4b.ii), at
most an isolated value can be part of a candidate equilibrium distortion strategy (see Lemma
4). Any candidate equilibrium distortion strategy in region (4b.i) must be concave and cannot
therefore stay within the region for all φ. We conclude that there is no candidate equilibrium
distortion strategy in case 4b.
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Case 4c
(
po < pu − 2βγ
)
. We have δpref = G−1
(
γpu−β
γ(pu+po)
)
> 0 and distinguish five regions
of forecast distortions:
(4c.i) For u > δpref , we have w(u) > 0 with lim
u→∞w(u) =
b(1−α)
γpo+β
− 1 and lim
u→δpref+
w(u) =∞.
(4c.ii) For u = δpref , w(u) is not defined.
(4c.iii) For 0 < u < δpref , we have w(u) < −1 with lim
u→δpref−
w(u) = −∞ and lim
u→0+
w(u) =
b(1−α)
1
2
γ(po−pu)+β − 1.
(4c.iv) For u = 0, w(u) is not defined.
(4c.v) For u < 0, we have w(u) < −1 with lim
u→0−
w(u) = b(1−α)1
2
γ(po−pu)+β − 1 and limu→−∞w(u) =
− b(1−α)γpu−β − 1.
We rule out distortion strategies with values in regions (4c.iii)-(4c.v) based on Lemma 3.
Also, there cannot be a candidate equilibrium distortion strategy that takes more than an
isolated value in region (4c.ii) based on Lemma 4. Lastly, any candidate equilibrium distortion
strategy with values in region (4c.i) must be concave and therefore cannot cover the entire
type space without leaving the region. We conclude that there is no candidate equilibrium
distortion strategy in case 4c.
We can thus summarize that, given po >
b(1−α)−β
γ (see cases 1-3), s
sep is the Pareto-dominant
differentiable strategy for Sales in response to the ordering strategy qsep, which is played by
Operations in any separating equilibrium. We can further say that for po ≤ b(1−α)−βγ (see case
4), no candidate equilibrium signaling strategy and hence no differentiable separating equi-
librium exists. We conclude that whenever differentiable separating equilibria of the general
forecast error game exist, the equilibrium (ssep, qsep, µsep) Pareto dominates all other differen-
tiable separating equilibria. 
A.1.2. Proof of Proposition 1
Recall that the market uncertainty E is symmetrically distributed with mean zero (see Section
3.1.1). Suppose the distribution function of the market uncertainty G(·) is weakly concave
on R− and weakly convex on R+. This includes the normal distribution that we use in the
experiments.
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We use the partial derivatives of δsep with respect to the behavioral parameters γ and β to
express the sensitivity of δsep to changes in γ and β:
∂δsep
∂γ
=

− b(1−α)−β
γ2(pu+po)
(G−1)′
(
b(1−α)+γpu−β
γ(pu+po)
)
≤ 0 for po − pu < 2 b(1−α)−βγ ,
0 for 2 b(1−α)−βγ ≤ po − pu ≤ 2 b(1−α)+βγ ,
− b(1−α)+β
γ2(pu+po)
(G−1)′
(
b(1−α)+γpu+β
γ(pu+po)
)
≤ 0 for po − pu > 2 b(1−α)+βγ ,
(A.9)
and
∂δsep
∂β
=

− 1γ(pu+po)(G−1)′
(
b(1−α)+γpu−β
γ(pu+po)
)
≤ 0 for po − pu < 2 b(1−α)−βγ ,
0 for 2 b(1−α)−βγ ≤ po − pu ≤ 2 b(1−α)+βγ ,
+ 1γ(pu+po)(G
−1)′
(
b(1−α)+γpu+β
γ(pu+po)
)
≥ 0 for po − pu > 2 b(1−α)+βγ .
(A.10)
Let d = po − pu = p¯o − p¯u denote the difference in the unit forecast error penalties and
substitute po + pu = 2pu + d. Note that, ceteris paribus, for any d the conditions for the three
different cases of δsep are the same. Note further that ∂δ
sep
∂γ ≤ 0 in all cases and that ∂δ
sep
∂β ≤ 0
in the domain of overforecasting (first case) and ∂δ
sep
∂β ≥ 0 in the domain of underforecasting
(third case).
For ease of exposition of the following arguments, we drop the case conditions which are the
same as above. We take the cross-partial derivative of ∂δ
sep
∂γ with respect to pu
∂δsep
∂γ∂pu
=

2 b(1−α)−β
γ2(2pu+d)2
(G−1)′
(
b(1−α)+γpu−β
γ(pu+po)
)
+ (2(b(1−α)−β)−γd)(b(1−α)−β)
γ3(2pu+d)3
(G−1)′′
(
b(1−α)+γpu−β
γ(pu+po)
)
,
0,
2 b(1−α)+β
γ2(2pu+d)2
(G−1)′
(
b(1−α)+γpu+β
γ(pu+po)
)
+ (2(b(1−α)+β)−γd)(b(1−α)+β)
γ3(2pu+d)3
(G−1)′′
(
b(1−α)+γpu+β
γ(pu+po)
)
,
(A.11)
122
A. Appendix
to express how the sensitivity of δsep with respect to γ changes for a given d but different
values of pu. Making use of the case conditions (d < 2(b(1 − α) − β)/γ in the first case and
d > 2(b(1 − α) + β)/γ in the third case) and the properties of the distribution of the market
uncertainty ((G−1)′(x) ≥ 0 for all x, (G−1)′′(x) ≤ 0 for all x ∈ (0; 0.5) and (G−1)′′(x) ≥ 0
for all x ∈ (0.5; 1)), we can show that ∂δsep∂γ∂pu ≥ 0 for all three cases. Hence, given that δsep
decreases with increasing values of γ (∂δ
sep
∂γ ≤ 0), it decreases less strongly for bigger values of
pu and hence po.
Similarly, dropping the case conditions again, we take the cross-partial derivative of ∂δ
sep
∂β
with respect to pu
∂δsep
∂β∂pu
=

+ 2
γ(2pu+d)2
(G−1)′
(
b(1−α)+γpu−β
γ(pu+po)
)
+ 2(b(1−α)−β)−γd
γ2(2pu+d)3
(G−1)′′
(
b(1−α)+γpu−β
γ(pu+po)
)
,
0,
− 2
γ(2pu+d)2
(G−1)′
(
b(1−α)+γpu+β
γ(pu+po)
)
− 2(b(1−α)+β)−γd
γ2(2pu+d)3
(G−1)′′
(
b(1−α)+γpu+β
γ(pu+po)
)
,
(A.12)
to express how the sensitivity of δsep with respect to β changes for a given d but different
values of pu. Making use of the case conditions and the properties of G(·), we can show that
∂δsep
∂β∂pu
≥ 0 in the first case (overforecasting) and ∂δsep∂β∂pu ≤ 0 in the third case (underforecasting).
Hence, given that δsep decreases in β in the domain of overforecasting (∂δ
sep
∂β ≤ 0) and increases
in β in the domain of underforecasting (∂δ
sep
∂β ≥ 0), it does so less strongly for bigger values of
pu and hence po. 
A.1.3. Proof of Proposition 2
Given a trust-based belief µξ(φ | φˆ) = fξ(φ | φˆ), where fξ is the density function of ξφˆ+(1−ξ)Φ
and ξ ∈ (0; 1], it is straightforward to verify that the best response of Operations to a forecast φˆ
is qξ(φˆ) = ξφˆ+F
−1
Z (α), where FZ is the distribution function of Z = (1− ξ)Φ+E. To see this,
note that Operations faces a newsvendor problem with demand distribution ξφˆ+(1− ξ)Φ+E.
To derive the optimal response of Sales to an order strategy qξ, we differentiate US(qξ(φˆ), φˆ |
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φ) with respect to φˆ
∂US(qξ(φˆ), φˆ | φ)
∂φˆ
=bξ
(
1−G
(
ξφˆ+ F−1Z (α)− φ
))
− γ(po + pu)G(φˆ− φ) + γpu

−β for φˆ > φ,
+β for φˆ < φ,
(A.13)
and set ∂US
∂φˆ
= 0 to obtain the first-order condition
bξ
(
1−G
(
ξφˆξ + F
−1
Z (α)− φ
))
= γ(po + pu)G
(
φˆξ − φ
)
− γpu

+β for φˆξ > φ,
−β for φˆξ < φ,
(A.14)
where φˆξ is a forecast that solves the first-order condition.
We confirm concavity of US over R \ {φ} by means of the second derivative
∂2US(qξ(φˆ), φˆ | φ)
∂φˆ2
=− bξ2g
(
ξφˆ+ F−1Z (α)− φ
)
− γ(po + pu)g(φˆ− φ) < 0 for all φˆ 6= φ.
Given that US is concave on (−∞, φ) and on (φ,∞) and we have lim
φˆ→φ−
∂US
∂φˆ
≥ lim
φˆ→φ+
∂US
∂φˆ
for
all φ, there is at most one solution to Equation (A.14) for a given φ. If that solution exists, it
maximizes the utility of Sales.
We next derive the conditions under which a solution to Equation (A.14) exists. For po >
−β/γ, we have lim
φˆ→−∞
∂US
∂φˆ
> 0 and lim
φˆ→∞
∂US
∂φˆ
< 0. It follows that there is either a solution to
Equation (A.14) or we have lim
φˆ→φ−
∂US
∂φˆ
> 0 and lim
φˆ→φ+
∂US
∂φˆ
< 0, which implies that the truthful
forecast φˆξ = φ is the best response of Sales.
For po ≤ −β/γ, we have lim
φˆ→∞
∂US
∂φˆ
≥ 0, i.e., there exists no solution to Equation (A.14).
Because we have po ≥ 0, β ≥ 0 and γ ≥ 1 by definition, this case can only occur if we have
po = β = 0 and hence lim
φˆ→∞
∂US
∂φˆ
= 0. We conclude that there exists a unique equilibrium
response φˆξ for all Sales types φ if at least po > 0 or β > 0.
For ease of interpretation, we rewrite the case conditions of Equation (A.14) in terms of the
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incentive parameters po and pu by replacing φˆξ > φ with the requirement
lim
φˆ→φ+
∂US
∂φˆ
> 0 ⇔ po − pu < 2
γ
[
bξ
(
1−G ((ξ − 1)φ+ F−1Z (α)))− β] , (A.15)
and by replacing φˆξ < φ with the requirement
lim
φˆ→φ−
∂US
∂φˆ
< 0 ⇔ po − pu > 2
γ
[
bξ
(
1−G ((ξ − 1)φ+ F−1Z (α)))+ β] . (A.16)

A.1.4. Proof of Proposition 3
In analogy to the proof of Theorem 1 (Appendix A.1.1), it is straightforward to verify that the
best response of Operations given a na¨ıvete´-based belief
µθ(φ | φˆ) =

1 for φ = θφˆ+ (1− θ)s−1(φˆ),
0 otherwise,
is qθ(φˆ) = θφˆ+ (1− θ)s−1(φˆ) +G−1(α).
To derive the optimal response s(φ) of Sales to an order strategy qθ, suppose a Sales type φ
sent a signal s(φ¯) corresponding to some type φ¯. We first differentiate US(qθ(s(φ¯)), s(φ¯) | φ)
with respect to φ¯ :
∂US(qθ(s(φ¯)), s(φ¯) | φ)
∂φ¯
=b
(
1−G (θs(φ¯) + (1− θ)φ¯+G−1(α)− φ)) (θs′(φ¯) + (1− θ))
− γ ((po + pu)G(s(φ¯)− φ)− pu) s′(φ¯)

−βs′(φ¯) for s(φ¯) > φ,
+βs′(φ¯) for s(φ¯) < φ.
(A.17)
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Assuming a linear signaling strategy sθ(φ¯) = φ¯+ δθ, Equation (A.17) simplifies to
∂US(qθ(sθ(φ¯)), sθ(φ¯) | φ)
∂φ¯
=b
(
1−G (θδθ + φ¯+G−1(α)− φ))
− γ(po + pu)G(φ¯+ δθ − φ) + γpu

−β for φ¯+ δθ > φ,
+β for φ¯+ δθ < φ.
(A.18)
A sophisticated belief is based on the assumption that Operations can infer the true market
condition φ from the signal φˆ. We hence require Sales to signal the true type and we thus
evaluate Equation (A.18) at φ¯ = φ
∂US(qθ(sθ(φ¯)), sθ(φ¯) | φ)
∂φ¯
∣∣∣∣
φ¯=φ
=b
(
1−G (θδθ +G−1(α)))
− γ(po + pu)G(δθ) + γpu

−β for δθ > 0,
+β for δθ < 0.
(A.19)
We set Equation (A.19) equal to zero to derive the first-order condition for the best response
of Sales
b
[
1−G (θδθ +G−1 (α))] = γ [(po + pu)G (δθ)− pu]

+β for δθ > 0,
−β for δθ < 0.
(A.20)
We check concavity of US by means of the second derivative
∂2US(qθ(sθ(φ¯)), sθ(φ¯) | φ)
∂φ¯2
=− bg (θδθ + φ¯+G−1(α)− φ)
− γ(po + pu)g(φ¯+ δθ − φ) ≤ 0 for φ¯+ δθ 6= φ.
(A.21)
Since we have β ≥ 0 by assumption, it is straightforward to verify that concavity of US extends
to φ¯+ δθ = φ. Hence, if a solution to the first-order condition of Equation (A.20) exists, it is
unique and it maximizes the utility of Sales.
We next derive the conditions under which a solution to Equation (A.20) exists. Note that
we can treat Equation (A.19) as a sectionwise continuous function of δθ. For po > −β/γ, we
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have
lim
δθ→−∞
∂US
∂φ¯
∣∣∣∣
φ¯=φ
> 0 and lim
δθ→∞
∂US
∂φ¯
∣∣∣∣
φ¯=φ
< 0.
It follows that there is either a solution to Equation (A.20) or we have
lim
δθ→0−
∂US
∂φ¯
∣∣∣∣
φ¯=φ
> 0 and lim
δθ→0+
∂US
∂φ¯
∣∣∣∣
φ¯=φ
< 0,
and hence δθ = 0 is the best response of Sales. For po ≤ −β/γ, we have
lim
δθ→∞
∂US
∂φ¯
∣∣∣∣
φ¯=φ
≥ 0,
i.e., there exists no solution to Equation (A.20). Because we have po ≥ 0, β ≥ 0 and γ ≥ 1 by
definition, this case can only occur if we have po = β = 0 and hence
lim
δθ→∞
∂US
∂φ¯
∣∣∣∣
φ¯=φ
= 0.
We conclude that there exists a unique equilibrium distortion value δθ for all Sales types φ if
at least po > 0 or β > 0.
For ease of interpretation, we rewrite the case conditions of Equation (A.20) in terms of the
incentive parameters po and pu by replacing δθ > 0 with the requirement
lim
δθ→0+
∂US
∂φ¯
∣∣∣∣
φ¯=φ
> 0 ⇔ po − pu < 2
γ
(b (1− α)− β) , (A.22)
and by replacing δθ < 0 with the requirement
lim
δθ→0−
∂US
∂φ¯
∣∣∣∣
φ¯=φ
< 0 ⇔ po − pu > 2
γ
(b (1− α) + β) . (A.23)

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A.1.5. Proof of Proposition 4
In analogy to the proof of Theorem 1, it is straightforward to verify that µsepR satisfies Bayesian
consistency of beliefs and that qsepR is a sequentially rational response of Operations given µ
sep
R .
It remains to show that ssepR is a sequentially rational response of Sales given q
sep
R .
We first resolve the expected values and rewrite URS as
URS (q, φˆ | φ) = CS + b
(
q −
∫ q−φ
−∞
G(x)dx
)
− γpo
∫ φˆ−φ
−∞
G(x)dx
− γpu
(∫ φˆ−φ
−∞
G(x)dx+ EE(E)− (φˆ− φ)
)

+τpu
(
φˆ− φ− ∫ φˆ−φ0 G(x)dx)− λτpo ∫ φˆ−φ0 G(x)dx− β (φˆ− φ) for φˆ > φ,
−λτpu
(
φ− φˆ− ∫ 0φˆ−φG(x)dx)+ τpo ∫ 0φˆ−φG(x)dx+ β (φˆ− φ) for φˆ < φ.
(A.24)
To derive the optimal response s(φ) of Sales to an order strategy qsepR , suppose a Sales type φ
sent a signal s(φ¯) corresponding to some type φ¯. We first differentiate URS (q
sep
R (s(φ¯)), s(φ¯) | φ)
with respect to φ¯:
∂URS (q
sep
R (s(φ¯)), s(φ¯) | φ)
∂φ¯
= b
(
1−G (φ¯+G−1(α)− φ))− γ ((po + pu)G (s(φ¯)− φ)− pu) s′(φ¯)
+τpu
(
1−G (s(φ¯)− φ)) s′(φ¯)− λτpoG (s(φ¯)− φ) s′(φ¯)
−βs′(φ¯) for s(φ¯) > φ,
+λτpu
(
1−G (s(φ¯)− φ)) s′(φ¯)− τpoG (s(φ¯)− φ) s′(φ¯)
+βs′(φ¯) for s(φ¯) < φ.
(A.25)
In a separating equilibrium, we require Sales to send a signal that corresponds to the true type
φ. We hence evaluate Equation (A.25) at φ¯ = φ and set it equal to zero to derive the first-order
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condition as a differential equation:
s′(φ) =

b(1−α)
((1+τ)pu+(1+λτ)po)G(s(φ)−φ)−(1+τ)pu+β for s(φ) > φ,
b(1−α)
((1+λτ)pu+(1+τ)po)G(s(φ)−φ)−(1+λτ)pu−β for s(φ) < φ.
(A.26)
Setting s = ssepR , with (s
sep
R )
′(φ) = 1, Equation (A.26) holds for b(1−α)−β1+λτ < po < 2
b(1−α)−β
1+λτ +
1+τ
1+λτ pu and for po > 2
b(1−α)+β
1+τ +
1+λτ
1+τ pu. For 2
b(1−α)−β
1+λτ +
1+τ
1+λτ pu ≤ po ≤ 2 b(1−α)+β1+τ + 1+λτ1+τ pu,
we have ssepR (φ) = φ and Equation (A.26) is not defined, but we can verify for this case that
the right hand side of Equation (A.25) evaluated at φ¯ = φ is > 0 for s(φ) < φ and < 0 for
s(φ) > φ. Hence, the strategy ssepR fulfills the first-order condition.
For ssepR , the second derivative of Equation (A.24) is
∂2URS (q
sep
R (s
sep
R (φ¯)), s
sep
R (φ¯) | φ)
∂φ¯2
=− bg (φ¯+G−1(α)− φ)− γ(po + pu)g (φ¯+ δsepR − φ)
−(τpu + λτpo)g
(
φ¯+ δsepR − φ
)
for φ¯+ δsepR > φ,
−(λτpu + τpo)g
(
φ¯+ δsepR − φ
)
for φ¯+ δsepR < φ,
(A.27)
which is < 0 for all φ¯ + δsepR 6= φ. That is, URS is strictly concave in φ¯ for signals ssepR (φ¯)
to the left and to the right of φ. Since we have β ≥ 0 by assumption, concavity extends to
ssepR (φ¯) = φ. We can conclude that s
sep
R is a sequentially rational strategy for Sales and that
(ssepR , q
sep
R , µ
sep
R ) is a separating equilibrium of the game with reference-dependent forecast error
valuations.

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A.1.6. Proof of Proposition 5
To derive the optimal response of Sales to an order strategy qc(φˆ) = φˆ − c, we differentiate
US(qc(φˆ), φˆ | φ) with respect to φˆ
∂US(qc(φˆ), φˆ | φ)
∂φˆ
=b
(
1−G
(
φˆ− φ− c
))
− γ(po + pu)G(φˆ− φ) + γpu

−β for φˆ > φ,
+β for φˆ < φ,
(A.28)
and set ∂US
∂φˆ
= 0 to obtain the first-order condition
b
(
1−G
(
φˆc − φ− c
))
= γ(po + pu)G
(
φˆc − φ
)
− γpu

+β for φˆc > φ,
−β for φˆc < φ,
(A.29)
where φˆc is a forecast that solves the first-order condition.
To verify the existence and uniqueness of solutions to Equation (A.29), we first confirm
concavity of US over R \ {φ} by means of the second derivative
∂2US(qc(φˆ), φˆ | φ)
∂φˆ2
=− bg
(
φˆ− φ− c
)
− γ(po + pu)g(φˆ− φ) < 0 for all φˆ 6= φ. (A.30)
Given that US is concave on (−∞, φ) and on (φ,∞) and we have lim
φˆ→φ−
∂US
∂φˆ
≥ lim
φˆ→φ+
∂US
∂φˆ
for
all φ, there is at most one solution to Equation (A.29) for a given φ. If that solution exists, it
maximizes the utility of Sales.
We next derive the conditions under which a solution to Equation (A.29) exists. For po >
−β/γ, we have lim
φˆ→−∞
∂US
∂φˆ
> 0 and lim
φˆ→∞
∂US
∂φˆ
< 0. It follows that there is either a solution to
Equation (A.29) or we have lim
φˆ→φ−
∂US
∂φˆ
> 0 and lim
φˆ→φ+
∂US
∂φˆ
< 0, and hence φˆc = φ is the optimal
forecast.
For po ≤ −β/γ, we have lim
φˆ→∞
∂US
∂φˆ
≥ 0, i.e., there exists no solution to Equation (A.29).
Because we have po ≥ 0, β ≥ 0 and γ ≥ 1 by definition, this case can only occur if we have
po = β = 0 and hence lim
φˆ→∞
∂US
∂φˆ
= 0. We conclude that there exists a unique equilibrium
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response φˆc for all Sales types φ if at least po > 0 or β > 0.
For ease of interpretation, we rewrite the case conditions of Equation (A.29) in terms of the
incentive parameters po and pu by replacing φˆc > φ with the requirement
lim
φˆ→φ+
∂US
∂φˆ
> 0 ⇔ po − pu < 2
γ
[b(1−G(−c))− β] , (A.31)
and by replacing φˆc < φ with the requirement
lim
φˆ→φ−
∂US
∂φˆ
< 0 ⇔ po − pu > 2
γ
[b(1−G(−c)) + β] . (A.32)

A.2. Phase Line Diagrams and Vector Fields
The following figures serve to visualize additional candidate equilibrium distortion strategies
discussed in the proof of Theorem 1. The phase line diagrams describe the slope of u based on
the properties of w(u) (rightward pointing arrows: u is increasing, leftward pointing arrows: u is
decreasing, filled dots: the slope of u is 0, empty dots: the slope of u is not defined). Expressions
on top of the phase line denote the limits of w(u) towards infinity and from both sides at points
where w(u) changes sign and/or is not defined. The vector fields illustrate the behavior of u
depending on φ. They are based on an error distribution of E ∼ N (0, 30) and a critical ratio
of α = 0.5. For each phase there are graphs of example initial conditions (IC) including an
initial condition u(0) = δsep that corresponds to the Pareto-dominant differentiable separating
equilibrium. Where applicable, dotted lines represent u(φ) = δpref .
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Figure A.1.: Vector field plots of candidate equilibrium distortion strategies
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Figure A.1.: Vector field plots of candidate equilibrium distortion strategies (continued)
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Figure A.1.: Vector field plots of candidate equilibrium distortion strategies (continued)
A.3. Details of the Main Experiment
The experiment was conducted in German. The corresponding instructions and questionnaires
are available upon request from the author.
A.3.1. Instructions
At the beginning of the experiment, subject received the following instructions (exemplary for
the second session (Treatments 5–8) of the main experiment), which were first read aloud by
the instructor and then silently by each subject.
Overall situation.
In this experiment, you are working for a company that produces and sells a single product.
Half of you will assume the role of a salesperson, the other half of you will assume the role of
a production planner within this company.
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• It is the task of a salesperson to generate a sales forecast for the product and to commu-
nicate this forecast to the production planner. The salesperson possesses information on
demand for the product, that the production planner does not have.
• It is the task of a production planner to decide how much the company will produce
based on the sales forecast.
For the entire duration of the experiment, you will assume the role either of a salesperson or
of a production planner. You will be informed at the beginning of the experiment which role
you have been assigned to.
Demand information.
The real demand for the product of the company is unknown at the beginning of a period. It
depends on the overall market condition and additional random factors.
• The market condition is the expected value of demand and can take on a different value
in each period. The market condition follows a normal distribution with a mean of 100
units and a standard deviation of 30 units. The realization of the market condition is
known only to the salesperson.
• Random factors can cause the realization of demand to deviate from the market con-
dition. The random factors follow a normal distribution with a mean of 0 units and a
standard deviation of 30 units. The realization of random factors is known neither to the
salesperson nor to the production planner.
A characteristic of normally distributed random variables is that on average 68 % of all
realizations (i.e., of effectively drawn random numbers) are within an interval of plus/minus
one standard deviation of the mean. On average 95 % of all realizations are within an interval of
plus/minus two standard deviations of the mean. Figure A.2 shows an example with a market
condition of 120 units. Then real demand will be within the interval of 90 (= 120− 1 · 30) to
150 (= 120 + 1 · 30) with 68 % probability and within the interval of 60 (= 120− 2 · 30) to 180
(= 120 + 2 · 30) with 95 % probability.
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… NORMALLY DISTRIBUTED ERRORS
68% of demand realizations
between 90 and 150
95% of demand realizations between 60 und 180
Market condition
120
Probability 
density (%)
0.5
1.0
1.5
0
0 50 100 150 200 250
Demand
(units)
Figure A.2.: Example of demand distribution
At the end of each period (after the salesperson has communicated a forecast and the produc-
tion planner has chosen a production quantity) real demand occurs. The production quantity
chosen by the production planner determines how many units of the product can be sold.
There are three possibilities:
• Production quantity > demand: If production exceeds demand, all demand can be filled.
The remaining units (overage quantity) cannot be stored and therefore cannot be used
in subsequent periods.
• Production quantity < demand: If production is less than demand, only part of the
demand can be filled. The difference between demand and production quantity (overage
quantity) cannot be filled in subsequent periods.
• Production quantity = demand: If production equals demand, all demand can be filled
and there are neither overage nor underage quantities.
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Information on your compensation.
In each period you have the opportunity to earn bonuses valued at virtual currency units (ECU
= experimental currency unit). Over the course of the experiment you will play four different
scenarios in random order (A, B, C, D).
Compensation of the production planner: The calculation of the production planner’s bonus
is the same across all four scenarios. The bonus of a period is composed of a fixed component,
an overage component and an underage component.
• Fixed component: In each period, the production planner receives a fixed amount of 2,000
ECUs.
• Overage component: For each unit of overage quantity, 10 ECUs are deducted from the
overall bonus. For example, for an overage quantity of 50 units, the overage component
would be 50 · (−10) ECUs = −500 ECUs.
• Underage component: For each unit of underage quantity, 10 ECUs are deducted from
the overall bonus. For example, for an underage quantity of 50 units, the underage
component would be 50 · (−10) ECUs = −500 ECUs.
The magnitude of overage and underage quantities depends on the production quantity
decision of the production planner and on the demand realization. The production planner
does not know the demand but must estimate it based on the forecast of the salesperson. Table
A.1 shows two examples of how to calculate the bonus of the production planner in case of an
overage quantity (Example 1) and an underage quantity (Example 2).
Compensation of the salesperson: The calculation of the salesperson’s bonus varies by sce-
nario; the structural composition, however, is the same. The bonus of a period is composed
of a fixed component, a forecast component and a sales component. In the following, the cal-
culation will be explained with placeholders X and Y, which need to be replaced with values
depending on the scenario.
• Fixed component: In each period, the salesperson receives a fixed amount of 1,000 ECUs.
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4
Profit Produktionsmanager
Production quantity
> demand
 Forecast (of salesperson)
 Production quantity (of production planner)
 Demand realization
110
130
100
110
130
140
 Number of units sold
(minimum of production quantity and demand)
 Overage quantity
 Underage quantity
100
30
--
130
--
10
 Fixed component
 Overage component
(minus 10 ECUs for each unit of overage quantity)
 Underage component
(minus 10 ECUs for each unit of underage quantity) 
 Overall bonus (Fixed component
- overage component - underage component)
2,000
-300
--
1,700
2,000
--
-100
1,900
Production quantity
< demand
Example 1 Example 2
Table A.1.: Example bonus calculation of the production planner
• Forecast component: For each unit that the forecast deviates from the demand, some
ECUs will be deducted from the salesperson’s bonus. It will be distinguished between
an overestimation of demand (the forecast is greater than the demand) and an underes-
timation of demand (the forecast is smaller than the demand):
– Overestimation of demand: For each unit that the forecast is greater than the real
demand, X ECUs will be deducted from the salesperson’s bonus. For example, for
an overestimation of 50 units, the forecast component would be 50 · (−X) ECUs.
– Underestimation of demand: For each unit that the forecast is smaller than the real
demand, Y ECUs will be deducted from the salesperson’s bonus. For example, for
an underestimation of 50 units, the forecast component would be 50 · (−Y ) ECUs.
The magnitude of the forecast component depends on the forecast decision of the sales-
person and on the demand realization.
• Sales component: The salesperson receives 10 ECUs for each unit of the product sold.
For example, for a sold volume of 50 units, the sales component would be 50 ·10 ECUs =
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500 ECUs. The number of units sold depends on the production quantity decision of the
production planner and the on the demand realization.
The placeholders X and Y of the forecast component must be replaced by scenario as shown
in Table A.2.
PROGNOSEBONUS
 Scenario A
 Scenario B
 Scenario C
 Scenario D
-6
-8
-10
-12
-4
-2
--
-2
Overestimation of
demand
(placeholder X)
Underestimation of
demand
(placeholder Y)
Table A.2.: Values of placeholders by scenario of the experiment
Both players (salesperson and production planner) will be informed, over the course of the
experiment, which scenario is to be played. Table A.3 shows two examples of how to calculate
the bonus of the salesperson in scenario A in case of an overestimation of demand (Example
1) and an underestimation of demand (Example 2).
In total you will play 32 periods (plus 4 test periods). At the end of the experiment,
the computer will randomly choose 8 of these 32 periods. The sum of ECUs that you have
earned in these 8 periods determines your overall payout. Additionally, you will have two more
possibilities to increase your payout:
• You can earn an additional amount of 3,000 ECUs by correctly answering the questions
of the pre-experiment-questionnaire. You will receive 1,000 ECUs for each block of 3
questions that you answer correctly at your first try.
• At the end of the experiment, you can increase your payout by performing two additional
tasks.
When finished, you will receive your payout based on the sum of ECUs you earned. You will
receive EUR 1 for every 1,000 ECUs.
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5
Profit Sales Manager
 Forecast (of salesperson)
 Production quantity (of production planner)
 Demand realization
110
130
100
110
130
140
 Overestimation of demand
 Underestimation of demand
 Number of units sold
(minimum of production quantity and demand)
10
--
100
--
30
130
 Fixed component
 Forecast component: Overestimation of demand
(Minus 6 ECUs for each unit of overestimation)
 Forecast component: Underestimation of demand
(Minus 4 ECUs for each unit of underestimation)
 Sales component
(Plus 10 ECUs for each unit sold)
 Overall bonus (Fixed component
- forecast component + sales component)
1,000
-60
--
1,000
1,940
1,000
--
-120
1,300
2,180
Forecast
> demand
Forecast
< demand
Example 1 Example 2
Table A.3.: Example bonus calculation of the salesperson in scenario A
Sequence of events.
At the beginning of each period, one salesperson and one production planner will be randomly
matched. You will interact with a different participant of this experiment in each period and
you will never get to know who you are playing with. The general sequence of actions in each
period is the following (see Figure A.3):
1. Generation of market condition: At the beginning of each period the computer generates
a random market condition (i.e., the expected value of demand for that period).
2. Display of market condition: The salesperson receives information about the market con-
dition. This information will be displayed only on the salesperson’s screen; the production
planner will not see this information.
3. Communication of forecast: The salesperson sends a forecast to the production planner.
The production planner sees the forecast on his screen.
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4. Decision of production quantity: The production planner decides how much the company
will produce. This decision can be, but does not have to be based on the forecast.
5. Generation of demand: The computer generates the real demand. Based on the demand
and the production quantity the computer calculates how many units of the product can
be sold.
6. Calculation of bonuses: Based on the forecast, the demand, the number of units sold, the
overage and the underage quantity, the computer calculates the bonuses of both players.
3
FLOW OF THE GAME – EACH PERIOD CONSISTS OF THE SAME STEPS
Salesperson Productionplanner
Computer
 Communication
of forecast
3
 Generation of
market condition
1
 Display of
market condition
2  Decision of
production quantity
4
 Generation of
demand
5
 Calculation
of bonuses
6
Figure A.3.: Sequence of actions in each period
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A.3.2. Pre-Experiment Quiz
By way of example, the following set of questions relates to the second session (Treatments
5–8) of the main experiment. Correct answers are marked in the checkboxes.
1. Are you going to play all rounds of the experiment with the same partner?
 Yes, all rounds with the same partner
 No, each round with a different partner
 No, 10 rounds each with the same partner
2. What is the relationship between the forecast and the market condition?
 The forecast has to be equal to the market condition
 The forecast has to be higher than the market condition
 The salesperson can choose the forecast freely
3. What is the relationship between the forecast and the production quantity?
 The production quantity has to be equal to the forecast
 The production quantity has to be lower than the forecast
 The production planner can choose the production quantity freely
4. Who knows the market condition (=the expected value of demand) with certainty?
 The salesperson
 The production planner
 Both
5. Imagine the market condition is 85 units. In which interval will the real demand be with
95 % probability?
 Between 55 and 115 units
 Between 25 and 145 units
 Between 60 and 180 units
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6. Evaluate the statement “The more the production planner produces, the higher the ex-
pected sales bonus of the salesperson.”
 True
 False
 Neither true nor false
7. Imagine the production planner produced 70 units. The demand is 90 units. What is
the profit of the production planner?
 1,800 ECUs
 2,000 ECUs
 1,600 ECUs
8. Imagine the salesperson chose a forecast of 120 units. The production planner produced
130 units. The demand is 90 units. What is the profit of the salesperson in scenario A?
 1,780 ECUs
 2,120 ECUs
 1,720 ECUs
9. Imagine the salesperson chose a forecast of 60 units. The production planner produced
60 units. The demand is 90 units. What is the profit of the salesperson in scenario A?
 1,480 ECUs
 1,420 ECUs
 1,780 ECUs
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A.3.3. Screenshots
Format A2  Skalierung 50%
Scenario 
information
Production
quantity
decision
History of
the game
Forecast 
information
Optional 
decision
support
Scenario 
information
Forecast 
decision
History of
the game
Market 
condition
information
Optional 
decision
support
Period
Period
Figure A.4.: Example decision screen of SalesFormat A2  Skalierung 50%
Scenario 
information
Production
quantity
decision
History of
the game
Forecast 
information
Optional 
decision
support
Scenario 
information
Forecast 
decision
History of
the game
Market 
condition
information
Optional 
decision
support
Period
Period
Figure A.5.: Example decision screen of Operations
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Format A2  Skalierung 50%
History of the
game
Period
Decisions and
actual demand
Profit
History of the
game
Period
Results
• Quantity sold
• Overage and
underage
quantities
• Forecast error
Decisions and
actual demand
Profit
Results
• Quantity sold
• Overage and
underage
quantities
• Forecast error
Operations
Sales
Figure A.6.: Example results screen of SalesFormat A2  Skalierung 50%
History of the
game
Period
Decisions and
actual demand
Profit
History of the
game
Period
Results
• Quantity sold
• Overage and
underage
quantities
• Forecast error
Decisions and
actual demand
Profit
Results
• Quantity sold
• Overage and
underage
quantities
• Forecast error
Operations
Sales Figure A.7.: Example results screen of Operations
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A.3.4. Elicitation of Risk Attitudes
After the regular duration of the experiment, subjects were asked to make ten lottery decisions.
The following instructions (translated from German) were displayed on screen (see Figure A.8):
You now have the possibility to increase your payout for the experiment. Your profit in this
part of the experiment depends on your own decisions only. It will be added to your profit
from the forecast sharing task and will be paid out at the end of the experiment.
In the following, you have to make ten decisions. Each decision is a choice between “Option
A” and “Option B”. In the end, only one of the ten decisions will be used to calculate your
additional profit. Before you proceed, please read the following instructions.
After having made your ten decisions, the computer will generate two random numbers. The
first number determines, which one of the ten decisions is chosen for the profit calculation. The
second number determines the profit for the option (A or B) that you chose in this particular
decision task. Even though you will make ten decisions, only one will affect your profit. Every
decision has the same probability to be chosen in the end and you do not know yet which one
it will be.
Pleas take a look at the first decision task. In Option A, you will receive a profit of 1,000
ECUs with a probability of 10 % and a profit of 800 ECUs with a probability of 90 %. In
Option B, you will receive a profit of 1,925 ECUs with a probability of 10 % and a profit of 50
ECUs with a probability of 90 %. The remaining decisions are similar, however, the chances
of winning the higher payout are increasing. In decision number 10, the probability for the
higher payout is even 100 %, i.e., you are choosing between a sure payout of 1,000 ECUs and
a sure payout of 1,925 ECUs.
To summarize, you are making ten decisions of choosing between two Options A and B. You
can choose Option A in some decisions and Option B in others. You can make your decisions
in any order and you can change them as often as you like.
A.3.5. Post-Experiment Questionnaire
At the end of the experiment, subjects answered a questionnaire that tested their overall
understanding of the game and gave them the possibility to explain their decisions. Answering
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Format A2  Skalierung 50%
Scenario 
information
Production
quantity
decision
Forecast 
information
Optional 
decision
support
Period
Lottery
decisions
Task
instructions
Figure A.8.: Screenshot of lottery decisions
the questionnaire was voluntary and the responses did not affect the payout. The questions
differed according to the role the subject played throughout the experiment.
Questionnaire for Sales.
1. In each of the scenarios, did you report the true market condition to Operations?
• Scenario A:
 My forecast was usually higher than the market condition
 My forecast usually corresponded to the market condition
 My forecast was usually lower than the market condition
• Scenario B:
 My forecast was usually higher than the market condition
 My forecast usually corresponded to the market condition
 My forecast was usually lower than the market condition
• Scenario C:
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 My forecast was usually higher than the market condition
 My forecast usually corresponded to the market condition
 My forecast was usually lower than the market condition
• Scenario D:
 My forecast was usually higher than the market condition
 My forecast usually corresponded to the market condition
 My forecast was usually lower than the market condition
2. Please describe, in which situations you reported a forecast that was higher than the true
market condition?
3. Please describe, in which situations you reported a forecast that was lower than the true
market condition?
4. Which scenario was best for you personally?
 Scenario A
 Scenario B
 Scenario C
 Scenario D
5. Which scenario was best for the entire company?
 Scenario A
 Scenario B
 Scenario C
 Scenario D
Questionnaire for Operations.
1. Imagine, you knew the true market condition. Which order quantity would you choose
if...
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• ...the market condition was 75?
• ...the market condition was 100?
• ...the market condition was 125?
2. In each of the scenarios, do you think the salesperson reported the true market condition?
• Scenario A:
 The forecast was usually higher than the market condition
 The forecast usually corresponded to the market condition
 The forecast was usually lower than the market condition
• Scenario B:
 The forecast was usually higher than the market condition
 The forecast usually corresponded to the market condition
 The forecast was usually lower than the market condition
• Scenario C:
 The forecast was usually higher than the market condition
 The forecast usually corresponded to the market condition
 The forecast was usually lower than the market condition
• Scenario D:
 The forecast was usually higher than the market condition
 The forecast usually corresponded to the market condition
 The forecast was usually lower than the market condition
3. Please describe, in which situations you chose an order quantity that was higher than
the forecast?
4. Please describe, in which situations you chose an order quantity that was lower than the
forecast?
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5. Which scenario was best for you personally?
 Scenario A
 Scenario B
 Scenario C
 Scenario D
6. Which scenario was best for the entire company?
 Scenario A
 Scenario B
 Scenario C
 Scenario D
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A.3.6. Subject Pool Characteristics
Before collecting their payouts, we asked subjects to answer some statistical questions. Table
A.4 summarizes the results.
Number of subjects
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Demographics
 Age (years)
 Gender
 Female
 Male
Study background
 Semester of studies
 Level of studies
 Bachelor
 Master
 Course of studies
 Business Administration
 Economics
 Information Systems
 Other
 Attended basic OM course
 Yes
 No
Sales
25.9 (3.1)
43.8%
56.2%
7.2 (4.1)
46.9%
53.1%
59.4%
28.1%
9.4%
3.1%
68.8%
31.2%
32
Operations
24.2 (3.6)
43.8%
56.2%
6.2 (4.9)
62.5%
37.5%
65.6%
25.0%
6.3%
3.1%
68.8%
31.2%
32
Total
25.0 (3.4)
43.8%
56.2%
6.7 (4.5)
54.7%
45.3%
62.5%
26.6%
7.8%
3.1%
68.8%
31.2%
64
Table A.4.: Subject pool characteristics of the main experiment
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